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Residential racial segregation has been perennially viewed as a major urban 
problem in the United States.  Meanwhile, the single-family mortgage market has been an 
influential factor in determining segregation since at least the 1930s. Although many 
prior studies rightly have focused on the very real individual and social costs of subprime 
loans and related loan features, the greater leverage they afford also may have allowed 
some, especially minority, homebuyers to purchase properties they otherwise would not 
have been able to afford.  Limited loan-to-value and payment-to-income ratio 
requirements have constrained borrowers from prime, conventional lenders, and relaxing 
these standards might allow some borrowers to purchase more expensive homes, possibly 
in higher quality neighborhoods. 
Additionally, if minority borrowers disproportionately obtained high-leverage 
loans, the effect of these loans on neighborhood choice may be greater for minorities than 
non-Hispanic whites.  Since higher-quality neighborhoods are disproportionately non-
Hispanic white or racially diverse, the increase in high-leverage mortgages might 
mitigate the neighborhood quality gap between minorities and non-Hispanic whites and 
reduce levels of racial/ethnic segregation. Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on two 
research questions: 1) whether high-leverage home purchase loans enabled borrowers to 
purchase more expensive homes and homes in higher-quality neighborhoods; and 2) 
whether these loans affected the racial/ethnic segregation of homebuyers at the 
metropolitan level.  Since blacks and Hispanics comprise significant minorities in many 
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metropolitan areas in the 2000s, I examine the questions for three racial/ethnic 
groups:  non-Hispanics whites, blacks, and Hispanics. 
 To answer the first question, household housing demand and neighborhood 
quality models are estimated using the American Housing Survey data.  To answer the 
second question, metropolitan area segregation models are estimated primarily using the 
American Community Survey and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.  Both cross-
sectional and fixed-effect panel segregation models are estimated using a two-stage least 
squares approach with chosen instruments. 
I find that the use of high-leverage loans increases housing demand and 
neighborhood quality, holding other household characteristics constant.  I also find that 
high-leverage loans have a substantial, negative effect on black segregation, while the 
effect on Hispanic segregation is somewhat ambiguous.  The findings suggest that 
policymakers should consider the impact of regulations affecting allowable loan-to-value 
and payment-to-income ratios on borrowers’ residential choice and urban form, as well as 









The policy debate surrounding the subprime mortgage crisis generally has 
centered on the costs and risks of subprime mortgage lending to households and 
neighborhoods.  Many prior studies rightly have focused on the very real individual and 
social costs of subprime loans and related loan features, including their effects on default 
and foreclosure rates, the resulting foreclosures effects on neighborhoods, and the 
steering of prime borrowers to subprime loans (Ernst, Bocian, & Li, 2008; Goodman & 
Smith, 2010; Immergluck & Smith, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Pennington-Cross & Ho, 2006; 
Quercia, Stegman, & Davis, 2007; Renuart, 2004; Rose, 2008).  However, 
notwithstanding the considerable harm that subprime loans may impose, the greater 
leverage (higher loan-to-value and payment-to-income ratios) they afford also may have 
allowed some homebuyers to purchase properties they otherwise would not have been 
able to afford, including homes in neighborhoods with more economic opportunity, such 
as those with better public services and transit, lower poverty rates, and better schools.  
When we consider minorities’ much greater reliance on subprime loans and the 
correlation between better neighborhoods and neighborhoods’ white proportion, the 
greater leverage might also affect racial segregation in our metropolitan areas.  Although 
in a highly deregulated subprime market that permits predatory lending practices and 
excessive foreclosure rates, an increase in access to credit may have obvious downsides, 
a more cautious expansion of responsibly underwritten, high-leverage loans actually may 
benefit certain low- and moderate-income buyers. 
Residential racial segregation has been perennially viewed as a major urban 
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problem in the United States.  Studies on racial segregation have shown that it has 
negative effects on the quality of life and economic opportunity, including educational 
attainment, employment, and health (Coleman et al., 1966; Condron, Tope, Steidl, & 
Freeman, 2013; Kain, 1968; Stoll & Raphael, 2000; Subramanian, Acevedo-Garcia, & 
Osypuk, 2005; Wells & Crain, 1994).  Coleman and his colleagues (1966) and Wells and 
Crain (1994) found that the racial composition of school districts explains both school 
and occupational achievement.  Condron and his colleges (Condron, et al., 2013) also 
found that various types of state level racial segregation negatively affect school 
achievement.  Kain (1968) found that racial segregation affects the distribution of black 
employment and reduces blacks’ job opportunities.  Stoll and Raphael (2000) also found 
that over half of the mean racial and ethnic differences in the quality of spatial job search 
are explained by racial segregation.  Subramanian (2005) and his colleagues found that 
racial segregation negatively affects blacks’ self-rated health status, but not whites’.  In 
sum, racial segregation generates harms to very important aspects of the quality of life of 
minority population and exacerbates racial inequality. 
Policymakers, therefore, should be wary of overly restrictive credit – of the 
pendulum swinging too far in the direction of less access – due to the potential for greater 
racial segregation and other spatial implications.  Increased access to loans with higher 
payment-to-income (PTI) and/or higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios has the potential to 
result in lower levels of racial segregation, especially when such segregation arises, in 
part, from income or wealth constraints.  Of course, if such loans entail excessive 
foreclosure risk, any racially integrative effects may be short-lived, and the negative 
impacts of foreclosure may do substantial harm to borrowers and their communities. 
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This topic is particularly timely as federal regulators, lenders, and consumer 
advocates currently debate the potential impacts of various lending and securities 
regulation that could directly affect access to high-leverage home loans.  In two such 
policy debates – concerning the definition of a “qualified mortgage” and the definition of 
a “qualified residential mortgage” – policymakers are determining measures that may 
affect the accessibility of high-leverage loans with little to no consideration for the urban 
spatial implications of these regulations.  Moreover, policymakers will be revisiting these 
definitions over time, repeatedly considering proposals to loosen or tighten thresholds 
and to redefine what constitutes a high level of leverage in home loans. 
The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently released its final rules 
on qualified mortgages, which require mortgage lenders to consider consumers’ ability to 
repay their home loans at the time of origination.  A lender that originates loans satisfying 
the regulatory definition can argue that it properly considered the consumers’ ability to 
repay in any future lawsuit.  Under these rules, however, stated-income and/or stated-
assets loans cannot be considered qualified mortgages, and loans with negative 
amortization, interest-only payments, balloon payments, or terms exceeding 30 years 
generally cannot be qualified mortgages.  Nevertheless, the CFPB imposed no overly 
restrictive rules on LTV or PTI ratios. 
The more intense debate focuses on the definition of qualified residential 
mortgages, which determines the privately-securitized mortgages that are exempted from 
minimum five percent credit risk retention requirements.  Consequently, loans falling 
outside the definition entail much higher costs.  Various interest groups have debated  the 
inclusion and thresholds of LTV and PTI ratios in the definition of a qualified residential 
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mortgage..  Although an obvious benefit of decreased default probability exists with a 
low-leverage threshold, both industry and consumer advocates have expressed concerns 
about any restricted flow of mortgages, especially for low- and moderate income families 
(Holtz-Eakin, Smith, & Winkler, 2012; Quercia, Ding, & Reid, 2012).  Nowhere in this 
debate, however, have the spatial implications, such as racial residential segregation, 
been considered.  If planners and researchers fail to act with foresight on this issue, we 
may lose a vital opportunity to positively influence long-term spatial structure.  When 
experts did not recognize the implications of the Federal Housing Agency’s lending 
policies in the 1930s, they lost a similar opportunity to direct the debate. (Immergluck, 
2004; Massey & Denton, 1993). 
Housing scholars have considered the implications of mortgage policies and 
mortgage types on racial segregation since the 1990s.  The strong economy and moderate 
interest rates, together with legislative and regulatory changes in the 1990s, generated 
large increases in loans to low-income and minority households  (Scheessele, 1999), and 
several researchers examined the impacts of these changes on racial segregation (Duda, 
2005; Duda & Belsky, 2001; Immergluck, 1998; MacDonald, 1998; Stuart, 2000).  
Although these researchers reported some improvement in racial integration among 
homebuyers, most did not provide strong evidence of a causal relationship.  Two other 
studies, however, furnished stronger proof of the effects of certain types of mortgages.  
Bond and Williams (2007) found a desegregation effect from mortgages provided by 
traditional lenders but no significant effect from subprime mortgages.  Friedman and 
Squires (2005) found a positive effect from loans regulated by the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) on the share of minority buyers in predominantly white 
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neighborhoods.  In the 2000s, however, the substantial increase in minority 
homeownership was largely attributable to the prevalence of subprime loans, primarily 
originated by lenders not regulated by the CRA or by independent mortgage companies.  
The subprime loans in the 2000s also differed from those in the 1990s in that the share of 
subprime loans in the home purchase market grew substantially and the loan features of 
subprime loans changed significantly.  This study aligns with previous research on the 
impacts of the mortgage market on racial segregation but anticipates that the 
desegregation effect will be driven by a different cause, namely, the prevalence of 
mortgages with high LTV and/or PTI ratios, or referred to herein as “high-leverage” 
home loans. 
Existing LTV and PTI ratio standards have constrained borrowers from prime, 
conventional lenders, and relaxing these standards might allow some borrowers to 
purchase more expensive homes, possibly in higher quality neighborhoods.  Additionally, 
if minority borrowers disproportionately obtained these high-leverage loans, the effect of 
these loans on neighborhood choice may be greater for minorities than non-Hispanic 
whites.  Since higher-quality neighborhoods are disproportionately non-Hispanic white or 
racially diverse, the increase in high-leverage mortgages might mitigate the neighborhood 
quality gap between minorities and non-Hispanic whites and reduce levels of 
racial/ethnic segregation.  Accordingly, this dissertation examines whether high-leverage 
loans affect the racial/ethnic segregation of homebuyers in the U.S. metropolitan areas. 
Although the subprime loans of the middle 2000s may not represent the ideal form of 
high-leverage loans, given the excessive foreclosure risk and sometimes predatory nature 
they exhibited, their high PTI and LTV features – together with their sheer volume – 
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should reveal any short-term spatial impacts that high-leverage lending might have on 
segregation and urban form.  Thus, subprime loans are used as a proxy in this dissertation 
for high-leverage loans.  Most subprime loans are expected to exhibit high PTI and LTV 
features, and although these features may increase default risk to some degree, research 
has also shown that high-leverage, by itself, does not mandate a dramatic effect on 
foreclosure risk (Quercia, et al., 2012). 
The characteristics of subprime loans in the 2000s changed from those in the 
1990s.  While the subprime loans in the 1990s were primarily for credit-impaired 
borrowers and tended to have low LTV ratios, those in the 2000s exhibited many 
characteristics other than low credit scores to distinguish them from prime loans.  
Industry data demonstrate that credit score gaps between prime and subprime loan pools 
were substantially narrowed during the 2000s, and the more prominent features of the 
subprime loan pool were high LTV and PTI ratios, at least at the peak of the mortgage 
boom (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006; Foote, Gerardi, Goette, & Willen, 
2008).  Since information on LTV and PTI ratios are not available in public data, I will 
use high-priced loans identified in Home Mortgage Disclosure Data (HMDA) from 2005 
through 2007, as a proxy for high-leverage loans.  I also assume that the primary risk 
factor for high price loans during this period was high LTV and/or PTI ratios. 
Nevertheless, by employing high-priced loans as a proxy for high-leverage loans 
this analysis is not ignoring the downside of excessively risky and potentially predatory 
subprime loans.  Rather, the subprime mortgage boom represents the only period in 
which lenders made high-leverage home purchase loans in a sufficient quantity to affect 
metropolitan segregation levels.  Moreover, high-leverage lending can be done – and, in 
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fact, has been done, albeit on a limited scale – in a manner not involving excessively high 
interest rates, high fees, and predatory lending features such as heavy prepayment 
penalties.  High-leverage lending also can be done more prudently by requiring full loan 
documentation and incorporating pre-purchase loan counseling and the like to minimize 
underwriting risks (Quercia, Freeman, & Ratcliffe, 2011).  High-leverage loans can 
benefit low-income, minority homebuyers only if these loans are originated without 
predatory features and excessive risk taking.  This dissertation focuses on the initial effect 
of high-priced loans – desegregation caused by high-leverage – while other studies have 
focused on the eventual effect of these loans – foreclosures caused by predatory and poor 
underwriting practices. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation reviews the literature on mortgage market changes 
in the 1990s and the 2000s and the impact of high-leverage loans on neighborhood 
quality and racial segregation.  Chapter 3 presents the research question and proposes the 
hypotheses of this study.  Chapter 4 examines the effect of high-leverage loans on 
neighborhood quality with the American Housing Survey data.  Chapter 5 examines the 
effect of high-leverage loans on racial/ethnic segregation with the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act and American Community Survey data.  Chapter 6 summarizes the results 








 Because the vast majority of families need financing to purchase homes, mortgage 
markets may have major impacts on residential patterns such as racial segregation.  
Moreover, since mortgage markets can reflect people’s or customers’ attitudes on race 
and preference for living environments, they can be facilitating instruments of majority 
groups’ values.  The mortgage industry has contributed to racial segregation at the 
beginning of, and during the large-scale development of, entrenched segregation patterns 
in the U.S.. 
Describing the formation of urban black ghettos, Massey and Denton (1993) 
showed lenders’ participation in confining blacks in these neighborhoods.   Black ghettos 
started being formed in the early 20th century when blacks migrated into cities, especially 
northern ones.  The large scale influx of poor blacks from southern rural areas triggered 
white hostility, and whites started to segregate blacks using both violent and non-violent 
tactics such as racially restrictive covenants.  White realtors and lenders did not permit 
blacks to move in white neighborhoods.  With “blockbusting”, some realtors and lenders 
deliberately allowed blacks to move in border neighborhoods, generating panic among 
white neighbors and subsequent white departure from the neighborhood.  This generated 
profits from selling homes to blacks at high prices with high interest rates. 
The confinement of blacks in ghettos and whites’ persistence in maintaining this 
color line continued in subsequent periods.  Explaining the suburbanization of U.S. cities 
from the older walking city to the present, Jackson (1987) described the impact of 
mortgage markets on suburbanization and segregation in the post-war era.  In 1933, the 
9 
 
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created to refinance mortgages at the risk 
of default or foreclosure by introducing the long-term, fully-amortizing loans with fixed 
monthly payments.  The HOLC’s important influence was to provide a formal and 
uniform appraisal scheme including a government-sanctioned neighborhood rating 
system across the nation, reflecting the industry’s practices.  In this rating system, the 
mortgage industry’s disfavor for dense, old, and racially-mixed neighborhoods was well 
expressed.  Later, this appraisal system was adopted by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), which provided government-insurance for 11 million families by 
1972.  Since the FHA’s insurance greatly reduced the affordability of homeownership, its 
influence on the residential location was also substantial.  Consequently, FHA had a great 
impact on residential patterns.  By formally stating the neighborhoods with dense and old 
structures, and those with non-white residents as risky neighborhoods in which to invest, 
the FHA endorsed and strengthened the mortgage industry’s preferences for 
suburbanization and racial segregation. 
Following a series of federal laws attempting to address racial discrimination and 
disinvestment in minority neighborhoods, which are briefly introduced in the next 
paragraphs, segregation has only slowly been reduced.  This chapter describes the general 
mortgage market environment in the 1990s, focusing on regulatory change, and in the 
2000s, focusing on changes in the mortgage industry.  The chapter also reviews the 
research on homebuyers’ racial and ethnic segregation since the 1990s and related 
research on mortgage markets.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the expected 
impact of high-leverage loans on neighborhood location choice and segregation, which 




Changes in the Mortgage Market in the 1990s 
In the 1990s, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) were significantly enhanced by amendments and changes in 
regulations.  The purpose of the CRA is to “encourage depository institutions to help 
meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
2009a).”  To fulfill this purpose, the legislation tasks four federal regulators with the job 
of examining the performance of an institution, and these regulators can deny its 
application for business expansion based on a poor CRA evaluation.
1
  With the passage 
of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, 
CRA reports and ratings from these evaluations became publicly available, pressuring 
both lenders and examiners to improve their CRA performance (Garwood & Smith, 
1993).  The CRA was subsequently modified to focus more on actual lending outcomes 
and to require consideration of lenders’ compliance with fair lending laws in assessing 
their performance.  In 1995, federal regulators also revised CRA regulations to emphasize 
lending outcomes over processes such as community outreach efforts.  The overall CRA 
rating includes scores from three test domains: lending, investment, and services, with 
more emphasis on the lending score.  After 1995, when examiners assigned lending 
scores, they started counting loans to low- and moderate-income individuals as well as 
loans to low- and moderate-income census tracts (Friedman & Squires, 2005). 
                                                          
1
 These regulators are the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 




The purpose of the HMDA is “to provide public loan data to assist in determining 
whether financial institutions are serving the housing needs of their communities, in 
distributing public-sector investments so as to attract private investment to areas where it 
is needed, and in identifying possible discriminatory lending patterns (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council, 2009b).”  The FIRREA amended the HMDA to 
include critical information for racial discrimination studies.  These amendments required 
lenders to report both denied and originated loan applications, the race and gender of 
applicants, and the type of loan purchasers.  In addition, the FIRREA amended the 
HMDA to require the reporting of loan information by independent non-depository 
lenders with offices in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and with assets exceeding 
$10 million.  In 1991 and 1992, changes in federal regulations expanded the requirement 
for reporting loan data under the HMDA to include non-depository institutions that made 
at least 100 home purchase or refinance loans per year, regardless of the institution’s 
asset size.  As a result, HMDA data began to include loan data from both large and small 
mortgage companies after 1993.  The expanded HMDA data helped public officials, 
community advocates, and researchers to analyze racial disparity and discrimination (in 
combination with other data sources) in mortgage markets and to increase pressure on 
lenders’ behavior regarding racial discrimination. 
Changes in the secondary mortgage market also facilitated mortgage lending to 
low- and moderate-income borrowers and low- and moderate-income minority 
communities.  In 1992, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness 
Act (FHEFSSA) required government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), namely Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, to increase their purchases of mortgages originated on properties in 
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underserved neighborhoods and further mandated that the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) set affordable housing goals.  HUD is responsible for 
setting the GSEs’ mortgage purchasing goals for homes of low- and moderate-income 
households; homes located in central cities, rural regions and other underserved areas; 
and special affordable housing (Freeman, Galster, & Malega, 2006). 
Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act (FaHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (ECOA) also strengthened in the 1990s.  The FaHA “prohibits discrimination in 
home mortgage loans, home improvement loans, and other residential credit transactions, 
on the basis of color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status or disability,” and the 
ECOA “prohibits creditors from discriminating against credit applicants on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or because an applicant 
receives income from a public assistance program or exercises rights protected under the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act (United States Department of Justice, 2009).”  In 1988, 
amendments to the FaHA eased the time commitment and monetary burden of  plaintiffs 
seeking redress for violations of the lending laws (Massey & Denton, 1993).  Under both 
the FaHA and the ECOA, the U.S. Attorney General is allowed to prosecute cases on 
behalf of individuals seeking monetary damage and injunctive relief, and HUD is 
empowered to initiate fair housing investigations (Immergluck, 2004; Massey & Denton, 
1993).  In the 1990s, the number of fair lending lawsuits filed by the Justice Department 
reached historically high levels (Immergluck, 2004). 
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Table 1 Major Regulatory Changes Influencing Mortgage Markets in the 1990s 
Year Legislation Major Regulatory Change 
1988 
Fair Housing Act (FaHA) 
Amendments 
Penalties for defendants increased, the litigation time 
shortened, and HUD was empowered to initiate fair housing 
investigation and complaints. 
1989 
Financial Institutions Reforms 
Recovery and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) 
CRA reports and ratings of the evaluation became publicly 
available. 
HMDA data included information on denied applications, the 
race and gender of applicants, and the type of loan purchasers. 
HMDA data included loan information from independent, non-
depository lenders with offices in metropolitan statistical areas 
and assets of more than ten million dollars. 
1991 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) 
HMDA data included loan information from independent, non-
depository lenders who made at least 100 home purchase or 
refinance loans per year regardless of asset size. 
1992 
Federal Housing Enterprises 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act 
(FHEFSSA) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increased their share of the 
purchase of mortgages originated on properties in underserved 
neighborhoods and mandated that HUD set affordable housing 
goals. 
1995 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
Amendments 
CRA examination scores more weight on the evaluation of 
lending outcomes than on the investment and services. 
 
 
While the private lending industry attempted to adjust its behavior to conform 
with these legislative and regulatory changes, a new segment of the industry began to 
rapidly emerge.  Subprime loans in the 1990s primarily attracted borrowers with 
blemished or limited credit histories, carried higher rates of interest, and often involved 
less favorable loan terms, such as higher fees (United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2009).  During the mid- and late 1990s, subprime loans increased 
rapidly from $40 million in 1994 to $160 billion in 1999 (United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2002).  Between 1993 and 1997, subprime home 
purchase lending increased 452 percent (Scheessele, 1999), although about 80 percent of 
such loans were refinance loans, primarily for “cash-out” purposes (Temkin, Johnson, & 
Levy, 2002).  Subprime loans have been faulted for their association with predatory 
practices and aggressive marketing strategies.  Predatory practices occur in all stages of 
the loan cycle from pre-loan marketing to the post-closing process and include aggressive 
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push marketing, falsification of borrowers’ incomes, inflation of appraised values, 
exorbitant fees and closing costs, heavy prepayment penalties with higher-interest rates, 
changes in loan terms at time of closing (bait-and-switch tactics), and additional profit-
taking through loan flipping (Renuart, 2004).  Since individuals with financial difficulties 
and a poor understanding of mortgage products comprised the target market for these 
loans, properties in low-income, minority neighborhoods made up a disproportionate 
share of the subprime market (Immergluck, 2004). 
In the 1990s, the strong economy and moderate interest rates combined with 
legislative and regulatory changes generated a significant increase in loans to low-income 
and minority households (Scheessele, 1999).  Although these changes neither specifically 
mention residential racial segregation nor provide direct tools for integrated home buying, 
they put pressure on lenders to do their business in a non-discriminatory way.  And 
minority homebuyers with better access to mortgages may have gained the ability to buy 
homes in better neighborhoods, even predominantly white or less-segregated 
neighborhoods.  Several studies have described these increases and analyzed them 
according to racial/income groups and neighborhoods in an attempt to measure the effects 
of specific policies.  A review of these studies provides an overview of the resulting 
home buying patterns in terms of racial segregation. 
 
Patterns of Segregated Home Buying in the 1990s 
Enhanced HMDA data beginning in the 1990s has allowed housing scholars to 
examine racially segregated home buying patterns.  These studies include three distinct 
groups: descriptive studies of the segregated patterns of home purchase loans; studies on 
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the market share of specific loan types in minority mortgage markets and minority 
neighborhoods; and studies of the impact of specific loan types on racial segregation (see 
Table 2).  This section summarizes the results of the reviewed literature, focusing on the 
improvement of segregation levels, minorities’ disproportionate market share of non-
conventional loans, and the impact of different loan types on racial and ethnic segregation. 
 
Changes in Segregated Patterns of Home Buying 
Although the limited nature of these studies and difficulties in comparison prevent 
the drawing of definitive conclusions, home buying segregation appears to have changed 
slightly during the 1990s.  The patterns differ by racial/ethnic groups and vary 
substantially in different metropolitan areas.  One study of the 50 largest metropolitan 
areas shows lower levels of home buying segregation in 40 metro areas, but higher levels 
in 10 metro areas (Duda, 2005).  The average magnitude of change was somewhat small, 
2.4 points based on the dissimilarity index, but in several metro areas it was over 10 
points.  That study compares segregation of the whole population in 2000 with that of 
homebuyers in 1999-2001, while other studies compare segregation of homebuyers over 
time.  The study assumes that segregation levels of the entire population in 2000 reflect 
old segregation patterns and that of homebuyers in 1999-2001 reflects new segregation 
patterns.  An assumption that the segregation of rental housing is lower than that of 
owner-occupied housing, however, may underestimate the desegregation of homebuyers.  
Moreover, this study used a multi-ethnic index, which measured the level of segregation 
among four racial/ethnic groups, making it difficult to directly compare the result with 
those of other studies that use two-group indices. 
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Table 2  Studies on Home Buying Segregation in the 1990s 
Focus of Study Author(s) Year Study Area Study Period Loan Types Major Findings 
Pattern of segregation 




More integrative home buying between whites 
and blacks 




Similar level of segregation between whites and 
blacks 




More integrative home buying between whites 
and blacks and more segregated one between 
whites and Hispanics and whites and Asians 
Duda and Belsky 2001 9 MSAs 1993-1999 No distinction 
Still segregated home buying (no comparison 
over time) 
Duda 2005 50 MSAs 2000 No distinction 
More integrative home buying than population as 
a whole in terms of multi-group segregation 
Disproportionate 
distribution of loan 
products in racial/ethnic 
groups 
Pennington-Cross 2002 306 MSAs 1995-1996 Subprime 
Proportion of subprime loans is positively 
associated with proportion of blacks and level of 
segregation in an MSA. 




Proportion of subprime loans is positively 
associated with proportion of blacks in a 
neighborhood.  Black borrowers have higher 
likelihood of obtaining subprime loans. 
Calem, Hereshaff, and 
Wachter 
2004 7 MSAs 1997 & 2002 
Subprime 
refinance 
Proportion of subprime loans is positively 
associated with proportion of blacks in a 
neighborhood.  Black borrowers have higher 
likelihood of obtaining subprime loans. 
Williams, Nesiba, and 
McConnell 





Large proportion of increase in loans to black 
borrowers and minority neighborhoods is 
achieved by subprime and manufactured home 
loans. 











Loans to minority neighborhoods are better 
served by independent mortgage companies.  
Market share of CRA-regulated lenders 
decreased, while subprime share increased. 
Apgar and Duda 2003  Entire US 1993-2000 
CRA-
regulated 
 CRA-regulated lenders better serve minority 
borrowers than other lenders in prime market. 
Impact of loan products 
on segregation 







Increase in loans made by traditional lenders to 
blacks is positively associated with decrease in 
segregation level in an MSA. 
Friedman and Squires 2008 101 MSAs 2000 
CRA-
regulated 
Proportion of CRA-regulated loans is positively 




Case studies of individual cities show mixed results.  In Boston, the black-white 
dissimilarity index fell, but both Hispanic-white and Asian-white indices rose (Stuart, 
2000).  In Chicago, the distribution of black homebuyers across neighborhoods classified 
by relative threshold or racial composition and by the Gini index measure showed no 
change (Immergluck, 1998).  One more factor complicating the comparison of results is 
the change in HMDA data coverage over time.  Two studies (Immergluck, 1998; 
MacDonald, 1998) compared pre- and post-1993 data as well as 1992 and 1993 data.  As 
noted above, the 1992 data included large independent mortgage companies and 
expanded to cover smaller companies after 1993, and these two studies may have 
revealed differences between depository institutions and independent mortgage 
companies.  Differences in racial/ethnic groups, metropolitan areas, and lender types 
make the comparison of single-city case studies difficult. 
Patterns identified in individual case studies vary.  The segregated patterns 
described by the absolute measures used in the studies above must be approached with 
caution.  In Chicago, the absolute distribution of black homebuyers across neighborhoods 
changed toward black neighborhoods, but the relative distribution did not (Immergluck, 
1998).  The relatively similar distribution of black homebuyers was confirmed in the Gini 
index, another comparative measure.  In Boston, the concentration of black homebuyers 
in black neighborhoods classified by comparative thresholds decreased, but that of 
Hispanics and Asians increased (Stuart, 2000).  In a slightly different vein, MacDonald 
(1998) found that home purchase loan applications of both whites and blacks increased in 
the majority of census tracts in the St. Louis metropolitan area.  In sum, black-white 
segregation in three different metropolitan areas shows mixed results: both more 
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segregation and more integration.  Hispanic-white and Asian-white segregation each 
became worse in Boston, and segregation among all four groups declined in 40 large 
metropolitan areas with substantial minority populations. 
One study (Stuart, 2000) calculated the dissimilarity indices of home buying 
according to different income levels to isolate racial impacts across varying levels of 
income.  In this study of the Boston area, the indices generally fell as income levels of 
minorities rose between 1993 and 1998.  In another study of St. Louis (MacDonald, 
1998), however, more integrated patterns of home buying were observed in the 1990-
1994 period when income gaps increased between blacks and whites.  These two case 
studies provide no clear conclusion regarding the influence of income on segregation.  
Further, the causes of segregation can vary, including racial differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics affecting neighborhood choices, racial prejudice of homebuyers, and racial 
discrimination in housing markets (Dawkins, 2004).  Although a complete discussion of 
the causes behind segregation is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the various 
determinants of racial segregation should be recognized.  In the broader segregation 
literature, income differences certainly account for some proportion of racial segregation, 
but they do not explain a significant proportion of black-white segregation (Bayer, 
McMillan, & Rueben, 2004; Farley & Frey, 1994; Krivo & Kaufman, 1999). 
Some studies focused on the increase in minority suburbanization and found that 
the pattern of segregation was replicated in the suburbs.  In Boston, the proportion of 
black, Hispanic, and Asian suburban buyers increased during the 1990s, where the 
market shares of those groups also increased (Stuart, 2000).  The majority of Hispanics 
and Asians bought homes in suburban communities, but a slight majority of blacks still 
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bought homes in the central city.  In a national study of low-income minorities, 53 
percent of low-income minority homebuyers bought homes in the suburbs (Duda & 
Belsky, 2001).  After identifying increases in minority suburbanization, researchers 
examined the segregation pattern of suburban home buying.  In a Boston study, a 
comparison of the dissimilarity indices found the segregation pattern in suburbs, as all 
minority group indices in the suburbs, increased (Stuart, 2000).  In the case of Hispanics, 
even the index in the central city increased substantially.  A nine-MSA study revealed 
that the majority of minority home buying in mostly minority tracts occurred more than 
eight miles outside the central city (Duda & Belsky, 2001).  A 50-MSA study found that 
the levels of segregation in the suburbs were lower than those in the central cities, but the 
levels of segregation of suburban homebuyers nearly matched those of the suburban 
population in 2000 (Duda, 2005).  Thus, in Boston, the level of suburban segregation 
increased while 50 other metropolitan areas showed little change.   Given the limited 
evidence involved and the incompatibility among these studies, one can only conclude 
that the suburban segregation of homebuyers did not improve substantially during the 
1990s.  More research is needed to determine if any trend toward suburban home buying 
segregation is the result of minorities moving into suburban neighborhoods.  If so, future 
studies should focus on the causes and remedies of such a trend. 
The relatively small changes in segregated home buying patterns, despite 
regulatory changes in favor of low-income, minority borrowers and neighborhoods, 
might be attributed to the fact that the most heavily regulated lenders were less dominant 
in minority borrowers and neighborhoods.  These lenders are depository institutions, 
which are regulated under the CRA and fair lending laws and which are influenced by the 
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GSEs’ affordable housing goals.  Assuming that government-insured loans and subprime 
loans, both primarily issued by non-depository institutions, were disproportionately 
distributed to minority borrowers and in minority neighborhoods, the reduced prospect of 
minority borrowers moving into less-segregated neighborhoods may be explained by the 
less favorable pricing terms of such loans.  Government-insured and subprime loans have 
less advantageous terms, such as higher insurance premiums and interest rates, especially 
when compared to conventional prime loans (Williams, McConnell, & Nesiba, 2001). 
 
Racial Differences in Market Shares by Mortgage Products 
These varying types of mortgage products are distributed disproportionately 
among different racial and ethnic groups.  For example, while whites receive a higher 
share of conventional prime loans, black borrowers are more likely to receive 
government-insured and conventional subprime loans.  Analysis of HMDA data from 
1992 and 1999 demonstrates that 78 percent of white home buyers obtained conventional 
loans while 22 percent  obtained government-insured loans, compared to 49 percent and 
51 percent, respectively, of black home buyers (Bond & Williams, 2007).  The same 
study also shows that for those home buyers receiving conventional loans, six percent of 
blacks borrowed from subprime lenders compared to two percent of whites.  Another 
study found that although home purchase loans made to minority borrowers increased 
during the 1990s, more than 40 percent of these gains occurred with subprime and 
manufactured home lenders (Williams, Nesiba, & McConnell, 2005). 
The uneven distribution of government-insured and subprime loans can be 
attributed to the borrowers’ economic and financial constraints as well as their race and 
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ethnicity.  Moreover, segregation itself affects the distribution of loan types across 
racial/ethnic lines.  Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000), controlling for loan-to-value 
ratio, payment-to-income ratio, and credit history, found that Hispanics were more likely 
to receive Federal Housing Administration (FHA) than conventional loans, while blacks 
were less likely to receive FHA loans.  Instead, black borrowers were more likely to get 
subprime loans.  Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004), controlling for neighborhood credit 
risk, income, foreclosure rate, housing turnover rate, and other demographic factors, 
found that the proportion of blacks in a neighborhood, but not that of Hispanics or Asians, 
was strongly and positively associated with the subprime share of the neighborhood’s 
loans.  The study also found that black borrowers were more likely to obtain subprime 
loans.  Further evidence supports these findings.  Pennington-Cross (2002), controlling 
for economic risks such as housing price appreciation, unemployment rate change, 
housing cost, and region, found that among low-income borrowers, borrowers in an MSA 
with a larger proportion of minorities were more likely to use both FHA and subprime 
loans.  He also found that the level of black-white segregation in a metropolitan area 
positively correlates with the subprime market share in that area.  Although this study 
involved only low-income borrowers, the other two studies applied to minority borrowers 
of all income levels.  Thus, even considering the economic disparity between whites and 
minorities, minorities are more likely to receive government-insured and subprime loans.  
The patterns vary, however, between of black and Hispanic borrowers.  While Hispanics 
are more likely to receive government-insured loans, blacks are more likely to obtain 
subprime loans.  Therefore, metropolitan areas with higher levels of black segregation, 
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not just those with a larger black population, reflect higher shares of subprime loans, 
raising questions regarding the causes for the black population’s reliance on these loans. 
Williams, Nesiba, and McConnell (2001; 2005) suggest several reasons for the 
disproportionate minority market share of subprime lenders.  They argue that these 
lenders targeted minority neighborhoods, where loan originations to black borrowers and 
minority neighborhoods increased substantially by 2000 at every income level (Williams, 
et al., 2005).  Finding that mortgage companies had larger market shares in Indiana's 
black mortgage market during the 1990s, Williams et al. (2001) argue that blacks 
developed only weak relationships with depository institutions in their area, and thus they 
may have felt alienated from these banks and thrifts and less motivated to choose such 
institutions than whites were.  They also assert that because mortgage companies made a 
large proportion of government-insured loans and these loans were disproportionately 
popular among blacks, the mortgage companies consequently made strong inroads into 
black mortgage markets.  Because mortgage companies are responsible for making most 
of the subprime loans, the preponderance of such loans in the black community may be 
attributed to the same factors.  
Although government-insured and subprime loans are more dominant in the 
minority mortgage market than in the white market, conventional loans still serve about 
half of minority borrowers.  In 2000, the proportion of conventional purchase loans made 
by banks and thrifts was at least 50 percent, with substantial cross-MSA variation 
(Friedman & Squires, 2005).  Since the CRA governs banks and thrifts, these institutions 
are expected to serve low-income neighborhoods and borrowers better than non-regulated 
institutions.  One study confirmed this effect by comparing the performance of loans by 
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CRA-regulated lenders in their assessment areas, CRA-lenders outside their assessment 
area, and non-regulated lenders in the prime conventional market (Litan, Retsinas, Belsky, 
& Haag, 2000).  Because minorities historically have earned disproportionately lower 
incomes, the loans made by these lenders might better serve minority communities.  This 
notion is supported by Apgar and Duda (2003), who found that in the low-income 
mortgage market, the share of conventional prime loans to blacks and Hispanics made by 
CRA-regulated lenders within their assessment areas were higher than that of CRA-
regulated lenders outside their assessment areas and that of non-regulated lenders. 
In sum, minority groups obtained a disproportionate share of government-insured 
and subprime loans, due not only to the economic and financial constraints of such 
groups but also due to their minority status.  Government-insured loans historically have 
been concentrated among minority borrowers and in minority neighborhoods and have 
been provided primarily by mortgage companies rather than depository institutions.  The 
historical alienation of minorities from banks and thrifts also contributed to the 
emergence of subprime lenders that targeted minority neighborhoods with aggressive 
marketing strategies.  While non-depository lenders increased their share of the minority 
market by offering subprime loans and government-insured loans, depository institutions 
also played a role in serving minorities in the prime mortgage markets although these 
institutions might have had a different effect on racial segregation in home buying.  If 
minority homebuyers who qualified for prime conventional loans at depository 
institutions chose not to pursue such loans because they found access to non-depository 
lenders easier and more comfortable, the opportunity for minorities to buy homes in 
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better neighborhoods might not have shown significant improvement.  Thus, the levels of 
segregation in home buying might vary according to loan product and type of lender. 
 
Different Effects on Segregation by Mortgage Products 
The differential distribution of mortgage products among racial/ethnic groups has 
also affected racial segregation.  Two studies examined the effects of different mortgage 
products on racial segregation.  Bond and Williams (2007) tested these effects using 
HMDA data for 237 metropolitan areas.  Controlling for various metropolitan 
characteristics -- such as the ratio of black-to-white income, regional variances, recent 
housing construction, population size and growth, the difference in growth rates between 
black and white populations  and between blacks and other minorities, and the difference 
in the exposure indices between blacks and whites --  the researchers found that the 
proportion of loans made by traditional lenders (including lenders of government-insured 
loans, but not subprime or manufactured home lenders) and the increase in the number of 
loans made by such lenders to black borrowers in a particular metropolitan area were 
negatively associated with the level of black-white segregation in the area.  In contrast, 
the proportion of loans made by manufactured home lenders in a metropolitan area was 
positively associated with the level of black-white segregation in the same area.  The 
proportion of government-insured and subprime loans and the increase in the number of 
such loans made to blacks showed no statistically significant effect on the segregation 
index.  Although the relative impact of loans from traditional lenders on segregation may 
appear small, it actually affects a large number of borrowers.  A ten percentage-point 
increase in loans made by traditional lenders in a metropolitan area decreased the 
dissimilarity index by 0.011 points, and a ten percent increase in the number of loans to 
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blacks made by traditional lenders from 1992-1994 and from 1997-1999 decreased the 
index by 0.003 points. 
Friedman and Squires (2005) examined the impact of loans made by CRA-
covered lenders on minority homebuyers’ access to white neighborhoods by using 
HMDA and census data in 2000 for 101 MSAs.  Controlling for the mean income of 
blacks, the proportion of owner-occupied housing units, the vacancy rate of homes, the 
size of the population, the proportion of the black population, and the black-white 
dissimilarity index, they found that a ten percentage-point increase in CRA coverage 
results in a two percentage-point increase in the share of black homebuyers in 
predominantly white neighborhoods.  The impact for Hispanics was more than twice that 
for blacks. 
Controlling for other determinants of racial segregation is essential in determining 
the impact of mortgage products on the issue.  Bond and Williams (2007) and Friedman 
and Squires (2005) controlled various factors affecting segregation or minority’s 
residential mobility in their metropolitan-level multivariate regression analyses.  These 
factors include various socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and housing 
market conditions found primarily in decennial census and HMDA data sets.  Ideally, the 
analysis would control for factors affecting both the mortgage product choice and racial 
segregation to satisfy the need for exogenous mortgage variables.  Omitting mortgage 
characteristics such as credit history and loan-to-value ratio could create biases in 
estimating the effect on segregation of various kinds of mortgages.  Some studies (Calem, 
et al., 2004; Pennington-Cross & Nichols, 2000) on the relationship between mortgage 
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products and race and ethnicity controlled for these mortgage characteristics, utilizing 
data sets from private vendors. 
Combining the findings reviewed in this section, it appears that in the 1990s, 
home buying by minority groups increased relative to that of whites, and the increase 
occurred in a slightly less segregated way than that of the previous pattern, although with 
some variation by race and place.  One reason for this trend may be that loans with more 
effect on desegregation drew a smaller share of the minority market than of the white 
market.  Accordingly, an increase in loans made by traditional lenders, especially 
depository institutions, could contribute to a more integrated pattern of home buying.  
Unfortunately, in the 2000s, the minority market share of depository institutions 
decreased, and the number of subprime loans from non-depository institutions increased 
(Apgar & Duda, 2003). 
 
Changes in Mortgage Markets in the 2000s 
In the 2000s, the mortgage market changed primarily due to the innovation in the 
mortgage industry rather than changes in regulations.  The rapid growth of subprime 
loans began in the 1990s, but the boom in subprime and high-leverage lending in the 
2000s differed from the changes in the 1990s.  Cash-out refinanced loans with moderate 
collateral risk drove the 1990s boom, and the market share and growth rate of subprime 
home purchase loans were substantially lower and slower than in the 2000s (Immergluck, 
2009).  After a brief plateau due to the Asian and Russian financial crises and the 
recession of the early 2000s, the second boom of subprime mortgages began.  In contrast 
to the 1990s, the subprime boom in the 2000s was driven by a rapid increase in both 
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home purchase and refinance loans, especially after 2003.  Additionally, exotic features 
found in many subprime home purchase loans attracted new borrowers. 
Subprime loans are often characterized as high-cost or high-priced loans, which 
include high interest rates and fees (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006; Lax, 
Manti, Raca, & Zorn, 2004).  The loans are priced high, in part, because of their elevated 
risk levels.  In the literature, researchers often identify the criteria used to classify 
subprime loans, such as pricing information in the HMDA data, a list of subprime lenders 
developed by HUD, or whether the loans were sold and packaged in a subprime 
mortgage-backed securitization. 
Subprime mortgages typically exhibit various features that, especially in 
combination, can increase repayment risks.  These include not only PTI and LTV ratios 
but also lower credit scores, low levels of (or no) income or asset documentation, 
adjustable or hybrid interest rate structures, prepayment penalties, and other risk-inducing 
features.  Prime conventional loans typically involve borrowers with credit scores above 
640 (on a scale to 850), PTI ratios of not more than 28 percent, and LTV ratios of not 
more than 80 percent, or not more than 95 percent if the borrower has private mortgage 
insurance.  In contrast, subprime loans usually have a variety of risk-inducing features 
layered on top of one another, which interact and compound default risks.  A “middle 
ground” of moderate-risk, prime or near-prime loans also exists, which, for example, fail 
to meet only one or two of the usual prime-loan requirements and involve only modest 
violations of the traditional loan requirements (e.g., PTI ratios of 30 percent or LTV 
ratios of less than 85 to 90 percent).  Credit scores for subprime loans are, on average, 
lower than those for prime loans (Lax, et al., 2004).  The credit scores of subprime loan 
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borrowers have increased over time, however, narrowing the gap between prime and 
subprime loan rates (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006; Foote, et al., 2008).   
Two key characteristics of subprime loans became more common in the 2000s: 
higher PTI and LTV ratios (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006; Foote, et al., 
2008).  While the subprime loans in the 1990s and early 2000s were primarily for low 
credit score borrowers, the lenders’ underwriting standards tended to limit other risk 
factors.   As the 2000s progressed, however, subprime loans took on higher PTI and LTV 
ratios.  Further, an increase in exotic features, such as low- or no-documentation loans, 
piggyback (second mortgage) loans, and hybrid adjustable rate mortgage (hybrid-ARM) 
structures, which can result in a rapid increase in the amount of monthly payments after 
two or three years, added additional layers of risk to subprime loans.   Moreover, the lack 
of proper documentation for income and asset values can mean that the true PTI and LTV 
ratios are greater than those used by lenders in their underwriting calculations.  
Piggyback loans – subordinate home purchase loans that accompany the principal, senior 
mortgage – contributed to very high cumulative LTV ratios by letting borrowers purchase 
homes with virtually no equity.  And calculating the PTI ratio based on the initial 
payment of a hybrid-ARM effectively underestimates the ratio.  The prevalence of these 
loan features in the mid-2000s suggests that the loan risks may be higher than that 
reflected in data with limited variables. 
 
Expected Impacts of High-Leverage Loans on Neighborhood Location 
The features of high-leverage loans such as higher LTV and PTI ratios not only 
may increase the incidence of initial homeownership but may also help borrowers 
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purchase more expensive homes.  Prospective homebuyers face the mortgage 
qualification criteria of lending institutions and are constrained by income and wealth as 
to what down payment they can afford.  First, these constraining factors can decrease the 
rate of home ownership.  Linneman and Wachter (1989) find that both of these 
constraints reduce homeownership probability, with a stronger impact for constraints on 
down payments.  Duca and Rosenthal (1994) also find these constraints to have a 
significant negative effect on homeownership rates, especially for younger and minority 
families.  Moreover, the income and down-payment constraints can decrease owner-
occupied housing demand.  Zorn (1989) found that 67 percent of the households that 
moved and purchased a new housing unit bought lower levels of housing services than 
the maximum flow of housing services obtainable from newly purchased units given the 
mortgage market constraints.  He used such constraints as 20 percent down-payment and 
28 percent payment-to-income ratio with a 25-year fixed-rate mortgage, utilizing the 
nationally representative sample for 1986.  In the model of Hendershott, LaFayette, and 
Haurin (1997), households constrained by wealth but not by income choose the largest 
LTV ratio possible to purchase housing closest to their unconstrained housing demand or 
their desired value of housing unit.  In the same model, households constrained by 
income, but not by wealth, choose higher values for their housing units, when they can 
access looser income qualifications.  Although the researchers tested this model in the 
context of the choice of FHA-insured loans relative to conventional loans, subprime loans 
in the mortgage boom also have features that reduce both down-payment constraints -- 
such as higher LTV ratios -- and income qualification constraints -- such as higher PTI 
ratio, no or less-income verification, and adjustable-rate structure.  In addition, Ross and 
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Yinger (2002) argue that households with these constraints would consume less housing 
services to increase the probability of mortgage approval.  Therefore, the increase in 
high-leverage loans is likely to increase homeownership rates and may increase the 
demand for housing services. Because minorities are disproportionately more income- 
and wealth-constrained, these effects should be greater for minorities. 
When housing demand increases and households buy more expensive housing 
units, buyers might purchase higher-quality housing units, units in higher-quality 
neighborhoods, or both.  If the quality of housing units and the quality of the 
neighborhoods are complementary goods, households will tend to purchase better 
housing units in better neighborhoods.  If these two qualities are substitute goods, they 
will favor one of these goods over the other, depending on prices.  Recent studies of 
American Housing Survey (AHS) data found that these factors do represent 
complementary goods (Ioannides & Zabel, 2008; Zabel, 2004).  Additionally, many 
suburban communities have exclusionary zoning regulations that prevent the entry of 
lower-valued housing units (Pendall, 2000).  Thus, in many metropolitan areas, the more 
expensive housing units are disproportionately located in higher-income suburban 
communities.  These factors make it likely, therefore, that the more expensive housing 
units purchased through access to high-leverage loans would be found in better-quality 
neighborhoods.  Moreover, because better neighborhoods are disproportionately white-
dominated neighborhoods and since subprime loans – typically high-leverage loans – 
have been disproportionately used by minorities, these factors could alter the racial/ethnic 





Expected Impacts of High-Leverage Loans on Racial Segregation 
The dramatic change in mortgage markets during the 2000s, when subprime home 
purchase loans grew rapidly from 2002 to early 2007, is likely to have influenced 
homebuyer segregation.  In the 1990s, lenders disproportionately granted subprime loans 
to minorities and concentrated in minority neighborhoods, resulting in the maintenance of 
a segregated home buying pattern.  As discussed above, subprime home purchase loans in 
the 2000s differed from those in the 1990s in terms of volume, leverage, and risk 
characteristics, and the market share of subprime home purchase loans in the 2000s 
significantly outpaced that of the 1990s.  Research by Bond and Williams (2007) found 
that subprime loans had only an insignificant impact on segregation when the market 
share of such loans was only 2.9 percent of all buyers and 5.8 percent of black buyers.  In 
the 2000s, the share of home purchase subprime loans increased rapidly.  For example, 
the share of such loans among all conventional loans was 11.5 percent in 2004 and 24.6 
percent in 2005 (Avery, Brevoort, & Canner, 2006). Moreover, subprime purchase loans 
in the 1990s differed from those in the 2000s, with the earlier loans primarily serving 
borrowers with impaired credit and the later loans typically having higher PTI and LTV 
ratios.   
The features of high-leverage loans such as high LTV and PTI ratios can increase 
homeownership propensity and help borrowers purchase more expensive homes.  
Prospective homebuyers face the mortgage qualification criteria of lending institutions 
and are constrained by income and wealth as to what down payment they can afford.  
Relaxing these constraints for high-leverage loans in the 2000s is likely to have increased 
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not only homeownership rates—at least in the short term—but also the demand for 
housing services.  Since minorities are disproportionately more income- and wealth-
constrained, these effects are expected to be greater for minorities.  When housing 
demand increases and households buy more expensive housing units, households can 
purchase more housing unit qualities, more neighborhood qualities, or both.  When these 
two qualities are complementary goods, as demonstrated in recent findings (Ioannides & 
Zabel, 2008; Zabel, 2004), and exclusionary practices are prevalent, the more expensive 
housing units purchased via high-leverage loans would be found in higher-income, better-
quality communities and neighborhoods. 
Because lenders made a disproportionate number of subprime loans to blacks and 
Hispanics, high-leverage home purchase loans might be expected to contribute to 
desegregation.  Although these high-leverage loans ultimately resulted in very high 
default and foreclosure rates, they may have at least temporarily encouraged more 
dispersed home-buying patterns among minorities.  Moreover, if wider availability and 
high PTI and LTV ratios allowed a homebuyer access to a wider variety of 
neighborhoods, then, even if his or her loan ended in foreclosure, this process may have 
longer term impacts on segregation.  The initial access to different neighborhoods may 
have a more persistent impact on widening the array of prospective neighborhoods that 
the buyer (perhaps later a renter) is likely to consider in the home search process.  In the 
2002-2007 mortgage boom, the greatest increases in subprime and exotic home purchase 
loans were in high-cost metropolitan areas (Immergluck, 2008).  Before the foreclosure 
crisis began in late 2006 and 2007, high-leverage loans may also have affected many 
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higher-cost submarkets; thus such loans could have enabled access to a wider array of 
neighborhoods. 
At the same time, the unsustainability of many of these loans suggests that the 
integrative effects might eventually diminish or disappear due to high default and 
foreclosure rates.  In addition, the virtual collapse of the non-agency secondary market 
and the high default rates caused lenders to tighten their mortgage standards, which could 
stifle increased demand by minority homebuyers.   
Although many policymakers are advocating for more restrictive mortgage 
standards on the ground of financial market stability, more stringent standards are likely 
to limit access to mortgage credit for low-income, minority households and may limit 
their mobility to better neighborhoods, with the resulting effect on segregation levels.  If 
this impact is supported by empirical evidence, policymakers should consider more 
appropriate mortgage standards, weighing the benefit of increasing minority mobility to 
better, primarily white neighborhoods -- as well as other benefits of minority 
homeownership -- against the costs of potentially higher foreclosure rates.  Of course, 
high-leverage loans should be priced at reasonable levels, not contain predatory features, 








This chapter presents the research questions and hypotheses within the broader 
conceptual framework.  Research methodologies for testing each hypothesis are detailed 
in Chapters 4 and 5, including results and discussions of the data analyses. 
 
Research Question 
Conceptually, racial segregation might best be addressed with explicit integrative 
policies.  However, due to problems of political viability, there are little federal, pro-
integrative policies for owner-occupied houses while there are some policies for rental 
houses and a handful of local, explicitly pro-integrative efforts (Orfield, 2002).  Congress 
strengthened the fair housing laws somewhat in the late 1980s, but little substantial 
change in enforcement efforts has occurred (Silverman & Patterson, 2011).  The only 
related, governmental policy to have some effect on desegregation was the strengthened 
enforcement of the CRA in the middle 1990s.  However, in the 2000s, additional gains in 
minority homeownership were due in large part to the prevalence of subprime loans 
primarily originated from lenders not regulated by the CRA.  Although the CRA may 
have contributed to desegregation, the legislation failed to regulate independent mortgage 
companies.  This regulatory gap enabled subprime lenders, mostly independent mortgage 
companies, to exploit low-income, minority borrowers (Immergluck, 2009).  With 
broader CRA regulations, the increase in low-income, minority homeownership might 
have occurred through more regulated channels, resulting in lower foreclosure rates and 
thus a more sustainable growth trend.  The largest growth in minority homeownership 
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occurred in the least-regulated segments of the mortgage market, which are associated 
with very high-risk and sometimes predatory lending.  If this growth had occurred in a 
well-regulated market, however, fewer foreclosures may have resulted. 
The type of risks associated with subprime mortgages changed in the 2000s.  
While subprime loans in the 1990s were primarily for credit-impaired borrowers, those in 
the middle-2000s entailed other risk characteristics.  Credit scores for subprime loans 
actually improved overall after the 1990s, but PTI and LTV ratios increased.  Although 
lenders specializing in subprime loans assumed more risk than other lenders, at least 
some lenders resisted  layering additional risk factors onto those inherent in these loans.  
For example, some lenders prohibited borrowers with very low credit scores from 
obtaining high PTI and LTV loans.  The subprime lenders in the mid-2000s avoided the 
most extreme level of risk associated with higher PTI and LTV ratios by requiring higher 
credit scores.   
In this dissertation, the term, “high-leverage” is used to indicate loans with high-
PTI and LTV ratios.  An increase in high-leverage loans might increase borrowers’ 
housing consumption and allow them to purchase more expensive homes.  The 
prevalence of no-documentation, piggyback, and hybrid-ARM loans in the middle-2000s 
also may have inflated effective PTI and LTV ratios, which, in turn, may have increased 
the loans’ effect on housing consumption.  Of course, the addition of such features to a 
loan also may increase the foreclosure risk well beyond desirable levels. 
Borrowers also may use the increased purchasing power provided by higher 
leverage to move into higher-quality neighborhoods. If minority borrowers 
disproportionately obtain high-leverage loans, as occurred with subprime loans in the 
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2000s, the effect of these loans on neighborhood choice may be greater for minorities 
than non-Hispanic whites.  Since “higher-quality” neighborhoods are disproportionately 
white neighborhoods, an increase in high-leverage mortgages might mitigate the 
neighborhood quality gap between minorities and non-Hispanic whites and reduce levels 
of racial/ethnic segregation.   
Although record-high minority homeownership rates were observed in the middle 
2000s, no study to date has thoroughly examined the neighborhood distribution of high-
leverage home purchase loans for different racial/ethnic groups and the consequent 
change in racial/ethnic segregation in the 2000s.  Accordingly, this dissertation focuses 
on two research questions: 1) whether high-leverage home purchase loans enabled 
borrowers to purchase more expensive homes and homes in higher-quality 
neighborhoods; and 2) whether these loans affected the racial/ethnic segregation of 
homebuyers at the metropolitan level.  Since blacks and Hispanics comprise significant 
minorities in many metropolitan areas in the 2000s, we examine the questions for three 
racial/ethnic groups:  non-Hispanics whites, blacks, and Hispanics. 
 
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
In this section, I outline a conceptual model that demonstrates the potential effect 
of high-leverage loans on the racial segregation of homebuyers and the relationship 
between this effect and other causal factors affecting segregation.  Using Figure 1, I first 
describe how high-leverage loans might affect the quality of neighborhoods where 
borrowers purchase homes and then, using Figure 2, describe how high-leverage loans 
might play a role in the racial segregation of homebuyers in the context of other causal 
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factors of segregation.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Effect of High-leverage Loans on Neighborhood Quality 
 
The use of high-leverage loans mitigates the income and wealth constraints of 
homebuyers as the first arrow indicates.  Higher LTV ratios enable households to borrow 
more given their down payment, and higher PTI ratios allow increased monthly payments 
due to the elevated default risk in higher LTV loans. 
As the second arrow indicates, the lower level of income and wealth constraints 
enabled by looser underwriting requirements allows borrowers to increase their housing 
demand and purchase more expensive homes.  In the 1980s, approximately 70 percent of 
mortgage borrowers were constrained by either income or wealth (Hendershott, et al., 
1997; Zorn, 1989), and these constrained borrowers had to purchase homes with housing 
values less than desired (Zorn, 1989).  According to the model of Hendershott and his 
colleagues (1997), borrowers constrained by either income or wealth choose the 
maximum PTI and LTV ratios to purchase homes with maximum values closer to their 
desired values, while unconstrained borrowers can purchase homes with their desired 
housing values and choose optimal PTI and LTV ratios by considering the return on their 
down-payment investment.  In the 2000s, high-leverage loans allowing high PTI and 
LTV loans provided the opportunity for constrained borrowers to increase their housing 
demand and purchase homes closer to their desired values.  Thus, the first hypothesis is 
that households who obtain high-leverage loans purchase more housing services than 
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otherwise equivalent households.  Greater housing services can mean larger houses, 
houses with more convenient features, or houses in higher-quality neighborhoods, which 
may include neighborhoods with better schools, less crime, better transit options, and 
various amenities. 
The third arrow indicates that when housing demand increases and households 
buy more expensive homes, they purchase homes in higher quality neighborhoods.  
However, this result is possible only if the demand for house size and/or house quality 
and the demand for neighborhood quality are complementary goods.  If housing unit size 
and neighborhood qualities are complements, households will purchase larger housing 
units in higher-quality neighborhoods, but if these two kinds of housing services are 
substitute goods, households will choose either of these goods, depending on price.  
Recent studies of AHS data found that these goods are complements (Ioannides & Zabel, 
2008; Zabel, 2004).  In addition, many suburban communities have exclusionary zoning 
regulations that prevent the development of lower-valued housing units within the 
community, and in many U.S. metropolitan areas, more expensive housing units can be 
disproportionately found in higher-quality suburban communities (Pendall, 2000).  
Therefore, it is expected that, on average, more expensive housing units, sometimes 
purchased via access to high-leverage loans, will be larger homes that tend to be located 
in higher-quality neighborhoods.  The second hypothesis of this dissertation, therefore, is 
that when households obtain high-leverage loans and all other household characteristics 




Figure 2 Links among Racial/ethnic Residential Segregation and Causal Factors 
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The effect of high-leverage loans on borrowers’ neighborhood outcomes may be 
linked to the racial segregation of homebuyers.  This mechanism, together with other 
factors affecting segregation, is shown in the top of Figure 2.  The proportion of high-
leverage loans in an MSA is expected to decrease income and wealth constraints of 
minorities relative to those of whites because historically subprime loans, which include 
many high-leverage loans, have been made to a disproportionate number of minority 
borrowers (Avery, et al., 2006; Bond & Williams, 2007; Williams, et al., 2005).  The 
disproportionate minority share of subprime loans is caused by both economic/financial 
constraints and race/ethnicity per se.  Some studies find differences in the probabilities of 
obtaining subprime loans across racial and ethnic groups, even after controlling for 
economic variables (Pennington-Cross, 2002; Pennington-Cross & Nichols, 2000).  
Williams and his colleagues (2005) argue that subprime lenders target minority 
neighborhoods and aggressively market their products and that this marketing can work 
because of the historical alienation between minorities and traditional depository lending 
institutions.  Since no evidence has emerged of narrowing economic gaps between 
minorities and non-Hispanic whites and since few significant social or regulatory changes 
improved the relationship between minority borrowers and lending institutions, the 
disproportionate minority share in subprime loans, including high-leverage loans, 
continued in the 2000s.  Thus, more minority borrowers became able to mitigate their 
income and wealth constraints through increased access to high-leverage loans relative to 
white borrowers.  Further, the proposition that more minority borrowers could mitigate 
their income- and wealth-constraints implies an increase in housing demand and home 
purchase price of minorities.  As minority housing demand increases, the quality of 
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neighborhoods where minority borrowers with high-leverage loans can purchase homes 
may also be expected to increase, due to the complementary nature of the demand for 
housing structure and neighborhood quality. 
Next, the increase in neighborhood quality of minority, high-leverage borrowers 
and neighborhood segregation can be linked by the disproportionate distribution of higher 
neighborhood quality in predominantly- or majority-white neighborhoods.  Historically, 
higher-quality neighborhoods have been disproportionately white due, in part, to the 
combination of the lower incomes earned by minorities and whites’ resistance to racially-
mixed neighborhoods.  Several researchers have emphasized inequality in neighborhood 
outcomes across racial composition, poverty status, or inner-city/suburb divide (Dreier, 
Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2001; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987).  The common 
indicators of neighborhood quality in these studies include access to jobs, median 
income, unemployment rate, poverty rate, housing unit qualities/values, school qualities, 
crime rates, local public services and shopping convenience.  These attributes typically 
correlated strongly with racial composition.  If hypotheses one and two are true, minority 
borrowers with high-leverage loans should be able to purchase homes in higher-quality 
neighborhoods.  When minority demand for higher-quality neighborhoods increases, 
minorities can purchase homes either in existing, primarily white neighborhoods or in 
newly created neighborhoods, which tend to be more racially diverse.  Thus, minority 
borrowers with high-leverage loans are likely to purchase a home in primarily white 
neighborhoods or in racially diverse neighborhoods.  Assuming this correlation between 
high-quality neighborhoods and neighborhood racial composition, I propose the third 
hypothesis that homebuyers are less racially segregated in a metropolitan area with a 
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higher share of high-leverage loans when other metropolitan characteristics are equal. 
With regard to this third hypothesis, in Figure 2, considers causal factors other 
than the proportion of high-leverage loans that affect the racial segregation of 
homebuyers.  Figure 2 outlines a conceptual framework for the relationship among racial 
segregation, the proportion of high-leverage loans, and other major causal factors of 
segregation, such as discrimination, racial preference, and racial disparity socioeconomic 
characteristics.  The direction of the arrows and the sign in parentheses indicate the 
causal relationship among these variables.  The major causes of racial/ethnic segregation 
are frequently divided into at least three categories:  1) in-group preferences (and/or out-
group animus) and self-sorting; 2) interracial differences in socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics; and 3) discrimination.  The preferences of neighborhood 
racial/ethnic composition, surveyed in several metropolitan areas, show that whites prefer 
white-majority neighborhoods with a small percentage of minorities, but minorities prefer 
more integrated neighborhoods or minority-majority neighborhoods with a sizable 
percentage of whites (Charles, 2001; Clark, 1991; Farley, Fielding, & Krysan, 1997).  
These preferences for neighborhood racial/ethnic composition cause whites to move to 
predominantly white neighborhoods and to avoid neighborhoods with significant 
proportions of minority groups.  Although the preferences of blacks and Hispanics also 
affect racial segregation, the effect of these preferences is likely to be minimal (Ihlanfeldt 
& Scafidi, 2002).  Cultural assimilation also influences the racial preferences of 
minorities.  Assimilation theory predicts that immigrants are segregated when they arrive 
in the country, but as they become culturally and socioeconomically assimilated over 
time, they tend to scatter among the mainstream neighborhoods.  This factor, however, is 
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more relevant for Hispanics than blacks (Massey & Denton, 1993). 
In-group preferences of whites could lead to differential treatment or 
discrimination against minorities.  For example, discrimination by real estate agents and 
mortgage brokers or lenders can create obstacles to residential mobility.  Such 
discrimination could be direct or referred, such as when realtors steer minority groups 
away from white neighborhoods for fear of angering or irritating residents (and potential 
customers) in those neighborhoods.  Although explicit discrimination became illegal and 
was prohibited by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and its amendments in 1988, 
enforcement of these laws has been inconsistent, and more subtle forms of discrimination 
may still persist (Galster, 2008).  The U.S. government’s discrimination study reports that 
despite the decrease in overall discrimination, the steering of minority homebuyers to 
minority neighborhoods increased during the 1990s (Turner, Ross, Galster, & Yinger, 
2002). 
Interracial differences in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics can also 
affect segregation patterns.  A decreased ability to afford housing costs may result in 
minorities residing in neighborhoods with lower property values or more rental units.  
Blacks and Hispanics are relatively limited in income and wealth when compared to 
whites, affecting their ability to meet their desire for housing, including housing in 
higher-quality neighborhoods.  Household characteristics such as age of the householder, 
existence of children, and marital status are also likely to affect the choice of 
neighborhood (Rossi, 1955).  Accordingly, interracial differences in household 
characteristics may cause different preferences for housing and neighborhoods. 
Other causal factors such as discrimination and racial disparity in socioeconomic 
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characteristics also affect the proportion of high-leverage loans.  If these factors are 
properly controlled, the effect of high-leverage loan on racial segregation will not be 
biased.  While racial disparity in socioeconomic characteristics can be measured without 
severe measurement error, discrimination is difficult to measure.  Due to this lack of data, 
the presence and degree of discrimination can be measured only by proxies, such as the 
age of population and the proportion of minority population.  When the measure of 
discrimination is not accurate, the bias will be positive because discrimination is 
positively correlated with both the proportion of high-leverage loans and racial/ethnic 
segregation.  Because the expected effect of the proportion of high-leverage loans is 
negative, our measure of effect can be regarded as a conservative one. 
The bidirectional arrow between the proportion of high-leverage loans and racial 
segregation suggests the potential for simultaneity.  Recent research finds empirical 
evidence for the positive effect of segregation on the proportion of subprime loans (Been, 
Ellen, & Madar, 2009; Squires, Hyra, & Renner, 2009).  When conventional lenders 
avoid segregated neighborhoods and subprime lenders target these neighborhoods, 
segregation level is positively associated with the proportion of subprime loans (Hyra, 
Squires, Renner, & Kirk, 2012; Williams, et al., 2005).  To address potential 












As discussed in Chapter 3, borrowers with low income and wealth may realize 
their desired housing consumption from the increased purchasing power afforded by 
higher LTV and PTI ratios, which allow them to buy more expensive homes.  Due to the 
complementary nature of housing unit and neighborhood qualities and the practice of 
exclusionary land use, borrowers with high-leverage loans are expected to purchase 
homes in higher quality neighborhoods compared to those with similar household 
characteristics. 
This chapter empirically tests the hypothesis that households who obtain high-
leverage loans purchase houses with greater housing services and houses in higher-
quality neighborhoods, when other household characteristics are equal, relying on the 
national version of AHS data.  
 
Methodology 
The analysis uses the national version of the AHS microdata from 2001 to 2007, 
which randomly selects housing units throughout the United States.  Since the national 
AHS data are collected every two years in odd-numbered years, four waves of data, from 
2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007, were merged.  The AHS data represents the only publicly 
available household-level microdata with household, housing unit, neighborhood quality, 
and mortgage characteristics. 
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Although the total number of observations for owner-occupied housing units in 
the merged data set is 135,181, the sample size in this analysis is dramatically reduced to 
3,006 in the data selection and cleaning process.  First, among the available observations, 
only the observations on housing units purchased within two years from the survey year 
are included in the sample.  For example, in the 2003 data, only units purchased in 2001, 
2002, or 2003 are selected.  Since household characteristics at the time of interview are 
recorded in the data, the observations on more recent buyers have more accurate 
household characteristics at the time of home purchase.  To balance the accuracy of 
household characteristics at the time of home purchase and the number of sample 
observations, the observations two years prior to the survey year and at the survey year 
are used.  This selection procedure produces some duplicate observations.  For example, 
if a unit is purchased in 2001 before the survey date and the same household stays in the 
unit until the 2003 survey date, the information on home purchase is recorded both in 
2001 survey and 2003 survey.  Further, these duplicate observations have identical 
characteristics on home purchase, but different household characteristics reflecting 
changes between 2001 and 2003.  Thus, in this example, the observation recorded in the 
later survey, the 2003 survey, must be excluded.  If a unit is purchased in 2001, but after 
the survey date, no duplication of data occurs.  Using information indicating whether a 
household lived in this unit in the previous survey and when a household moved, I 
eliminated the duplicate observations.  These procedures reduced the sample size to 
18,307.  In addition, the observations on manufactured housing and those missing the 
MSA indicator are excluded, reducing the sample size to 6,986. 
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Further, observations with purchase prices below $10,000 are excluded.  Also, 
observations with purchase prices less than or equal to 80 percent of the owner’s 
valuation of the unit are excluded because these observations are not likely to be arm’s-
length transactions.  In addition, observations with topcoded values on purchase price, 
loan amount, income, and mortgage payment are excluded because it is impossible to 
calculate accurate LTV and PTI ratios for these observations.  Finally, observations with 
CLTV (combined loan-to-value) ratios greater than 1.3 and those with PTI ratios greater 
than 0.7 are excluded.  CLTV ratios greater than 1 could occur because interviewers 
reported home purchase prices excluding the closing cost.  Also, the purchase price is 
likely to be smaller than the assessed value in this period of rapid housing price 
appreciation.  The lax underwriting standards of the 2000s, especially by subprime 
lenders, can partially explain PTI ratios that are higher than the GSE standards.  
Observations with extreme values in CLTV and PTI ratios are considered as coding 
errors.  Since I cannot access lenders’ data, the CLTV and PTI ratio in the sample should 
be considered as proxies, not the accurate ratios on the lenders’ books.  However, as 
described in the descriptive statistics, these proxies show a reasonable representation of 
the expected trends in CLTV and PTI ratios.  The source of metropolitan areas’ house 
price is the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)’s house price data. 
To examine the effects of high PTI and CLTV ratios on housing demand and 
neighborhood qualities, I use a linear regression for the housing demand model and a 
binary logit model for the neighborhood quality model.  First, to examine the effect on 






In this model, ln(Hi) is the log of housing demand index of household i.  Housing 
demand is not directly observed; rather only the product of quantity and price (or total 
expenditure) is. Therefore, a housing demand index is calculated by dividing the housing 
expenditure or a house purchase price by the MSA housing price index, assuming one 
housing price per an MSA, following Zabel (2004).  The housing expenditure is 
measured by the owners’ valuation in the AHS data, and the MSA housing price index is 
measured by the FHFA house price index for metropolitan area where the household 
resides.  The primary explanatory variables of interest, PTI and CLTV, are PTI and CLTV 
ratios of household i's home purchase loan.  Ln(Pricei) is the log of MSA housing price 
index.  The vector Xi is a set of other variables affecting housing demand, such as 
household characteristics and mortgage characteristics other than PTI and CLTV.  These 
include the log of household income, household size, the household head’s age, the 
interest rate of the loan, a dummy variable indicating a government-insured loan, a 
dummy variable indicating an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), down payment, and 
square of down payment.  I use the logged form of the housing price index and household 
income variables to reduce non-normality and represent their effects as elasticities, as in 
most housing demand literature. 
Also, Xi includes dummy variables indicating married-couples and female-headed 
families and variables indicating black, Hispanic, Asian, and other races.  Omitted 
categories are male-headed family for family type and non-Hispanic white for 
race/ethnicity.  In addition, a set of MSA dummies, MSAi, and the year of home purchase, 
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ti, is controlled to capture MSA fixed effects other than housing price and yearly trend. 




The dependent variable P(yi=1) is the conditional probability of choosing a better 
neighborhood.  All the binary neighborhood quality indicators are recoded so that one 
indicates better quality and zero indicates worse quality.  Each neighborhood quality 
variable is described in detail in the descriptive statistics section.  A vector Xi includes all 
the explanatory variables included in model (1). 
 
Results 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the full AHS sample.  All dollar values are 
adjusted to 2007 dollars using the U.S. city average, all items less shelter series of 
Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The average purchase price is 
$201,796 in 2007 dollars, which is greater than the $164,233 average in the ACS data 
from 2007.  The average family income is $84,885, which is also greater than the average 
of $80,265 found in the ACS data from 2007.  The average household size is 2.78.  
Married-couple, male-headed, and female-headed families comprise 58, 20, and 22 
percent of the sample, respectively.  Heads of Household with a high school diploma or 
some college experience, those with a bachelor degree, and those with a post-graduate 
degree comprise 50, 28, and 14 percent of the sample, respectively.  Household heads 
without a high school diploma comprise only eight percent of the sample.  Non-Hispanic 
 
50 
white, black, Hispanic, and Asians comprise 67, 10, 16, and 6 percent of the sample, 
respectively. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Purchase Price 201,795.69 100,774.05 17,800.75 554,731.19 
Housing Price Index 180.96 39.12 103.59 352.39 
Housing Demand Index 1,103.71 473.59 96.57 3,414.01 
Family Income 84,884.91 66,286.30 4,634.98 812,794.62 
Household Size 2.78 1.52 1.00 17.00 
Married Couple Household 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Male-headed Household 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Female-headed Household 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Age of Householder 38.16 11.18 16.00 88.00 
No high school graduate 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
High school graduate or more 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Bachelor degree 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Post-graduate degree 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Non-Hispanic White 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Black 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Hispanic 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Asian 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Others 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Loan Amount 167,456.12 88,409.21 1.06 548,211.91 
Interest rate 7.40 1.65 1.10 20.49 
Term 28.33 5.23 1.00 37.00 
Government-insured 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
ARM 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Down payment 35,401.65 53,407.49 0.00 405,574.34 
CLTV 0.85 0.20 0.00 1.29 
PTI 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.69 
     
N 3,006 
   
 
Government-insured loans comprise 26 percent of all loans, which suggests that 
such loans may be somewhat overrepresented in this sample.  However, a declining trend 
occurred in the share of government-insured loans; it decreased from about 35 percent in 
1999 to 22 percent in 2007.  ARMs comprise seven percent of all loans.  Average CLTV 
and PTI ratios are 0.85 and 0.23 respectively (Table 3).  CLTV and PTI ratios increased 
over time, but the magnitudes of increase are somewhat smaller than expected.  Grouping 
loans based on typical thresholds on PTI and CLTV ratios, however, shows a clearer 
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picture of changing loan types.  Higher-risk loans, in terms of both PTI and CLTV ratios, 
increased substantially between 1999 and 2007.  While the proportion of loans with PTI 
ratios of less than 0.2 decreased by 9.6 percentage points, the proportion of loans with 
PTI ratios of greater than 0.3 increased by 9.5 percentage point between 1999 and 2007 
(Table 5 and Figures 3 through 6).  The proportion of loans with PTI ratios greater than 
or equal to 0.2, but less than 0.3, was fairly stable over time.  The proportion of loans 
with CLTV ratios greater than or equal to 0.9 and less than 1 decreased by 9.3 percentage 
points, while the proportion of loans with CLTV ratios greater than or equal to 1 
increased by 9.4 percentage points (Table 6 and Figures 7 through 10).  Thus, the sample 
is consistent with previous findings of increasing PTI and CLTV ratios made in the peak 
of the mortgage boom period.  However, the patterns of the loans’ PTI and CLTV ratios 
are slightly different.  In the case of PTI ratios, the significant change was a shift from 
loans with low-PTI ratios to those with high-PTI ratios.  In the case of CLTV ratio, the 
most significant change was the shift from loans with high CLTV ratios to those with 
even higher CLTV ratios.  (This CLTV ratio should be considered as a proxy for the 
actual CLTV ratio in a lender’s book.  Lenders are unlikely to make loans with a CLTV 
greater than 1, but due to the reasons outlined in the data description, this category is 
likely to capture loans with CLTV ratios very close to 1 in the lender’s calculation.)  
Finally, as expected, the CLTV and PTI ratios are significantly higher for blacks and 
Hispanics than for non-Hispanic whites and Asians (Table 7).  Hispanics’ PTI ratios are 





Table 4 Means of CLTV and PTI over Time 
 
CLTV PTI N 
1999-2000 0.83 0.21 634 
2001-2002 0.85 0.23 828 
2003-2004 0.86 0.23 840 




Table 5 Proportions of PTI over Time 
 
PTI < 0.2 0.2 ≤ PTI < 0.3 PTI ≥ 0.3 N 
1999-2000 51.9% 30.0% 18.1% 634 
2001-2002 46.5% 32.0% 21.5% 828 
2003-2004 46.2% 31.4% 22.4% 840 




Table 6 Proportions of CLTV over Time 
 
CLTV < 0.8 0.8 ≤ CLTV < 0.9 0.9 ≤ CLTV < 1 CLTV ≥ 1 N 
1999-2000 31.5% 14.5% 32.3% 21.6% 634 
2001-2002 27.9% 17.6% 31.4% 23.1% 828 
2003-2004 27.3% 17.7% 24.6% 30.4% 840 




Table 7 Loan's Risk Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity 
 
CLTV PTI CLTV ≥ 1 PTI ≥ 0.3 
Non-Hispanic White 0.84 0.22 22.9% 17.7% 
Black 0.89 0.23 43.1% 24.5% 
Hispanic 0.89 0.28 37.7% 41.1% 

















































Figure 10 Distribution of CLTV during 2005-2007 
 
The AHS data have variables that measure the condition or quality of 
neighborhoods.  A total of 22 variables exist in the four waves of surveys, and their 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8.  All these variables are dummy variables 
that equal one if what is expected to be a generally desirable characteristic is present in 
the neighborhood; otherwise they equal zero.  For example, the “No Townhouses or 




present within a half block of the house; otherwise it equals zero.  The “No Townhouses 
or Rowhouses”, “No Apartment Buildings”, “No Mobile Homes”, “No Business or 
Institutions”, “No factories or Industrial Structures”, “No Parking Lots”, and “No 
Railroad, Airport, or Highway” variables measure whether potentially undesirable land 
uses are absent in the neighborhoods, while the “Open Spaces” variable measures 
whether positive or desirable land uses are present.  The “No Abandoned Buildings”, “No 
Buildings with Bars on Windows”, “No Trash or Junk”, and “No Roads Needing 
Repairs” variables measure the absence of the typical, negative features of declining or 
blighted neighborhoods.  The “High Neighborhood Rating” variable equals one if the 
overall neighborhood rating is eight, nine, or ten; otherwise it equals zero.  The “No 
Noise”, “No Bad Smells”, “Satisfactory Police Protection”, “Satisfactory Public 
Elementary School”, “Public Elementary School within 1 mile”, “Better School 
Performance”, “Satisfactory Neighborhood Shopping”, “Neighborhood Stores within 15 
minutes”, and “No Serious Neighborhood Crime” variables measure neighborhood 
qualities on noise, smell, police protection, public school, and shopping. 
Neighborhood quality variables can be divided into two larger categories:  
variables evaluated by interviewers and those evaluated by interviewees.   The variables 
from the first row to the 12th row in Table 8 are evaluated by interviewers, while the 
remaining variables are evaluated by interviewees.  Interviewers observe and answer 
questions describing the immediate surroundings, within a half block of the sample unit, 
while interviewees answer questions based on their subjective assessment of 
surroundings that they consider to be their neighborhoods (Econometrica, Inc., 2011).  




quality more objectively than the variables answered by interviewees, because standards 
of interviewees can vary greatly and might be conflated by race, income, or some other 
household characteristics.  The interviewer-observed variables are answered by 
observation rather than subjective satisfaction. 
 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics of Neighborhood Quality Variables 
Var. # Variable Num. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses 2964 0.78 0.41 
2 No Apartment Buildings 2979 0.78 0.41 
3 No Mobile Homes 2980 0.99 0.12 
4 No Business or Institutions 2980 0.76 0.43 
5 No Factories or Industrial Structures 2980 0.98 0.15 
6 No Parking Lots 2980 0.79 0.40 
7 No Railroad, Airport, or Highway 2981 0.88 0.32 
8 Open Spaces 2978 0.31 0.46 
9 No Abandoned Buildings 2971 0.97 0.18 
10 No Buildings with Bars on Windows 2890 0.91 0.29 
11 No Trash or Junk 2979 0.93 0.25 
12 No Roads Needing Repairs 2975 0.67 0.47 
13 High Neighborhood Rating 2954 0.70 0.46 
14 No Noise 481 0.82 0.39 
15 No Bad Smells 3001 0.96 0.19 
16 Satisfactory Police Protection 2904 0.95 0.22 
17 Satisfactory Public Elementary School 957 0.85 0.36 
18 Public Elementary School within 1 Mile 1139 0.71 0.46 
19 Better School Performance 201 0.45 0.50 
20 Satisfactory Neighborhood Shopping 2977 0.93 0.26 
21 Neighborhood Stores within 15 Minutes 2788 0.87 0.34 
22 No Serious Neighborhood Crime 2968 0.87 0.34 
 
The observations on neighborhood quality variables are smaller than those on 
housing demand due to missing responses on these variables.  Variables whose sample 
size is less than 2,000 such as the “No Noise”, “Satisfactory Public Elementary School”, 
“Public Elementary School within 1 Mile” and “Better School Performance” variables 
are excluded in the subsequent analysis.  The proportion of households living in 
neighborhoods without “bad” neighborhood characteristics are greater than about 70 




Spaces”, “No Roads Needing Repairs”, and “Better School Performance” variables.  In 
the sample, only 31 percent of the households live in neighborhood with open spaces.  
The proportion of households living in neighborhoods without roads needing repairs is 67 
percent and the proportion of those living in neighborhoods with better than average 
schools is 45 percent.  The proportion of households living in neighborhoods with a 
“High Neighborhood Rating” is 70 percent.  A high rating is defined as a rating greater 
than eight on a scale of one-to-ten.  Since each household rated its own neighborhood, the 
data reflects that 70 percent of households are highly satisfied with their neighborhoods.  
Separate tabulations (not shown here) show that only 6.8 percent of households gave a 
rating of less than five to their neighborhoods.  Some of the variables, including “High 
Neighborhood Rating”, are originally measured at ordinal levels but recoded at binary 
levels.  In preliminary analyses, ordered logit models did not work, primarily due to a 
violation of the proportional odds assumption, so the descriptive statistics are provided 
for variables recoded as binary ones to be consistent with the following binary logit 
model estimation results. 
The estimation results for equation (1) are reported in Table 9 as Model 1.  In this 
model, PTI ratio and CLTV ratio variables are positively associated with housing demand 
as hypothesized.  Since the positive effect of CLTV ratio is likely to occur for households 
constrained by down payment, I also estimated the model with the series of CLTV ratio 
intervals over 0.85.  The CLTV ratio variable is replaced by a set of dummy variables of 
CLTV ratios in Model 2.  The CLTV ratio dummy variables equal one if a loan is within 
the given CLTV interval and equals zero if not.  For example, the CLTV_85_90 variable 




reference category is a CLTV ratio of less than 0.85.  The down payment variable is 
included in the model as a proxy for the wealth variable, which is not available in the 
AHS data.  I assume that the down payment is roughly proportional to the liquid wealth 
of most households.  Accordingly, the coefficient for down payment is interpreted as the 
effect of a household’s liquid wealth.  Also, the coefficient for the CLTV variable is 
interpreted as the effect of the CLTV, holding other variables constant, including the 
liquid wealth for down payment. 
The elasticities of income and housing price are statistically significant at 0.01 
and 0.52 and –0.60, respectively in the Model 1, as expected based on neoclassical 
consumer theory.  In the Model 2, the magnitudes of these elasticities are 0.55 and –0.60, 
respectively.  Household characteristics are all statistically significant except dummy 
variables for female-headed, Asian, and other race households.  An increase of one more 
household member and that of ten years in the age of the head of household are expected 
to increase housing demand by about one percent, other things being equal, indicating a 
small impact in magnitude.  Married couple households are expected to consume five 
percent more housing than male-headed households, with other things being equal.  The 
education level of a household head has a greater effect on housing demand than 
household size and the age of the household head.  Where the head of the household has a 
high school diploma, bachelor’s degree, or post-graduate degree, the household is 
expected to consume 5 to 6, 12 to 13, and 15 or 17 percent more housing respectively.  
Also, as expected, black and Hispanic households consume less housing than non-










Variable Coef. t p-value 
 
Coef. t p-value 
Intercept 3.118 12.40 <.0001 
 
3.064 12.04 <.0001 
LN_ZINC_07 0.520 45.55 <.0001 
 
0.552 50.96 <.0001 
LN_HP_07 -0.601 -13.08 <.0001 
 
-0.586 -12.61 <.0001 
PER 0.009 2.63 0.0085 
 
0.009 2.68 0.0074 
HHAGE 0.001 3.36 0.0008 
 
0.001 3.31 0.0009 
MARRIED 0.046 3.82 0.0001 
 
0.046 3.72 0.0002 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.019 -1.42 0.1558 
 
-0.017 -1.27 0.2036 
HIGH 0.055 3.17 0.0015 
 
0.063 3.59 0.0003 
BACH 0.117 6.13 <.0001 
 
0.130 6.75 <.0001 
PGRAD 0.152 7.30 <.0001 
 
0.166 7.86 <.0001 
BLACK -0.087 -5.75 <.0001 
 
-0.087 -5.66 <.0001 
HISPANIC -0.020 -1.41 0.1582 
 
-0.027 -1.96 0.0499 
ASIAN -0.022 -1.15 0.2515 
 
-0.017 -0.91 0.3651 
OTHERS 0.008 0.17 0.8644 
 
0.011 0.26 0.7983 
INTEREST_07 -0.035 -10.97 <.0001 
 
-0.037 -11.38 <.0001 
TERM 0.002 2.50 0.0126 
 
0.003 3.13 0.0018 
GOV -0.067 -6.66 <.0001 
 
-0.065 -6.31 <.0001 
ARM_DUM 0.029 1.75 0.0795 
 
0.031 1.87 0.0621 
DOWNPAY_07 0.006 20.49 <.0001 
 
0.005 17.22 <.0001 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 -9.48 <.0001 
 
0.000 -7.80 <.0001 
CLTV 0.494 9.57 <.0001 
    
CLTV_85_90 
    
0.063 3.43 0.0006 
CLTV_90_95 
    
0.076 4.33 <.0001 
CLTV_95_100 
    
0.073 3.86 0.0001 
CLTV_100_105 
    
0.079 4.18 <.0001 
CLTV_105_110 
    
0.115 2.91 0.0037 
CLTV_GT_110 
    
0.204 4.98 <.0001 
PTI 2.043 38.09 <.0001 
 
2.174 41.98 <.0001 
WHEN 0.002 0.71 0.4763 
 
0.003 0.90 0.3672 
MSA dummies Yes 
 
Yes 




















Turning to loan characteristics, the mortgage interest rate is negatively related to 
housing demand.  A one percentage-point increase is expected to decrease housing 
demand by 4 percent.  Also, a ten-year increase in term is expected to increase housing 
demand by two to three percent.  Obtaining a government-insured loan is expected to 
decrease housing demand by seven percent, consistent with the loan size limit rules in 




by three percent, showing the mitigating effect of income constraint.  A 10,000 dollar 
increase in down payment is expected to increase housing demand by five to six percent. 
The variables of primary interest, the PTI ratio and the CLTV ratio dummies 
show a statistically significant, positive effect on housing demand both in Model 1 and 
Model 2.  An increase of 0.05 in PTI ratio is expected to increase housing demand by ten 
percent.  In Model 1, an increase of 0.05 in CLTV ratio is expected to increase housing 
demand by two percent.  In Model 2, a household with a loan whose CLTV ratio is 
between 0.85 and 0.90 is expected to exhibit a housing demand of six percent more than a 
household with a loan whose CLTV ratio is less than 0.85 holding other variables 
constant.  A household receiving a loan whose CLTV ratio is between 0.90 and 0.95 or 
between 0.95 and 1.00 is expected to exhibit about seven percent greater housing demand.  
A household receiving a loan whose CLTV ratio is between 1.00 and 1.05, between 1.05 
and 1.10, or greater than 1.10 is expected to exhibit an 8, 12, and 20 percent greater 
housing demand than a household receiving a loan whose CLTV is less than 0.85 
respectively. 
The models for neighborhood quality include the same set of explanatory 
variables found in the housing demand in Model 2.  Initially, standard binary logit models 
were estimated for 18 neighborhood quality variables after excluding four variables with 
sample sizes of less than 2,000.  Among the 18 models, another five models were 
excluded.  Three models of “No Mobile Homes”, “No Factories or Institutional 
Structures”, and “No Bad Smells” were excluded because these models failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of all zero coefficients of explanatory variables, based on log 




“Satisfactory Neighborhood Shopping” were excluded because the probabilities of the 
selection of a neighborhood with these expected qualities is not influenced by household 
income, indicating that the qualities are not normal goods, or, more plausibly, these 
variables do not accurately measure better neighborhoods in the home-buying process.  
The estimation results of the remaining 13 models of neighborhood qualities are 
discussed below, and the effects of variables across the models are reported in the 
Appendix A. 
Among these 13 models, only one model on “No Apartment Buildings” show 
estimated results consistent with the hypothesis on both PTI and CLTV ratios.  In this 
model, the coefficients for the PTI ratio and all the CLTV ratio dummies except two are 
positive and statistically significant.  Another four models on “No Business or 
Institutions”, “No Parking Lots”, “High Neighborhood Rating”, and “Stores within 15 
minutes” show results consistent with the hypothesis for the PTI ratio and partially 
consistent with the hypothesis for the CLTV ratio.  The coefficient for the PTI ratio is 
positive and statistically significant and at least one CLTV ratio dummies are positive 
and statistically significant.  Other CLTV ratio dummies are generally positive, but not 
statistically significant.  Incidentally, the data reflects that the “Neighborhood Store 
within 15 Minutes” variable does not appear to better neighborhood quality because it 
measures the proximity to unwanted land uses or commercial areas.  Thus, for this 
variable, a negative coefficient reflects the hypothesized effect.  The models of “No 
Townhouses or Rowhouses”, “No Abandoned Buildings”, “No Buildings with Bars on 
Windows”, “No Trash or Junk”, No Roads Needing Repairs”, and “No Serious 




remaining two models of “Open Spaces” and “Satisfactory Police Protection” do not 
show statistically significant effects for PTI ratio or CLTV ratio dummies.  In sum, 
among the 13 logit models, 11 models show statistically significant positive effects for 
the PTI ratio and five models show statistically significant positive effects for at least one 
CLTV ratio dummies.  Two models show no significant effects for either the PTI ratio or 
the CLTV ratio dummies.  The coefficients for the log of income, the PTI ratio, and the 
CLTV dummies are reported in Table 10. 
I also estimated the models without PTI ratio variable.  Since PTI ratio and CLTV 
ratio variables are highly correlated, it might be difficult to isolate the effect of CLTV 
ratio.  The results show general improvement in the effects of CLTV ratio dummies 
(Table 11).  After dropping PTI ratio from the models, most of CLTV dummies in “No 
Townhouses or Rowhouses” model and all CLTV dummies in “No Apartment Buildings” 
model show statistically significant, positive effects.  Also, one to three CLTV dummies 
in “No Business or Institutions”, “Open Spaces”, “No Buildings with Bars on Windows”, 
“No Parking Lots”, “High Neighborhood Rating”, “Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes”.  Thus, the effect of some CLTV ratio dummies disappears when PTI ratio is 
controlled because these variables are highly correlated.  When we consider the casual 
relationship between these variables, it is difficult to think that high PTI ratio causes high 
CLTV ratio.  It is more plausible that a high CLTV ratio causes an increase in the PTI 
ratio.  It seems that the effect of CLTV ratio is difficult to isolate from the effect of PTI 
because they are closely related.  Since PTI ratio has its own effects independent from 
reflecting CLTV ratio’s effect, the PTI ratio shows more significant results in the models.  




Buildings” , “No Townhouses and Rowhouses”, and “No Parking Lots”.  These 














R-squared 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 ≤ 1.10 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses  0.760 ***  4.090 ***  0.280  0.316  0.250  0.180  0.462  0.813 0.307 
2 No Apartment Buildings  1.035 ***  4.134 ***  0.226  0.463 **  0.250  0.451 **  1.114 **  0.980 * 0.275 
4 No Business or Institutions  0.506 ***  1.949 ***  0.548 **  0.214 -0.002  0.128  0.262  0.551 0.187 
6 Open Spaces  0.231 **  0.676  0.074 -0.115  0.242  0.304 -0.103  0.310 0.120 
7 No Abandoned Buildings  0.812 ***  2.230 *  0.924  0.041 -0.013  0.384 -0.209  0.048 0.252 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows  0.652 ***  2.121 **  0.557  0.497  0.121 -0.088 -0.645 -0.193 0.330 
9 No Trash or Junk  0.689 ***  2.106 *  0.029 -0.003 -0.755 ** -0.685 * -0.937 -1.124 0.171 
10 No Parking Lots  0.865 ***  3.961 ***  0.320  0.255  0.080  0.142  0.435  0.975 0.202 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.258 **  1.645 *** -0.111 -0.076  0.073 -0.089 -0.039 -0.029 0.148 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  0.630 ***  2.936 ***  0.432 ** -0.223  0.013  0.062 -0.552  0.559 0.142 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection  0.491 * -0.655 -0.053 -0.175 -1.095 -0.868 -1.011 -1.209 0.214 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
-0.425 ***  2.806 ***  0.181 -0.068 -0.420 -0.254  0.100 -1.255 ** 0.221 
20 No Serious Neighborhood Crime  0.680 ***  2.650 ***  0.123  0.161  0.049  0.107 -0.182  0.015 0.165 
*** Significant at 0.01 level  
**  Significant at 0.05 level  













R-squared 0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 ≤ 1.10 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses  0.183 *  0.503 **  0.550 ***  0.418 *  0.377  0.599  1.193 **  0.290 
2 No Apartment Buildings  1.035 ***  0.425 *  0.678 ***  0.422 *  0.632 ***  1.295 **  1.308 **  0.255 
4 No Business or Institutions  0.222 **  0.647 ***  0.323 *  0.080  0.212  0.339  0.682  0.182 
6 Open Spaces  0.138 *  0.110 -0.078  0.270  0.335 * -0.071  0.365  0.119 
7 No Abandoned Buildings  0.470 **  1.009 *  0.166  0.063  0.437 -0.138  0.155  0.248 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows  0.329 **  0.665 *  0.603 *  0.202 -0.015 -0.541 -0.098  0.327 
9 No Trash or Junk  0.380 **  0.133  0.109 -0.671 -0.596 -0.859 -0.998  0.167 
10 No Parking Lots  0.301 **  0.530 **  0.489 **  0.274  0.349  0.624  1.359 **  0.184 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.027 -0.029  0.010  0.139 -0.016  0.032  0.089  0.144 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  0.215 **  0.580 *** -0.059  0.143  0.198 -0.408  0.796 *  0.130 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection  0.594 *** -0.081 -0.212 -1.121 ** -0.897 * -1.043 -1.250  0.213 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
-0.049  0.008 -0.248 -0.570 * -0.433 -0.104 -1.521 **  0.213 
20 No Serious Neighborhood Crime  0.306 **  0.236  0.284  0.123  0.190 -0.100  0.145  0.158 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
**  Significant at 0.05 level 






With regard to variables other than PTI and CLTV ratios, by construction, the log 
of income is positive and statistically significant in all models (Table 10).  The effects of 
the log of housing price are negative and statistically significant in only 1 of 13 models.  
In our sample, most of the neighborhood qualities do not appear to be responsive to MSA 
housing price.  The effects of household characteristics other than income vary according 
to the models.  The effect of household size is statistically significant in 7 of 13 models.  
Larger households are more likely to choose a neighborhood with no townhouses or 
rowhouses, no apartment buildings, no business or institutions, no abandoned buildings, 
no parking lots, but are less likely to choose a neighborhood with satisfactory police 
protection and no serious neighborhood crime.  It seems that larger households choose 
higher-quality neighborhoods in terms of objective criteria, but these households are less 
satisfied with their police protection probably because of the presence of children.  A 
household with an older head is more likely to choose a neighborhood with no apartment 
buildings and no roads needing repairs; however this variable was not statistically 
significant in models of other neighborhood qualities.  Compared to a male-headed 
household, a married-couple household is more likely to choose a neighborhood with no 
apartment buildings, no business or institutions, no parking lots, and a high neighborhood 
rating.  Compared to a male-headed household, a female-headed household is less likely 
to choose a neighborhood with no roads needing repairs.  Education showed statistically 
significant effect in five models.  Compared with a household with a head of household 
with no high school diploma, a household with a head of household who has a high 
school diploma is more likely choose a neighborhood without apartments.  Compared 




with a head of household who has a bachelor’s degree is more likely choose a 
neighborhood with open spaces.  Compared with a household with a head of household 
with no high school diploma, a household with a head of household who has more 
education is more likely choose a neighborhood with no roads needing repairs.  
Compared with a household with a head of household with no high school diploma, a 
household with a head of household who has a high school diploma is less likely choose a 
neighborhood with stores within 15 minutes.  Surprisingly, compared with a household 
with a head of household with no high school diploma, a household with a head of 
household with a higher education is less likely to choose a neighborhood with no 
townhouses or rowhouses.  In our sample, households with more education seem to be 
more willing to live in townhouses. 
The effects of race and ethnicity are significant in some models (Table 13).  
Compared with a non-Hispanic white household, a black household is less likely to 
choose a neighborhood with no business or institutions, no abandoned buildings, no 
building with bars on windows, and no serious neighborhood crime.  However, a black 
household is more likely to live in a neighborhood with a high neighborhood rating.  
Given the subjective nature of neighborhood ratings, blacks may simply be more 
generous in rating their own neighborhoods.  Compared to a non-Hispanic white 
household, a Hispanic household is likely to choose a neighborhood with no serious 
neighborhood crime and with a high neighborhood rating.  Compared to a non-Hispanic 
white household, an Asian household is less likely to choose a neighborhood with no 
townhouses or rowhouses and more likely to choose a neighborhood with no serious 




likely to choose a neighborhood with no townhouses or rowhouses and more likely to 
choose a neighborhood with no roads needing repairs.  Overall, household characteristics 
other than income are only statistically significant in certain variables (Tables 12 and 13). 
Among loan characteristics other than PTI and CLTV ratios, the mortgage interest 
rate and down payment are often statistically significant, but the terms, government-
insured loan status, and existence of an ARM are not significant (Table 13).  The year-
trend variable is negative and statistically significant in 5 of 13 models, but positive and 
statistically significant in 2 models. (Table 14). 
Next, I calculate the average marginal effects of important variables across the 
models:  the log of income, the PTI ratio, the CLTV ratio dummies, and the down 
payment for the ten models (Tables 15 and 16).  A ten percent change in income is 
expected to increase the probability of choosing a better neighborhood by 0.02 to 8.12, 
depending on the specific type of neighborhood quality, holding other variables constant.  
Although the effects of income on the probability of choosing a better neighborhood are 
statistically significant, the magnitude of these effects is generally modest.  This same 
trend holds true for the down payment variable.  A 10,000 percent increase in down 
payment is expected to increase the probability of choosing a better neighborhood by less 
than 0.01.  The effect of the square of down payment is statistically significant in five 
models. 
The magnitude of the marginal effects of the PTI and CLTV ratio is somewhat 
modest.  A 0.05 increase in PTI ratio is expected to increase the probability of choosing a 
better neighborhood by 0.003 to 0.03, depending on the neighborhood quality variable 




between 1.05 and 1.10, and greater than 1.10 are expected to increase the probability of 
choosing neighborhoods without apartment buildings by 0.064, 0.062, 0.133, and 0.121, 
relatively to loans with a CLTV ratio less than 0.85.  Loans with a CLTV ratio between 
0.85 and 0.90 are expected to increase the probability of choosing neighborhoods without 
business or institutions by 0.082.  Loans with a CLTV ratio greater than 1.10 are 
expected to increase the probability of choosing neighborhoods without parking lots and 
stores within 15 minutes by 0.115 and 0.157.  If the PTI ratio variable is omitted from the 






Table 12 Logit Coefficients of Explanatory Variables (1) 
Var. 
# 
Variable Log of HPI PER HHAGE MARRIED 
FEMALE 
HEAD 
HIGH BACH PGRAD 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses -0.750  0.229 ***  0.001  0.146 -0.244 -0.417 * -0.686 *** -0.672 ** 
2 No Apartment Buildings -1.277 **  0.144 ***  0.011 **  0.278 * -0.108  0.369 *  0.067 -0.114 
4 No Business or Institutions -0.680  0.084 **  0.002  0.414 ***  0.093  0.012 -0.047  0.095 
6 Open Spaces  0.314 -0.052  0.004  0.138  0.063  0.148  0.370 *  0.313 
7 No Abandoned Buildings -0.086  0.168 *  0.012  0.106 -0.016 -0.149  0.246 -0.042 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows -0.022 -0.041  0.000  0.121  0.108  0.097  0.044 -0.437 
9 No Trash or Junk -0.158  0.005  0.009  0.283 -0.009 -0.088  0.126 -0.055 
10 No Parking Lots -0.224  0.181 ***  0.006  0.271 *  0.027 -0.140 -0.345 -0.486 * 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.059 -0.039  0.012 ***  0.084 -0.243 *  0.314 *  0.485 **  0.415 ** 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  1.504 *** -0.048  0.004  0.403 ***  0.077 -0.131 -0.108 -0.252 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection  1.255 -0.145 ** -0.007  0.124  0.377  0.311  0.427  0.478 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
 1.063  0.032 -0.001 -0.318 -0.172 -0.789 ** -0.451 -0.561 
20 No Serious Neighborhood Crime -0.568 -0.101 **  0.001  0.180 -0.104  0.098  0.149 -0.119 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
**  Significant at 0.05 level 






Table 13 Logit Coefficients of Explanatory Variables (2) 
Var. 
# 
Variable BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN OTHERS INTEREST TERM GOV ARM 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses  0.259  0.116 -0.609 *** -0.945 * -0.027  0.008 -0.120  0.080 
2 No Apartment Buildings  0.304 -0.112 -0.282  0.459 -0.091  0.005 -0.175  0.035 
4 No Business or Institutions -0.543 *** -0.127 -0.271  0.581 -0.103  0.002  0.038  0.038 
6 Open Spaces -0.020  0.044  0.004  0.195  0.020 -0.011  0.053  0.208 
7 No Abandoned Buildings -1.439 *** -0.401 -0.427 -0.393 -0.168 **  0.039 **  0.197 -0.489 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows -0.660 ***  0.075  0.182 -0.733 -0.112 ** -0.002 -0.029  0.046 
9 No Trash or Junk -0.289  0.150  0.217  0.769 -0.026  0.010  0.029 -0.182 
10 No Parking Lots  0.287  0.021 -0.324 -0.361 -0.059  0.007  0.095  0.010 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.036  0.036  0.263  1.388 ** -0.061 *  0.009  0.066 -0.233 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  0.297 *  0.432 *** -0.086 -0.005 -0.019  0.004 -0.067  0.044 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection -0.061 -0.058 -0.100 21.126 -0.015  0.004  0.238  0.345 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
 0.187 -0.147 -0.334  0.579  0.280 *** -0.013  0.073 -0.331 
20 No Serious Neighborhood Crime -0.352 *  0.794 ***  0.692 **  0.275 -0.083 *  0.004  0.107  0.153 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
**  Significant at 0.05 level 






Table 14 Logit Coefficients of Explanatory Variables (3) 
Var. 
# 




1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses  0.008 **  0.000 -0.100 ** 
2 No Apartment Buildings  0.009 **  0.000 -0.081 * 
4 No Business or Institutions  0.005  0.000 -0.065 * 
6 Open Spaces  0.003  0.000  0.014 
7 No Abandoned Buildings  0.007  0.000 -0.099 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows  0.004  0.000 -0.116 * 
9 No Trash or Junk -0.007  0.000  0.067 
10 No Parking Lots  0.005  0.000 -0.111 *** 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.002  0.000 -0.036 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  0.009 ***  0.000 *  0.084 ** 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection -0.014 -0.000 -0.043 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
-0.014 **  0.000 **  0.270 *** 
20 No Serious Neighborhood Crime  0.007 *  0.000 -0.029 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
**  Significant at 0.05 level 







Table 15 Marginal effects of income and down payment 
Var. 
# 
Variable ME ln(INC) 
ME DOWN 
PAY 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses  0.103 ***  0.001 ** 
2 No Apartment Buildings  0.140 ***  0.001 ** 
4 No Business or Institutions  0.081 ***  0.005 
6 Open Spaces  0.045 **  0.001 
7 No Abandoned Buildings  0.812 ***  0.007 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows  0.043 ***  0.000 
9 No Trash or Junk  0.040 ***  0.000 
10 No Parking Lots  0.122 ***  0.001 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.051 **  0.000 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  0.119 ***  0.002 *** 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection  0.002 * -0.001 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
-0.041 *** -0.001 ** 







Table 16 Marginal effects of PTI ratio and CLTV ratio dummies 
Var. 
# 
Variable ME PTI 
ME CLTV 
0.85-0.90 0.90-0.95 0.95-1.00 1.00-1.05 1.05-1.10 ≤ 1.10 
1 No Townhouses or Rowhouses  0.553 ***  0.038  0.043  0.034  0.025   0.061  0.100 
2 No Apartment Buildings  0.561 ***  0.033  0.064 **  0.036  0.062 *  0.133 **  0.121 * 
4 No Business or Institutions  0.313 ***  0.082 **  0.035  0.000  0.021  0.042  0.083 
6 Open Spaces  0.132  0.014 -0.021  0.047  0.060 -0.019  0.061 
7 No Abandoned Buildings  0.067 *  0.022  0.001  0.000 -0.008  0.002  0.067 
8 No Buildings with Bars on Windows  0.141 **  0.033  0.030  0.008 -0.006 -0.053 -0.014 
9 No Trash or Junk  0.122 **  0.001  0.000 -0.046 ** -0.040 * -0.061 -0.079 
10 No Parking Lots  0.560 ***  0.045  0.036  0.012  0.021  0.059  0.115 * 
11 No Roads Needing Repairs  0.325 *** -0.022 -0.015  0.014 -0.018 -0.008 -0.006 
13 High Neighborhood Rating  0.557 ***  0.076 -0.044  0.002  0.012 -0.114  0.096 
15 Satisfactory Police Protection -0.028 -0.002 -0.006 -0.052 -0.037 -0.046 -0.060 
19 
Neighborhood Stores within 15 
Minutes 
-0.273 ***  0.015 -0.006 -0.043 -0.025  0.009 -0.157 * 






Summary of Results 
In sum, I test two hypotheses positing that high PTI and LTV ratios increase 
housing demand and neighborhood quality, holding other characteristics constant, using 
linear and logit models respectively.  The estimation results show that a household 
receiving a loan with 0.05 higher PTI ratio is expected to consume ten percent more 
housing, holding other variables constant.  Also, a household receiving a loan with CLTV 
ratio between 0.85 and 0.90, between 0.90 and 0.95, between 0.95 and 1.00, or between 
1.00 and 1.05 is expected to consume six to eight percent more housing than a household 
with a CLTV ratio less than 0.85, holding other variables constant.  A household 
receiving a loan with CLTV ratio between 1.05 and 1.10 or greater than 1.10 is expected 
to consume 12 or 20 percent more housing, respectively, than a household with a CLTV 
ratio less than 0.85, holding other variables constant. 
Regarding neighborhood quality variables, a household receiving a loan with a 
higher PTI ratio is expected to increase the probability of purchasing a home in a 
neighborhood with no townhouses or rowhouses, no apartment buildings, no business or 
institutions, no abandoned buildings, no building with bars on windows, no trash or junk, 
no parking lots, no roads needing repairs, high neighborhood rating, no stores within 15 
minutes, and no serious neighborhood crime, holding other variables constant. 
A household receiving a loan with a CLTV ratio higher than 0.85 is expected to 
increase the probabilities of purchasing a home in a neighborhood with no apartment 
building, holding other variables constant.  Only some of CLTV ratio dummies have 
statistically significant effect on choosing neighborhoods with no business or institutions, 




omitting PTI ratio in the models, most CLTV ratio dummies have a statistically 
significant, positive effect on choosing neighborhoods with no apartment buildings and 
no townhouses or rowhouses.  Also, some CLTV ratio dummies have a statistically 
significant, positive effect on choosing neighborhoods with no business or institutions, 
open space, no buildings with bars on windows, no parking lots, high neighborhood 
rating, and no stores within 15 minutes.  This change occurs because PTI ratio and CLTV 
ratio are closely correlated.  The explanatory power of neighborhood quality variable 
models is not as good as that of housing demand model.  This requires the more objective 
neighborhood quality measures such as neighborhood income and housing unit 
characteristics variables.  The neighborhood quality variables that have the most 
statistically significant effects for PTI and CLTV ratios are those evaluated by 










As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, borrowers who are credit-constrained by low 
income and wealth and by restrictive underwriting requirements may benefit from 
increased LTV and PTI ratios because they can purchase more expensive homes.  Due to 
the complementary nature of housing unit and neighborhood qualities and the nature of 
exclusionary land use regulations and practices, high-leverage loans may enable some 
buyers to purchase homes in higher quality neighborhoods compared to those with 
otherwise similar household characteristics.  Since the high-leverage, subprime loans 
prevalent in the middle-2000s went disproportionately to minorities, more minority 
borrowers mitigated their income and wealth constraints and purchased homes in higher 
quality neighborhoods relative to non-Hispanic white borrowers.  In addition, assuming a 
positive correlation between neighborhood quality and the proportion of non-Hispanic 
whites in a neighborhood, the use of high-leverage loans might serve to mitigate racial 
and ethnic segregation. 
This chapter empirically tests the hypothesis that homebuyers are less racially 
segregated in a metropolitan area with a higher share of high-leverage loans when other 




Based on the discussion in the previous section, I estimate an empirical model 




racial prejudice and discrimination level of non-Hispanic whites, racial differences in 
socioeconomic and household characteristics, and metropolitan ecological context.  
The primary data source for mortgage characteristics is HMDA data, which have 
information on the disposition of mortgage applications, the characteristics of loans, the 
race, ethnicity and income of applicants, and the census tract location of the mortgaged 
house.  After several revisions, the HMDA covers most depository institutions including 
banks, savings associations, and credit unions, as well as non-depository institutions such 
as mortgage companies.  Very small lending institutions or those without a branch in a 
metropolitan area are exempted (McCoy, 2007).  The data cover approximately 80 
percent of all of the nations’ home-lending activity (Avery, Brevoort, & Canner, 2007).  
The coverage is expected to be considerably higher in metropolitan areas, the focus here, 
than in non-metropolitan or rural areas. 
The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation C, which implements HMDA’s data 
collection, was significantly revised in 2002.  The revised regulations are reflected in the 
data since 2004, and thus researchers must exercise caution when comparing data before 
and since 2004. Beginning in 2004, the data began providing additional information, 
including whether pre-approval is requested, lien status, whether the property mortgaged 
is manufactured home, whether the loan is subject to the protections of the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), whether the loan is sold to private 
secondary markets, and loan pricing information.  In addition, since 2004, the data has 
employed different rules for reporting the race and ethnicity of applicants. 
The primary data source for MSA characteristics other than loans will be the 




study must use instruments to predict the proportion of high-leverage loans.  The data 
sources for these instruments are the anti-predatory law index developed by Bostic and 
his colleagues (2008), the state foreclosure law characteristics coded by Cutts and Merill 
(2008), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) house price index.  Bostic 
and his colleagues (Bostic, et al., 2008) analyzed the statues governing lending in all 50 
states to identify anti-predatory laws.  They also measured the strength of the laws in 
three dimensions:  coverage, restriction, and enforcement.  The enforcement index is used 
as an instrumental variable because this measure is significantly and positively associated 
with the probability of subprime origination.  The enforcement index is scored by two 
aspects: assignee liability and lender enforcement methods.  Cutts and Merill (2008) 
analyzed foreclosure laws in every state and identified whether the state’s most 
commonly used foreclosure process is judicial or non-judicial. 
The dependent variables are two measures of homebuyers’ racial/ethnic 
segregation level:  dissimilarity and isolation indices.  Homebuyers are identified from 
the HMDA data by identifying first-lien, home purchase loans for owner-occupied, 
single-family units.  The racial/ethnic categories of non-Hispanic whites, blacks 
regardless of ethnicity, and Hispanics are used because of comparability with the ACS 
data.  The ACS data does not provide socioeconomic data for non-Hispanic blacks.  The 
dissimilarity index measures how the two racial/ethnic groups are unevenly distributed 








where wi is the number of non-Hispanic white buyers in census tract i, W is the total non-
Hispanic white buyers in the metropolitan area, mi is the number of minority buyers 
(black or Hispanic buyers) in census tract i, and M is the total minority buyers (black or 
Hispanic buyers) in the metropolitan area.  The index is interpreted as the proportion of 
the minority buyers who would have to buy in other census tracts to achieve a uniform 
distribution of minority homebuyers across all tracts in the metropolitan area. 
The isolation index measures the degree to which the members of one group are 
exposed only to other members of the same group.  The isolation index is calculated by 




where mi is the number of minority buyers (black or Hispanic buyers) in census tract i, M 
is the total minority buyers (black or Hispanic buyers) in the metropolitan area and ti is 
the number of total buyers in census tract i.  The index is interpreted as the probability 
that a minority homebuyer buys a home in a census tract where a homebuyer of the same 
racial or ethnic group also buys.  The isolation index is sensitive to the proportion of the 
homebuyers in the metropolitan area within the minority group.  When two metropolitan 
areas are similar in terms of the dissimilarity index, the metropolitan area with the larger 
share of buyers who are in the minority group would show a higher isolation index 
(Massey & Denton, 1988).  Overall, four models are estimated:  white-black 




 For the purposes of illustration, the Atlanta, GA and Chicago, IL-IN-WI MSAs 
are compared in Figures 11 and 12.  The two MSAs have similar isolation indices (0.60 
and 0.58), but dissimilarity index of Chicago MSA (0.74) is greater than that of Atlanta 
MSA (0.59).  Atlanta’s black homebuyers in 2005 and 2006 are more dispersed 
throughout the MSA than Chicago’s, and this is reflected in dissimilarity indices.  
Chicago has many more white-dominated tracts than Atlanta.  Since the isolation index is 
sensitive to the proportion of blacks in an MSA, the isolation index similar despite the 
impression in the figures.  The proportion of Atlanta’s homebuyers who were black 





Figure 11 Dissimilarity Index, Isolation Index, and Percentage of Blacks of Census 






Figure 12 Dissimilarity Index, Isolation Index, and Percentage of Blacks of Census 
Tracts, Chicago, IL-IN-WI Metropolitan Area 
 




high-leverage loans.  Since the LTV and PTI ratios are not available in publicly available 
data, a proxy variable, the proportion of higher-priced loans identified in the HMDA, is 
used.  Since 2004, the loans’ rate spread is reported in the HMDA data if the loan’s 
annual percentage rate (APR) exceeds a comparable Treasury security’s rate by three 
percentage points.  These higher-priced loans could be the result of several risk factors, 
such as lower credit score, higher LTV and PTI ratios, the poor quality of income 
documentation and other loan features.  Although earlier subprime lending began by 
serving mainly borrowers with blemished credit histories, the nature of subprime lending 
evolved during the 2000s.  Borrower credit scores in subprime loan pools have been 
increasing steadily, and the gaps between the prime and subprime loan pools substantially 
narrowed during the 2000s.  Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) report that 
the average credit score rose from under 622 in 2000 to over 651 in 2004 in their national 
sample.  Foote and his colleagues (Foote, et al., 2008) also report that the proportion of 
borrowers with a credit score of 620 or higher rose from less than 40 percent in 1999 to 
around 70 percent in 2004 in their sample of three New England states.  In contrast, other 
characteristics such as LTV, PTI, and the proportion of the loans with no or low income 
documentation increased.  Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross found that the 
proportion of loans with a relatively high LTV ratio, around 0.9, has increased since 
2000.  Foote et al. (2008) found that the average LTV ratio for borrowers with higher 
credit scores has steadily increased and reached about 95 percent in 2005 and 2006; that 
the average PTI ratio for all borrowers increased to over 40 percent; and that the 
proportion of fully documented loans for borrowers with higher credit scores decreased to 




explained by higher LTV, PTI, and other factors enabling borrowers to get larger loans 
such as less stringent requirements for income documentation. 
Any precise measurement of racial preferences or discrimination by existing 
white residents is generally not feasible.  Some studies rely on preference surveys and 
discrimination audits by paired testers, but these data are not available for numerous 
metropolitan areas or multiple years.  Possible proxy measures are the age, income, and 
educational level of non-Hispanic whites.  Younger, higher-income, and more educated 
individuals are likely to be more tolerant of racial/ethnic minorities (Galster & Keeney, 
1988).  To control the level of non-Hispanic whites’ racial preference and discrimination, 
I include three proxy variables:  the proportion of persons younger than 45, the median 
household income, and the proportion of persons over age 25 with at least a bachelor’s 
degree for non-Hispanic whites.  All of these variables are expected to be negatively 
associated with the segregation level. 
To control the effect of interracial differences in socioeconomic and household 
characteristics, I include the following independent variables: the interracial differences 
in median household income, the proportion of persons over age 25 with at least a 
bachelor’s degree, and the proportions of households that are female-headed families and 
married-couple families.  These variables are calculated by subtracting the value for each 
characteristic of the minority group from that of non-Hispanic whites.  The difference in 
the proportion of households that are female-headed families is expected to be negatively 
associated with the segregation level, and all other variables are expected to be positively 
associated with the segregation level. 




the population in the minority group, and the proportion of houses built in 2000 or later 
are included as control variables.  The population size and the minority group proportion 
are expected to be positively associated with segregation level, but the proportion of 
houses built in 2000 or later is expected to be negatively associated with segregation 
level.  For models involving Hispanic segregation, a variable capturing cultural 
assimilation, the proportion of Hispanic foreign-born population, is included and is 
expected to be positively associated with the segregation level, because the foreign-born 
population is less likely to be assimilated into mainstream society. 
The following model of racial/ethnic segregation level among homebuyers in 




where SEG is the dissimilarity or isolation index, x is the vector of control variables of 
metropolitan characteristics described above, z is the proportion of high-leverage loans, β 
and γ are unknown parameters, and e is the random error term.  Since I argue that 
minority use of high-leverage loans would mitigate the segregation level, the expected 
sign of γ is negative.   
However, the proportion of high-leverage loans might suffer from an endogeneity 
problem, especially in light of recent evidence of the effect of segregation on the 
proportion of higher-priced loans.  Recent research finds empirical evidence for the 
positive effect of segregation on the proportion of subprime loans (Been, et al., 2009; 
Squires, et al., 2009).  When traditional lenders avoid segregated neighborhoods and 




associated with the proportion of subprime or higher-priced loans (Hyra, et al., 2012; 
Williams, et al., 2005). 
Because the proportion of high-leverage loan variable might be correlated with 
the error term, an instrumental variable for this variable needs to be constructed. This 
instrumental variable should not be correlated with the error term, but should be 
correlated with the proportion of high-leverage loans.  We can construct this instrumental 
variable fitting a regression of the proportion of high-leverage loans on all the 
independent variables in the original model excluding the endogenous racial segregation 
index, but including some instruments that are highly correlated with the proportion of 
high-leverage loans.  The racial segregation index is excluded to remove the endogeneity 
problem, and the instruments are included to account for the proportion of high-leverage 
loans.  Thus, the instruments should be uncorrelated with the error term, but highly 
correlated with the proportion of high-leverage loans.  The second condition can be easily 
tested by regressing the proportion of high-leverage loans on instruments and all 
explanatory variables in the original models.  However, the first condition cannot be 
tested in case of a single instrument, but can be tested in the case of multiple instruments.  
After the instrumental variable is constructed, this variable is used as an independent 
variable in the original model to obtain unbiased estimates of parameters. 
To address this simultaneity, the model is estimated by an instrumental variable 
estimation using 2-stage least squares (2SLS) with the following instruments:  the 
strength of enforcement measure of the state-level anti-predatory laws and whether a 
state’s most commonly used foreclosure process is judicial or non-judicial.  The strength 




correlated with the proportion of higher-priced loans because more enforcement can 
stimulate the market if borrowers believe that the law will eliminate the predatory 
behavior of lenders (Bostic, et al., 2008).  Bostic and his colleagues found evidence of 
this in the 2005 HMDA data.  The speed of foreclosure, which is largely determined by 
state regulation, is correlated with the share of higher-priced loans because fast 
foreclosure processes can reduce the lender’s associated costs (Apgar, Bendimerad, & 
Essene, 2007).  Generally, a judicial foreclosure process is slower and less easy for the 
lender (Immergluck, 2010).  These two instruments are expected not to be directly related 
to racial segregation because these laws are not enacted to respond to or motivated by the 
racial segregation, but to protect general mortgage borrowers.  It is difficult to point out 
the independent impact on racial segregation except through the proportion of subprime 
loans or high-leverage loans and other metropolitan socioeconomic variables.  Since the 
number of instruments is greater than that of the endogenous variables, the orthogonality 
assumption of instruments will be tested using the Sargan (1958) and Basmann (1960) 
tests. 
Another approach for addressing possible endogeneity from the unobserved, time-
invariant effects on racial/ethnic segregation relies on the availability of a panel dataset.  
A fixed-effects model estimates parameters with time-demeaned or within-transformed 
data, which is the data subtracted by the time average of the entity (a metropolitan area in 
our case).  Through the within-transformation method, any unobserved, time-invariant 
effects are eliminated, and the estimation is done by OLS or 2SLS with transformed data.  
It should be noted that the fixed-effects model, alone, does not correct for the 




time-constant variables.  To address the simultaneity problem, the following model is 




where the two dots over the aforementioned variables means within-transformed data and 
year 2006 and year 2007 are dummy variables for these years.  This approach has the 
advantage of addressing omitted variable bias from any time-constant, unobserved 
variables, but has a disadvantage in that it relies only on the variable’s time variation, 
ignoring any cross-sectional changes.  The time variation is often very small, and 
consequently the standard errors can be large.  Thus, the parameter estimates of variables 
with small time variation may not be precisely identified.  Given substantial changes in 
MSA boundaries since 2005 and the limited availability of racially- or ethnically-specific 
variables that are consistent over time, only three annual waves of panel data are 
available, those for 2005, 2006 and 2007.  The annual dissimilarity and isolation indices 
computed from annual HMDA data are also measured less precisely than those computed 
from the HMDA data combined over two years.  Despite these disadvantages, the panel 
approach has the major advantage of addressing potential omitted variable bias and can 
provide for a robustness check to the 2005-2006 cross sectional analyses.  Two 
instruments described in the previous paragraph cannot be used because they do not vary 
over time.  For the panel regression, house price appreciation is used instead.  Strong 
house price appreciation encourages lenders to originate more high-leverage loans 
because, even if borrowers have trouble in payments, it is more likely that that they can 




affect racial segregation.  It might indirectly affect racial segregation through a white-
minority income gap and the prevalence of high-leverage loans, but there is no clear 
reason to expect an independent effect.  For illustration, figures 13 and 14 shows regional 
patterns of house price appreciation and home buyer segregation.  The house price 
appreciation is generally high in metropolitan areas on the West and East Coasts, and 
Florida.  While northeastern metropolitan areas have both high segregation and high 
house price appreciation, western and Florida metropolitan areas have low segregation 
and high house price appreciation.  In other metropolitan areas, the relationship between 
segregation and appreciation is not so clear.  
 
 






Figure 14 White-Black Dissimilarity Index in 2005 and 2006 
 
Results of the 2005-2006 Cross Sectional Data Analysis 
The four dependent variables, the black-white and Hispanic-white dissimilarity 
and isolation indices, are examined over three periods:  the pre-Boom (1999-2000) period, 
the Boom (2005-2006) period, and the post-Boom period (2008-2009).  The trend of the 
dissimilarity index shows a clear pattern as shown in Table 17 and Figures 15 and 16.  
The dissimilarity between non-Hispanic whites and blacks decreased from 0.496 in the 
pre-Boom period to 0.449 in the Boom period and increased back to 0.490 in the pre-
Boom period.  The dissimilarity between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics shows a 
similar pattern. 
The isolation index, however, does not exhibit the same patterns across black-




decreased while that of Hispanics was the highest in the Boom period.  Since the isolation 
index is sensitive to the proportion of the minority group’s population in the MSA, I did a 
simple exercise of regressing the isolation index on the proportion of each minority group 
in a metropolitan area and examined the adjusted isolation indices, which are intercepts 
of the regression estimation shown in the last two rows in Table 17.  These indices can be 
considered as the conditional mean after eliminating the influence of the proportion of the 
minority group.  The adjusted indices show a similar pattern as in the dissimilarity index: 
a decrease in the Boom period and then an increase in the post-Boom period. 
 
Table 17 The Comparison of Levels of Segregation over Three Periods 
 
1999-2000 2005-2006 2008-2009 
Dissimilarity Index (NHW-Black) 0.496 0.449 0.490 
Dissimilarity Index (NHW-Hispanic) 0.441 0.361 0.396 
Isolation Index (Black) 0.165 0.160 0.143 
Isolation Index (Hispanic) 0.127 0.161 0.140 
Adjusted Isolation Index (Black) 0.046 0.037 0.041 
Adjusted Isolation Index (Hispanic) 0.044 0.039 0.043 
N = 362 
   



































Figure 20 Trend in Hispanic Isolation Adjusted 
 
Next, Table 18 reflects a comparison of home buyer segregation levels between 
two sets of homebuyers: all buyers and those using non-high-leverage loans only.  The 
dissimilarity index reflects that the segregation level among all buyers is lower than that 
among those using non-high-leverage loans for both white-black and white-Hispanic 
dissimilarities.  The pattern is different for the isolation index, where the numbers among 
all buyers are higher in most cases than for the non-high-leverage buyers.  This result 
reflects the fact that the relative size of minority group is larger among all buyers than 
among buyers using non-high-leverage loans.  Under a similar exercise, the adjusted 




is reversed, the changes in isolation indices appear smaller than those in the dissimilarity 
indices.  In sum, these comparisons show that the high-leverage loans in the Boom period 
might have helped to mitigate the segregation level, especially in terms of the 
dissimilarity index. 
 
Table 18 Comparison of Segregation Level among All Loans and among Non-High-
leverage Loans Only 
 
1999-2000 2005-2006 2008-2009 
 
ALL Non-HL Only ALL Non-HL Only ALL Non-HL Only 
Dissimilarity Index (NHW-Black) 0.496 0.502 0.449 0.456 0.490 0.493 
Dissimilarity Index (NHW-Hispanic) 0.441 0.447 0.361 0.365 0.396 0.399 
Isolation Index (Black) 0.165 0.158 0.160 0.132 0.143 0.139 
Isolation Index (Hispanic) 0.127 0.128 0.161 0.143 0.140 0.136 
Adjusted Isolation Index (Black) 0.046 0.045 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.042 
Adjusted Isolation Index (Hispanic) 0.044 0.046 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.042 
N = 362 
   
 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the black-white and Hispanics-
white segregation models for the 2005-2006 period are shown in Table 19 and 20 
respectively.  The proportion of high-leverage loans in this period is just over 20 percent 
for both models, reflecting the prevalence of these loans at the peak of the mortgage 
boom.  The interracial difference in median household income is greater between non-
Hispanic whites and blacks than between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics.  The 
difference in education level between non-Hispanics whites and Hispanics is higher than 
between non-Hispanic whites and blacks.  But for the differences in median household 
income and family structure, the pattern is reversed.  Both blacks and Hispanics comprise 






Table 19 Descriptive Statistics for Blacks Models 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WB Dissimilarity Index 0.444 0.120 0.145 0.806 
Black Isolation Index 0.197 0.158 0.008 0.639 
% High-leverage Loans 0.206 0.068 0.045 0.421 
% Under 45, NHW 0.575 0.050 0.386 0.772 
Median Income, NHW (in thousands) 52.732 9.551 35.022 96.575 
% College, NHW 0.280 0.085 0.129 0.564 
WB Difference, Median Income (in thousands) 20.894 7.573 -5.097 47.610 
WB Difference, % College 0.128 0.061 -0.075 0.315 
WB Difference, % Married 0.230 0.071 -0.066 0.435 
WB Difference, % Female Head -0.188 0.069 -0.485 0.072 
Log of Population 12.909 1.077 11.188 16.749 
% Black 0.126 0.108 0.008 0.493 
% Built 2000 Later 0.111 0.048 0.024 0.264 
Enforcement Index 2.286 1.291 0.000 5.030 
Judicial Foreclosure 0.436 0.497 0.000 1.000 
     
N=273 
    
 
Table 20 Descriptive Statistics for Hispanic Models 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WH Dissimilarity Index 0.356 0.101 0.103 0.684 
Hispanic Isolation Index 0.185 0.192 0.017 0.923 
% High-leverage Loans 0.203 0.072 0.066 0.468 
% Under 45, NHW 0.577 0.054 0.386 0.781 
Median Income, NHW (in thousands) 53.014 9.118 36.414 96.575 
% College, NHW 0.287 0.087 0.129 0.607 
WH Difference, Median Income (in thousands) 15.112 7.887 -11.155 43.821 
WH Difference, College 0.149 0.086 -0.086 0.448 
WH Difference, Married 0.042 0.081 -0.190 0.294 
WH Difference, Female Head -0.076 0.060 -0.300 0.087 
Log of Population 12.839 1.058 11.163 16.749 
% Hispanic 0.126 0.159 0.009 0.947 
% Built 2000 Later 0.117 0.049 0.025 0.284 
% Foreign Born, Hispanic 0.350 0.140 0.031 0.647 
Judicial Foreclosure 0.395 0.490 0.000 1.000 
     
N=301 
    
 
The OLS and 2SLS estimation results for NHW-black dissimilarity, black 
isolation, NHW-Hispanic dissimilarity, and Hispanic isolation models are reported in 
Tables 23 through 26 respectively.  To be valid, the chosen instruments for the proportion 
of high-leverage loans must be highly correlated with the proportion of subprime but 




instruments are both individually significant in the first-stage regression, and the F-test 
statistic for joint significance is relatively large (Table 21).  In Hispanic models, however, 
the enforcement index is not statistically significant and the F-test statistic is fairly small.  
Since a weak instrument can cause asymptotic bias, only the judicial foreclosure variable 
is used as an instrument for the Hispanic models.  The first stage regression result of 
Hispanic model with the judicial foreclosure variable is reported in Table 22.  In the 
black models, the second requirement for instrument validity is tested with the Sargan 
and Basmann tests of over-identification.  Rejection of the null hypothesis for these tests 
implies that at least one instrument should not be used.  As Tables 23 and 24 indicate, the 
test statistics are very small and we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  Thus, both judicial 
foreclosure and the enforcement index are used as instruments in the black models, while 
only the judicial foreclosure variable is used in the Hispanic models, given that no 
apparent theoretical connection exists between judicial foreclosure and racial/ethnic 
segregation.  In all cases, the two Hausman-type tests in tables 23 through 26 indicate 
that significant changes in the coefficients arise after addressing the endogeneity problem.  
The test statistic for the NHW-black dissimilarity model is statistically significant at 






Table 21 Estimation Results of First Stage Regression of the Proportion of High-
Leverage Loans for Blacks, 2005-2006 Cross Section 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
Enforcement Index 0.005 0.003 1.990 0.047 
Judicial Foreclosure -0.032 0.007 -4.430 0.000 
% Under 45, NHW -0.402 0.070 -5.750 0.000 
Median Income, NHW 0.002 0.001 2.730 0.007 
% College, NHW -0.535 0.071 -7.500 0.000 
WB Difference, Median Income 0.000 0.001 0.230 0.818 
WB Difference, % College 0.080 0.087 0.920 0.359 
WB Difference, % Married -0.147 0.069 -2.120 0.035 
WB Difference, % Female Head -0.081 0.064 -1.260 0.208 
Log of Population 0.017 0.004 4.450 0.000 
% Black -0.005 0.032 -0.170 0.867 
% Built 2000 Later 0.096 0.072 1.330 0.183 
Intercept 0.276 0.063 4.390 0.000 
     N= 273 
   R-squared= 0.440 
   F-statistics= 10.49 
    
 
 
Table 22 Estimation Results of First Stage Regression of the Proportion of High-
Leverage Loans for Hispanics, 2005-2006 Cross Section 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
Judicial Foreclosure -0.015 0.006 -2.520 0.012 
% Under 45, NHW -0.217 0.058 -3.760 0.000 
Median Income, NHW 0.001 0.000 1.460 0.145 
% College, NHW -0.449 0.047 -9.550 0.000 
WB Difference, Median Income 0.001 0.001 1.220 0.222 
WB Difference, % College -0.062 0.053 -1.170 0.241 
WB Difference, % Married 0.023 0.044 0.530 0.597 
WB Difference, % Female Head 0.198 0.060 3.300 0.001 
Log of Population 0.018 0.003 5.570 0.000 
% Black 0.246 0.024 10.380 0.000 
% Built 2000 Later -0.050 0.063 -0.790 0.433 
% Foreign Born, Hispanic 0.052 0.023 2.250 0.025 
Intercept 0.163 0.053 3.080 0.002 
     N= 301 
   R-squared= 0.603 
   F-statistics= 6.35 










Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
% High-leverage Loans -0.022 0.091 -0.240 0.807 
 
-0.609 0.358 -1.700 0.090 
% Under 45, NHW -0.310 0.111 -2.790 0.006 
 
-0.527 0.175 -3.020 0.003 
Median Income, NHW -0.003 0.000 -2.910 0.004 
 
-0.002 0.000 -1.300 0.194 
% College, NHW -0.008 0.120 -0.070 0.944 
 
-0.336 0.232 -1.450 0.148 
WB Difference, Median Income 0.003 0.000 2.540 0.012 
 
0.003 0.000 2.350 0.020 
WB Difference, % College 0.100 0.132 0.760 0.450 
 
0.160 0.146 1.100 0.274 
WB Difference, % Married 0.130 0.106 1.230 0.221 
 
0.052 0.123 0.420 0.673 
WB Difference, % Female Head -0.057 0.092 -0.620 0.534 
 
-0.049 0.099 -0.490 0.626 
Log of Population 0.057 0.006 9.220 0.000 
 
0.067 0.009 7.460 0.000 
% Black 0.112 0.048 2.330 0.021 
 
0.125 0.052 2.390 0.018 
% Built 2000 Later -1.109 0.110 -10.110 0.000 
 
-1.032 0.127 -8.160 0.000 
Intercept 0.024 0.098 0.240 0.809 
 
0.171 0.136 1.250 0.211 
          
N 273 
    
273 
   
R-squared 0.585 
    
N/A 
   
          
F-stat for instruments significance N/A 
    
10.490 
   
Sargan N*R-sq test stat N/A 
    
0.678 
   
Basmann test stat N/A 
    
0.643 
   
Wu-Hausman F test stat N/A 
    
3.388 
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat N/A 
    
3.512 












Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
% High-leverage Loans 0.012 0.078 0.150 0.880 
 
-0.774 0.337 -2.300 0.022 
% Under 45, NHW 0.010 0.095 0.100 0.918 
 
-0.280 0.164 -1.710 0.089 
Median Income, NHW 0.000 0.000 -0.560 0.575 
 
0.001 0.000 0.950 0.343 
% College, NHW -0.019 0.103 -0.190 0.853 
 
-0.458 0.218 -2.100 0.036 
WB Difference, Median Income 0.000 0.000 0.290 0.769 
 
0.000 0.000 0.230 0.815 
WB Difference, College -0.134 0.113 -1.180 0.239 
 
-0.052 0.137 -0.380 0.706 
WB Difference, Married 0.057 0.091 0.620 0.534 
 
-0.048 0.116 -0.410 0.679 
WB Difference, Female Head -0.132 0.079 -1.660 0.098 
 
-0.120 0.093 -1.280 0.202 
Log of Population 0.056 0.005 10.450 0.000 
 
0.069 0.008 8.180 0.000 
% Black 1.188 0.041 28.730 0.000 
 
1.205 0.049 24.470 0.000 
% Built 2000 Later -0.624 0.094 -6.630 0.000 
 
-0.521 0.119 -4.380 0.000 
Intercept -0.607 0.084 -7.250 0.000 
 
-0.410 0.128 -3.210 0.001 
          N 273 
    
273 
   R-squared 0.824 
    
N/A 
   
          F-stat for instruments significance N/A 
    
10.490 
   
Sargan N*R-sq test stat N/A 
    
0.009 
   
Basmann test stat N/A 
    
0.009 
   
Wu-Hausman F test stat N/A 
    
8.398 
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat N/A 
    
8.542 












Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
% High-leverage Loans 0.093 0.089 1.050 0.293 
 
-1.675 0.932 -1.800 0.073 
% Under 45, NHW -0.097 0.087 -1.110 0.269 
 
-0.424 0.217 -1.950 0.052 
Median Income, NHW 0.000 0.000 -0.280 0.782 
 
0.001 0.000 0.900 0.369 
% College, NHW -0.130 0.082 -1.580 0.116 
 
-0.941 0.442 -2.130 0.034 
WH Difference, Median Income 0.002 0.000 2.230 0.027 
 
0.003 0.000 1.990 0.047 
WH Difference, College 0.206 0.080 2.570 0.011 
 
0.128 0.130 0.990 0.324 
WH Difference, Married -0.020 0.067 -0.290 0.769 
 
0.023 0.106 0.210 0.831 
WH Difference, Female Head -0.359 0.093 -3.870 0.000 
 
-0.021 0.227 -0.090 0.927 
Log of Population 0.034 0.005 6.500 0.000 
 
0.065 0.018 3.580 0.000 
% Hispanic -0.018 0.042 -0.420 0.676 
 
0.440 0.247 1.780 0.076 
% Built 2000 Later -0.754 0.096 -7.830 0.000 
 
-0.825 0.153 -5.390 0.000 
% Foreign Born 0.135 0.035 3.840 0.000 
 
0.235 0.075 3.120 0.002 
Intercept -0.035 0.080 -0.430 0.665 
 
0.207 0.176 1.180 0.241 
          N 301 
    
301 
   R-squared 0.533 
    
N/A 
   
          F-stat for instruments significance N/A 
    
6.350 
   Wu-Hausman F test stat N/A 
    
9.002 
   Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat N/A 
    
9.154 











Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t p-value 
% High-leverage Loans 0.223 0.085 2.630 0.009 
 
-0.991 0.755 -1.310 0.191 
% Under 45, NHW -0.073 0.083 -0.880 0.381 
 
-0.298 0.176 -1.690 0.092 
Median Income, NHW 0.004 0.001 4.960 0.000 
 
0.005 0.001 4.060 0.000 
% College, NHW -0.280 0.078 -3.560 0.000 
 
-0.837 0.358 -2.340 0.020 
WH Difference, Median Income 0.000 0.001 -0.190 0.851 
 
0.000 0.001 0.400 0.692 
WH Difference, College 0.081 0.076 1.060 0.292 
 
0.027 0.105 0.260 0.794 
WH Difference, Married -0.244 0.064 -3.800 0.000 
 
-0.215 0.086 -2.500 0.013 
WH Difference, Female Head -0.418 0.089 -4.710 0.000 
 
-0.186 0.184 -1.010 0.314 
Log of Population 0.019 0.005 3.850 0.000 
 
0.041 0.015 2.760 0.006 
% Hispanic 0.913 0.040 22.680 0.000 
 
1.227 0.200 6.120 0.000 
% Built 2000 Later -0.215 0.092 -2.340 0.020 
 
-0.264 0.124 -2.130 0.034 
% Foreign Born 0.138 0.034 4.120 0.000 
 
0.207 0.061 3.390 0.001 
Intercept -0.339 0.076 -4.440 0.000 
 
-0.173 0.143 -1.210 0.226 
          N 301 
    
301 
   R-squared 0.882 
    
N/A 
   
          F-stat for instruments significance N/A 
    
6.350 
   Wu-Hausman F test stat N/A 
    
4.571 
   Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat N/A 
    
4.719 




I first discuss the results for control variables in the 2SLS estimations.  Among 
the proxy variables for non-Hispanic whites’ preference and discrimination, the 
proportion of non-Hispanic persons younger than 45 is statistically significant (at below 
0.10) and negative in all models.  The effect is more significant in the dissimilarity 
models than in the isolation models.  The effects are significant at the 0.003 and 0.052 
levels in the NHW-black and NHW-Hispanic dissimilarity models, and at 0.089 and 
0.092 levels in the black and Hispanic isolation models, respectively.  The proportion of 
non-Hispanic persons over age 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree is negative and 
statistically significant at 0.05 significance in all models except the NHW-black 
dissimilarity model.  In the NHW-black dissimilarity model, the negative effect is 
statistically significant only at the 0.148 level.  The median household income coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Hispanic isolation model.  
Potential explanations for why Hispanics are more isolated from other groups in more 
affluent metropolitan areas will be addressed further below.  The results together 
generally support the claim that younger and better educated – but not richer – non-
Hispanic whites are more open to racial/ethnic residential integration. 
The variables on interracial differences in socioeconomic and household 
characteristics are not statistically significant except in certain cases.  The interracial 
difference in the median household income coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant in the dissimilarity models at the 0.05 significance level, but not in the 
isolation models.  The interracial difference in the proportion of married-couple families 
variable is negative and is statistically significant in the Hispanic isolation model at the 




Other metropolitan area characteristics are statistically significant in all the 2SLS 
models and show the expected signs.  Larger metropolitan areas and those areas with 
larger minority populations are more segregated.  Metropolitan areas with greater 
portions of recently constructed houses are less segregated.  Metropolitan areas with 
larger foreign-born populations have higher segregation levels, other things being equal.  
Finally, the explanatory variable of primary interest here, the proportion of high-
leverage loans, has a negative and statistically significant (at below 0.10) effect on 
segregation in all models except the Hispanic isolation model.  The negative effect of 
high-leverage on segregation is significant at the 0.090, 0.022, and 0.073 levels in NHW-
black dissimilarity, black isolation, and Hispanic dissimilarity 2SLS models, respectively. 
Comparing the OLS and 2SLS coefficient estimates for the proportion of high-
leverage loans, I find that the effect is negative in all 2SLS models, except the NHW-
black dissimilarity model.  This result indicates that the simultaneity causes an upward 
bias on the OLS estimates, and so the OLS models underestimate the effect that the 
proportion of high-leverage loans has on segregation, as expected.  The effect of the 
proportion of high-leverage loans on segregation is substantial.  A ten percentage point 
increase in the proportion of high-leverage loans in a metropolitan area is associated with 
0.061, 0.077, and 0.168 decreases in NHW-black dissimilarity, black isolation, and 
NHW-Hispanic dissimilarity, respectively.  These results reflect a substantial effect, 
considering the standard deviation of 0.120, 0.008 and 0.103 in these dependent variables, 
respectively.  Also, these effects are larger than those due to a ten percentage point 
increase in the proportion of non-Hispanic persons younger than 45 and a $20,000 




In order to demonstrate the “raw” effect of a standard-deviation increase in high-
leverage lending (6.8 percentage point) on homebuying patterns, I consider such an effect 
in three different MSAs, one with a low dissimilarity index (Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, 
AZ at 0.34), one with a moderate dissimilarity index (Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
FL at 0.46), and one with a high dissimilarity index (San Francisco-Oakland-Freemont, 
CA at 0.59).  Since a 100 percentage-point increase in high-leverage loans is associated 
with a 0.609 decrease in MSA’s dissimilarity index, a 6.8 percentage point increase in 
high-leverage loans is expected to decrease the dissimilarity index by 0.0414.  This 
corresponds to 4.14 percent of homebuyers moving to different neighborhoods.  In the 
2005-2006 period, the total number of homebuyers in Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Tampa-
St. Petersburg-Clearwater, and San Francisco-Oakland-Freemont were 210,646, 107,835, 
and 116,966 respectively.  Thus, a 6.8 percentage point increase in high-leverage loans 
would affect 8,721, 4,464, and 4,842 homebuyers in 2005-2006 in the Phoenix-Mesa-
Scottsdale, Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, and San Francisco-Oakland-Freemont 
MSAs, respectively. 
 
Results of 2005-2007 Panel Data Analysis 
A similar model was estimated with three waves of annual dataset from 2005 to 
2007.  Despite a less precise measure of dependent variables, fixed-effects estimation has 
the advantage of correcting potential omitted variable bias.  The fixed-effects estimation 
is done with within-transformed data, setting forth deviations from the time averages of 
the variables.  Since this method does not correct the simultaneity problem of time-




with a 2SLS approach and an instrument reflecting house price appreciation of the 
previous year.  The instruments used in the cross-sectional analysis could not be used 
because they do not change over time. 
 
Table 27 Descriptive Statistics for Black Models, 2005-2007 Panel Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WB Dissimilarity Index 0.509 0.111 0.207 0.828 
Black Isolation Index 0.256 0.159 0.019 0.663 
% High-leverage Loans 0.181 0.078 0.034 0.444 
% Under 45, NHW 0.575 0.041 0.446 0.725 
Median Income, NHW (in thousands) 55.755 10.072 37.894 100.422 
% College, NHW 0.312 0.081 0.157 0.577 
WB Difference, Median Income (in thousands) 22.585 7.150 -2.443 49.699 
WB Difference, % College 0.144 0.060 0.011 0.330 
WB Difference, % Married 0.227 0.067 -0.069 0.417 
WB Difference, % Female Head -0.196 0.053 -0.422 -0.016 
Log of Population 13.648 0.995 11.541 16.750 
% Black 0.135 0.094 0.011 0.454 
% Built 2000 Later 0.112 0.051 0.020 0.293 
Appreciation 0.068 0.077 -0.118 0.327 
     
Number of MSAs=135 
    
Time periods (years) =3 
    
 
Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the black and Hispanic 
segregation models for the annual panel data for the 2005-2007 period are shown in 
Table 27 and 28 respectively.  The proportions of high-leverage loans in this period are 
about 18 percent for both models, a bit less than those in 2005-2006 period dataset, but 
still a substantial portion of the loans.  As in the case of 2005-2006 period dataset, the 
interracial differences in median household income and family structure between non-
Hispanic whites and Hispanics are larger than the differences between non-Hispanic 
whites and blacks, while the difference in education between non-Hispanic whites and 
Hispanics is greater.  Blacks and Hispanics comprise about 14 and 17 percent of the 




relatively high because it includes 2005 and 2006, the peak of the housing boom.  The 
difference in the number of observations between blacks and Hispanics is caused by the 
limited availability of a median household income variable for blacks. 
The pooled 2SLS and fixed-effects 2SLS estimation results for NHW-black 
dissimilarity, black isolation, NHW-Hispanic dissimilarity, and Hispanic isolation models 
are reported in Table 29 through Table 32 respectively.  In all models, the house price 
appreciation variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.  Also, F-test 
statistics for the significance of house price appreciation is very large in all models except 
the NHW-black and black isolation models estimated by pooled OLS.  Thus, all the 
models estimated by fixed effects 2SLS appear to employ a strong instrument.  Since we 
have only one instrumental variable, we have to rely on the argument that no apparent 
causal relationship exists between house price appreciation and racial/ethnic segregation 
to defend the orthogonality of the instrumental variable. 
 
Table 28 Descriptive Statistics for Hispanic Models, 2005-2007 Panel Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WH Dissimilarity Index 0.415 0.101 0.170 0.700 
Hispanic Isolation Index 0.262 0.195 0.032 0.871 
% High-leverage Loans 0.183 0.083 0.030 0.477 
% Under 45, NHW 0.571 0.049 0.397 0.781 
Median Income, NHW (in thousands) 55.021 9.854 37.894 100.422 
% College, NHW 0.312 0.087 0.135 0.637 
WH Difference, Median Income (in thousands) 17.538 7.927 -4.206 45.544 
WH Difference, College 0.180 0.088 -0.130 0.499 
WH Difference, Married 0.040 0.085 -0.216 0.276 
WH Difference, Female Head -0.089 0.062 -0.334 0.060 
Log of Population 13.395 1.044 11.522 16.750 
% Hispanic 0.173 0.173 0.008 0.896 
% Built 2000 Later 0.118 0.054 0.020 0.323 
% Foreign Born, Hispanic 0.348 0.140 0.034 0.683 
Appreciation 0.072 0.083 -0.135 0.327 
     
Number of MSAs =168 
    
Time periods (years)=3 









Fixed Effects 2SLS 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
% High-leverage Loans -4.120 2.056 -2.000 0.046 
 
-0.528 0.161 -3.280 0.001 
% Under 45, NHW -2.671 1.262 -2.120 0.035 
 
0.227 0.397 0.570 0.568 
Median Income, NHW 0.004 0.004 1.060 0.289 
 
-0.002 0.001 -1.400 0.164 
% College, NHW -1.623 1.001 -1.620 0.106 
 
-0.045 0.200 -0.220 0.822 
WB Difference, Median Income 0.001 0.003 0.360 0.721 
 
0.000 0.001 -0.310 0.753 
WB Difference, % College 0.238 0.350 0.680 0.496 
 
-0.013 0.072 -0.170 0.862 
WB Difference, % Married -0.181 0.366 -0.490 0.622 
 
0.052 0.050 1.040 0.301 
WB Difference, % Female Head -0.489 0.314 -1.560 0.120 
 
-0.018 0.059 -0.300 0.761 
Log of Population 0.118 0.038 3.080 0.002 
 
0.101 0.106 0.950 0.341 
% Black 0.076 0.128 0.600 0.550 
 
-0.519 0.442 -1.170 0.242 
% Built 2000 Later 0.091 0.578 0.160 0.875 
 
-0.304 0.186 -1.640 0.102 
Year 2006 -0.002 0.032 -0.060 0.950 
 
0.012 0.007 1.790 0.075 
Year 2007 -0.400 0.233 -1.710 0.087 
 
-0.011 0.018 -0.620 0.535 
Intercept 1.473 0.808 1.820 0.069 
 
-0.697 1.353 -0.520 0.606 
          
N 405 
    
405 
   
          
F stat for instrument significance 4.960 
    
55.4 
   
Wu-Hausman F test stat 47.633 
    
N/A 
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat 44.081 
    
N/A 
   
Chi-squared-stat for endogeneity test N/A 
    
13.39 











Fixed Effects 2SLS 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
% High-leverage Loans -4.523 2.198 -2.060 0.040 
 
-0.667 0.152 -4.390 0.000 
% Under 45, NHW -2.659 1.349 -1.970 0.049 
 
0.033 0.375 0.090 0.930 
Median Income, NHW 0.005 0.004 1.320 0.189 
 
-0.002 0.001 -1.630 0.104 
% College, NHW -2.122 1.070 -1.980 0.048 
 
0.025 0.189 0.130 0.893 
WB Difference, Median Income 0.001 0.003 0.260 0.797 
 
0.000 0.001 -0.450 0.650 
WB Difference, % College 0.176 0.374 0.470 0.638 
 
-0.106 0.068 -1.550 0.123 
WB Difference, % Married -0.391 0.392 -1.000 0.319 
 
0.053 0.048 1.110 0.270 
WB Difference, % Female Head -0.487 0.335 -1.450 0.147 
 
0.066 0.056 1.170 0.241 
Log of Population 0.134 0.041 3.260 0.001 
 
-0.058 0.100 -0.580 0.564 
% Black 1.283 0.136 9.400 0.000 
 
0.059 0.417 0.140 0.888 
% Built 2000 Later 0.429 0.617 0.700 0.487 
 
0.096 0.175 0.550 0.584 
Year 2006 -0.002 0.034 -0.050 0.963 
 
0.020 0.006 3.160 0.002 
Year 2007 -0.469 0.249 -1.880 0.061 
 
-0.045 0.017 -2.690 0.008 
Intercept 1.048 0.864 1.210 0.226 
 
1.268 1.276 0.990 0.321 
          
N 405 
    
405 
   
          
F stat for instrument significance 4.960 
    
55.4 
   
Wu-Hausman F test stat 51.600 
    
N/A 
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat 47.323 
    
N/A 
   
Chi-squared-stat for endogeneity test N/A 
    
64.582 










Fixed Effects 2SLS 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
% High-leverage Loans -1.604 0.593 -2.710 0.007 
 
-0.119 0.114 -1.040 0.297 
% Under 45, NHW -0.487 0.146 -3.330 0.001 
 
0.695 0.322 2.160 0.032 
Median Income, NHW 0.002 0.001 1.900 0.058 
 
-0.001 0.001 -1.170 0.243 
% College, NHW -1.005 0.269 -3.740 0.000 
 
0.182 0.134 1.360 0.174 
WH Difference, Median Income 0.002 0.001 1.970 0.050 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.370 0.711 
WH Difference, % College 0.110 0.106 1.030 0.301 
 
-0.001 0.054 -0.020 0.984 
WH Difference, % Married -0.060 0.084 -0.710 0.475 
 
0.034 0.033 1.030 0.302 
WH Difference, % Female Head -0.236 0.114 -2.070 0.039 
 
0.027 0.038 0.700 0.482 
Log of Population 0.060 0.011 5.510 0.000 
 
-0.190 0.077 -2.460 0.014 
% Hispanic 0.254 0.134 1.900 0.058 
 
-0.280 0.477 -0.590 0.558 
% Built 2000 Later -0.779 0.106 -7.350 0.000 
 
0.138 0.133 1.030 0.303 
% Foreign Born, Hispanic 0.241 0.061 3.920 0.000 
 
0.007 0.044 0.170 0.869 
Year 2006 0.015 0.012 1.260 0.208 
 
0.020 0.005 3.820 0.000 
Year 2007 -0.128 0.064 -1.990 0.047 
 
0.020 0.013 1.550 0.123 
Intercept 0.303 0.118 2.580 0.010 
 
2.602 0.995 2.610 0.009 
          
N 504 
    
504 
   
          
F stat for instrument significance 14.860 
    
81.460 
   
Wu-Hausman F test stat 18.658 
    
N/A 
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat 18.560 
    
N/A 
   
Chi-squared-stat for endogeneity test N/A 
    
2.264 










Fixed Effects 2SLS 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
% High-leverage Loans 1.464 0.490 2.990 0.003 
 
0.700 0.106 6.590 0.000 
% Under 45, NHW -0.118 0.121 -0.970 0.330 
 
0.495 0.300 1.650 0.100 
Median Income, NHW 0.002 0.001 1.760 0.079 
 
0.000 0.001 0.310 0.754 
% College, NHW 0.028 0.222 0.130 0.899 
 
0.127 0.125 1.020 0.309 
WH Difference, Median Income 0.002 0.001 2.150 0.032 
 
0.000 0.000 -0.240 0.810 
WH Difference, % College 0.251 0.088 2.860 0.004 
 
0.016 0.050 0.320 0.751 
WH Difference, % Married -0.285 0.070 -4.100 0.000 
 
0.008 0.031 0.250 0.801 
WH Difference, % Female Head -0.515 0.094 -5.490 0.000 
 
-0.003 0.036 -0.090 0.928 
Log of Population -0.002 0.009 -0.220 0.822 
 
0.020 0.072 0.270 0.784 
% Hispanic 0.561 0.110 5.090 0.000 
 
-0.556 0.445 -1.250 0.212 
% Built 2000 Later -0.267 0.087 -3.050 0.002 
 
0.440 0.124 3.540 0.000 
% Foreign Born, Hispanic 0.049 0.051 0.970 0.333 
 
-0.015 0.041 -0.370 0.709 
Year 2006 0.010 0.010 1.050 0.294 
 
0.007 0.005 1.360 0.173 
Year 2007 0.131 0.053 2.460 0.014 
 
0.047 0.012 3.860 0.000 
Intercept -0.250 0.097 -2.570 0.010 
 
-0.437 0.928 -0.470 0.637 
          
N 504 
    
504 
   
          
F stat for instrument significance 14.860 
    
81.46 
   
Wu-Hausman F test stat 6.397 
    
N/A 
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test stat 6.521 
    
N/A 
   
Chi-squared-stat for endogeneity test N/A 
    
5.721 




The control variables are more often statistically significant in the pooled 2SLS 
estimates than in the fixed-effects model.  Actually, most control variables are not 
statistically significant in the fixed-effects 2SLS estimates, a result not caused by larger 
standard errors, but by changes in parameter estimates.  The estimates change rather 
radically, often with a different sign.  It appears that the short-term variation in 
homebuyer segregation in this period is not well explained by short-term changes in these 
control variables, or the imprecision of the annual ACS estimates may cause these 
unexpected results.  Previous studies typically have not been conducted in the fixed-
effects models framework, and further research with more reliable data is required to 
examine whether the long-term effects are different from the results here. 
The explanatory variable of our primary interest, the proportion of high-leverage 
loans have statistically significant -- at the 0.01 level, -- negative effects on segregation 
level in black models both in the pooled 2SLS and the fixed effects 2SLS, but not in the 
Hispanic models.  Moreover, in the Hispanic isolation model, the variable shows a 
statistically significant, positive effect.  After controlling for all the unobserved, time-
invariant, fixed effects, it seems that the hypothesized negative effect only holds for black 
segregation.  Hispanic isolation shows persistent positive effects from high-leverage 
lending in both cross-sectional analysis and panel data analysis.  It might be that 
Hispanics have a cultural preference for isolating themselves from other groups, and the 
use of high-leverage loans helped them realize that preference.  For blacks, the magnitude 
of the negative effect is comparable to the effect found in 2005-2006 cross-sectional 




metropolitan area is associated with 0.053 and 0.067 decrease in dissimilarity and 
isolation indices, respectively. 
 
Comparison of Cross-Sectional and Panel Analyses Results and Discussion 
The proportion of high-leverage loans has a statistically significant, desegregating 
effect on black segregation both in the 2005-2006 cross-sectional and the 2005-2007 
panel data analyses.  The magnitude of the effect is substantial.  A ten percentage point 
increase in the proportion of high-leverage loans is associated with a 0.061 decrease in 
dissimilarity and a 0.077 decrease in isolation indices across metropolitan areas, and this 
effect is associated with a 0.053 decrease in dissimilarity and a 0.067 decrease in 
isolation indices over time.  In the case of the cross-sectional analysis, these effects are 
larger than a ten percentage point increase in the proportion of non-Hispanic persons 
younger than 45 and a $20,000 decrease in median household income gap.  In the case of 
fixed-effects estimation, the effect on dissimilarity is larger than a ten percentage point 
increase in the proportion of houses built in 2000 or later, and the effect on isolation is 
larger than the effect of a $30,000 increase in the median household income of non-
Hispanic whites.   
In the case of Hispanic segregation, the results from the two analyses do not align 
well.  The desegregating effect of the proportion of high-leverage loans on the 
dissimilarity index is statistically significant in the 2005-2006 cross-sectional analysis, 
but not in the fixed-effects estimate.  Thus, these results support the hypothesis of the 
desegregating effect of the proportion of high-leverage loans only in a limited way.  The 




analysis, the effect of the proportion of high-leverage loans is statistically not significant, 
but with the expected negative sign.  In the fixed effects estimation, however, the effect is 
statistically significant and positive. Therefore, the hypothesized desegregating effect is 
not apparent among Hispanics.  Based on the fixed-effects estimate, we can infer that in 
the relevant period, Hispanics used high-leverage loans to buy homes in more isolated 
ethnic communities.  This result might be attributable to different preferences between 
blacks and Hispanics for neighborhood racial/ethnic composition and the larger 
proportion of immigrants among Hispanics.  The Hispanics’ preference for their own 
ethnic neighborhoods appears to be greater than that of blacks due to the higher rate of 
Hispanic immigrants and the consequent language barriers and dependence on ethnic 
cultural institutions (Charles, 2005).  Also, in a recent analysis of 2010 Census data, a 
large increase in Hispanic isolation indices, in contrast to the decrease in black isolation 
indices, was attributed to the Hispanic population growth and immigration into mostly 
established ethnic enclaves (Logan & Stults, 2011).  Thus, it might be argued that high-
leverage loans helped both blacks and Hispanics to realize their neighborhood preference, 
and Hispanics’ strong preference for an ethnic community or enclave results in the 









Summary of Results 
This dissertation examined the impacts of high-leverage loans on homebuyers’ 
housing demand, on the qualities of neighborhoods where homes are purchased, and on 
the metropolitan-level racial and ethnic segregation of homebuyers.  The first two 
impacts were examined using the AHS data at the household level, and the last impact 
was examined using the HMDA and the ACS data at the metropolitan area level. 
Results of the AHS data analysis show that the use of high-leverage loans 
increases housing demand and neighborhood quality, holding other household 
characteristics constant.  A household that receives a loan with 0.05 higher PTI ratio is 
expected to consume ten percent more housing, other things being equal.  Moreover, 
households receiving a loan with CLTV ratios between 0.85 and 0.90, between 0.90 and 
0.95, between 0.95 and 1.00, and between 1.00 and 1.05 are expected to consume more 
housing by six to eight percent, than a household with a CLTV ratio of less than 0.85, 
holding other variables constant. 
Regarding neighborhood quality, a household receiving a loan with a higher PTI 
ratio is expected to increase the probability of purchasing a home in a neighborhood with 
no townhouses or rowhouses, no apartment buildings, no business or institutions, no 
abandoned buildings, no building with bars on windows, no trash or junk, no parking lots, 
no roads needing repairs, high neighborhood rating, no stores within 15 minutes, and no 
serious neighborhood crime, holding other variables constant.  Also, a household 




probabilities of purchasing a home in a neighborhood with no apartment building, 
holding other variables constant.  Some of CLTV ratio dummies have statistically 
significant effects on choosing neighborhoods with no business or institutions, no parking 
lots, high neighborhood ratings, and no stores within 15 minutes.  After omitting PTI 
ratio in the models, most CLTV ratio dummies have statistically significant, positive 
effects on choosing neighborhoods with no apartment buildings and no townhouses or 
rowhouses.  Also, some CLTV ratio dummies have statistically significant, positive 
effects on choosing neighborhoods with no business or institutions, open space, no 
buildings with bars on windows, no parking lots, high neighborhood rating, and no stores 
within 15 minutes.  This change occurs because PTI ratio and CLTV ratio are closely 
correlated. 
Most of the neighborhood quality variables for which PTI and CLTV ratios have 
significant effects are those evaluated by interviewers, and these variables are likely to be 
more objectively and consistently assessed than those evaluated by the interviewees 
themselves.  The magnitudes of these effects are somewhat moderate.  A 0.05 increase in 
PTI ratio is expected to increase the probability of choosing a higher-quality 
neighborhood by between 0.003 and 0.03, depending on the variables measuring the 
neighborhood quality.  Loans with a CLTV ratio between 0.90 and 0.95, between 1.00 
and 1.05, between 1.05 and 1.10, and greater than 1.10 are expected to increase the 
probability of choosing neighborhoods without apartment buildings by 0.064, 0.062, 
0.133, and 0.121, relatively to loans with a CLTV ratio less than 0.85.  Loans with a 
CLTV ratio between 0.85 and 0.90 are expected to increase the probability of choosing 




greater than 1.10 are expected to increase the probability of choosing neighborhoods 
without parking lots and stores within 15 minutes by 0.115 and 0.157.  If the PTI ratio 
variable is omitted from the model, the magnitudes of CLTV ratio dummies generally 
increase. 
Results of the HMDA and ACS data analyses show that high-leverage loans have 
a negative effect on black segregation, while the effect on Hispanic segregation is 
somewhat ambiguous.  The proportion of high-leverage loans in a metropolitan area has a 
statistically significant, negative effect on black segregation both in the 2005-2006 cross-
sectional and the 2005-2007 annual panel data analyses.  The magnitude of this negative 
effect on segregation is substantial compared to those of other variables.  A ten 
percentage-point increase in the proportion of high-leverage loans is associated with a 
0.061 decrease in dissimilarity and a 0.077 decrease in isolation indices, across 
metropolitan areas, and the same increase is associated with a 0.053 decrease in 
dissimilarity and a 0.067 decrease in isolation indices over time.  In the cross-sectional 
analysis, these effects are more pronounced than those of a ten percentage point increase 
in the proportion of non-Hispanic persons younger than 45 and a $20,000 decrease in 
median household income gap among non-Hispanic whites and blacks.  In the fixed-
effects estimation, the effect on dissimilarity is larger than that of a ten percentage-point 
increase in the proportion of houses built in 2000 or later, and the effect on isolation is 
greater than that of the effect of a $30,000 increase in the median household income of 
non-Hispanic whites. 
In the case of Hispanic segregation, the results of the 2005-2006 cross-sectional 




loans has a negative effect on dissimilarity index between Hispanics and non-Hispanic 
whites in both cases, but is only statistically significant in the cross-sectional result.  The 
results on the Hispanics’ isolation index are more unexpected.  In the 2005-2006 cross-
sectional analysis, the effect of the proportion of high-leverage loans is statistically not 
significant, but with the expected negative sign.  In the fixed effects estimation, the effect 
is a statistically significant and positive.  Therefore, the hypothesized desegregating 
effect does not appear evident among Hispanics.  Based on the fixed effects estimate, 
which is considered to be better way to establish the causal relationship, in the 2005-2007 
period, the high-leverage loans seemed to help Hispanic borrowers to purchase homes in 
more isolated ethnic communities.  This result might result from the difference between 
black and Hispanic preference for neighborhood racial/ethnic composition and the large 
proportion of immigrants among Hispanics.  Although this can be attributed to the 
Hispanics’ preference for ethnic enclave or community and the higher proportion of 
recent-immigrants in the Hispanic community, further research on the Hispanic 
segregation tendency is needed to confirm the causes of this result. 
There are several ways to improve future research on the effect of high-leverage 
loans on neighborhood attainment and racial segregation.  Neighborhood qualities models 
do not perform as well as the housing demand models in this dissertation.  There are 
more objective measures of neighborhood qualities such income, housing unit 
characteristics, and other socioeconomic characteristics in the decennial census and the 
ACS data.  The access to this data requires the permission from the regional census data 
centers.  The estimation of similar models with census tract level neighborhood quality 




to the industry data on loan characteristics could provide more accurate information on 
high-leverage loans in the segregation models, although these data are not likely to cover 
a large set of metropolitan areas very well or very consistently.  The difference between 
black and Hispanic segregation models raise questions about the Hispanics’ preference 
for neighborhood racial/ethnic composition.  The research on this preference for both 
assimilated Hispanics and immigrant Hispanics would help us to understand whether the 




After the mortgage market collapse, mortgage underwriting criteria once again 
became more stringent.  Given the high default and foreclosure rates in the market, this 
reaction was understandable.  At the same time, stringent underwriting criteria, especially 
lower LTV and PTI ratios, will limit credit access for lower-income, minority households 
and thus limit both their opportunity to purchase homes and the choice of neighborhoods 
in which they can buy.  More specifically, these stringent standards may reduce the 
opportunity to mitigate racial and ethnic segregation, which has been viewed as an 
undesirable spatial structure of the metropolitan housing market for a long time.  Since 
both mortgage market stability and the potential benefits of homeownership – along with 
the mobility provided by the ability to purchase large homes – are important, 
policymakers should give careful consideration to the balance between the costs and 
benefits of the lower LTV and PTI ratios. 




future will affect the availability of high-leverage loans.  Although the FHA has insured 
high-leverage loans for a long time, the volume of these loans only is likely to have 
limited impact.  Also, GSEs have purchased loans for “underserved” households and 
communities since the mid-1990s; now they no longer do this since the crisis.  It is 
difficult to know the future of the mortgage finance system at this time, but the enhanced 
role of the government involvement in mortgage finance markets seems unlikely post-
crisis long-term change owing to the past taxpayer bailout of GSEs and the recently 
elevated chance of bailout of the FHA.  The two most direct and proximate examples are 
those concerning the definitions of the “qualified residential mortgage” and the “qualified 
mortgage,” definitions that are crucial elements of major new regulatory initiatives 
developed in response to the foreclosure crisis. 
The CFPB recently released the final rules on qualified mortgages, and 
supervisors of financial institutions are finalizing rules on qualified residential mortgages 
to require mortgage lenders to consider consumers’ ability to repay their home loans at 
the time of origination.  If lenders follow the rules on qualified mortgages, they can argue 
that they considered the consumers’ ability to repay in any future lawsuits.  While the 
rules on qualified mortgages are applied to all residential mortgages, the rules on 
qualified residential mortgages are applied only to privately-securitized residential 
mortgages.  The loans meeting the standards for qualified residential mortgages are 
exempted from the requirements for securitizers of asset-backed securities to retain not 
less than five percent of the credit risk of the assets collateralizing the ABS.  Thus, the 
cost of providing qualified residential mortgages through private securitization will be 




advocates are all concerned about the ability of these rules to balance the goals of 
reducing default risk and of providing credit to a wider range of households. 
The rules on qualified mortgages are aimed at restricting predatory or default risk-
inducing features without benefiting borrowers.  In the final rules, stated-income and/or 
stated-assets loans cannot be considered qualified mortgages and loans with negative 
amortization, interest-only payments, balloon payments, or terms more than 30 years 
generally cannot be qualified mortgages.  These rules require that the monthly payments 
should be calculated on the highest payment in the first five years and that total payment-
to-income or back-end debt-to-income ratio should not be more than 43 percent, which is 
neither too restrictive nor too lenient.  The qualified mortgage rules appear to reasonably 
restrict the risks without excessively excluding low-income, minority borrowers.  The 
proposed rules on qualified residential mortgages, however, include more stringent 
criteria on PTI and LTV:  a PTI ratio and total debt-to-income ratio not more than 28 and 
36 percent respectively, and a LTV ratio not more than 80 percent.  If these rules are 
finalized, the flow of mortgage capital to low-income and/or wealth-constrained, minority 
borrowers is likely to be restricted, and consequently the opportunities for 
homeownership, access to better neighborhoods, and  reduced racial/ethnic segregation 
are also likely to be restricted. 
These rules are opposed by both industry advocates and affordable housing 
advocates.  Holtz-Eakin et al. (2012), who represent a conservative, right-leaning 
perspective, argue that the tight rules may undermine mortgage finance and housing 
markets, and consequently the U.S. economy.  They examined the impact of the 




on the mortgage and housing markets and estimated about a 14 to 20 percent reduction in 
mortgage originations and a 9 to 13 percent reduction in home sales due to the stringent 
criteria.   Quercia et al. (2012), with the more left-leaning Center for Community Capital, 
argue that the stricter rules on qualified residential mortgages on top of the rules on 
qualified mortgages will not provide sufficient benefits of reduced default risk to justify 
the reduced access to affordable mortgage credits.  They examined reduced defaults, 
reduced foreclosures, and borrowers excluded under qualified residential mortgages rules 
in light of industry data.  They found that the 80 percent LTV requirement in addition to 
the qualified mortgage rules would exclude ten otherwise performing loans to prevent 
one foreclosure.  Similarly, they found that a 36% total debt-to-income ratio would 
exclude ten otherwise performing loans to prevent one foreclosure.  In addition, the 
combination of an LTV ratio of 80 and a total debt-to-income ratio of 30 would exclude, 
respectively, about 93 and 91 percent of black and Hispanic borrowers with performing 
loans.  Thus, these two studies coming from opposing ideological backgrounds express 
similar concerns about the stringent LTV and PTI ratios of the qualified residential 
mortgages rules. 
The results of this dissertation suggest that policymakers should consider the 
impacts of regulations effecting allowable LTV and PTI ratios on borrowers’ residential 
choices and urban form, as well as on default risk.  The qualified mortgage rules are 
likely to restrict most predatory features of past subprime loans, but the more careful 
approach taken by lenders, affordable housing advocates, and various levels of 
governments strengthen the argument for less stringent underwriting criteria.  




valuable lessons.  Quercia and his colleagues (2011) compared the performance of 
community reinvestment mortgages with that of subprime mortgages among similarly 
situated borrowers.  The community reinvestment mortgages in the study share the same 
high LTV ratios as subprime loans, but contain different product features.  Notably, these 
loans do not include predatory features such as prepayment penalties, balloon payments, 
or adjustable interest rates.  They found that responsibly originated loans with the same 
high LTV ratios performed substantially better than subprime loans.  The default rates of 
these community reinvestment mortgages were not only lower than those of subprime 
loans, but also lower than those of prime loans with adjustable interest rates.  The 
performance of this high-leverage, community reinvestment loans can be attributed to the 
use of a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage without complicated, predatory features, as well as 
the use of pre-purchase counseling, reserves, the avoidance of mortgage brokers whose 
incentives are tied to the volume and interest-rate of the loans, and responsive servicing 
when borrowers encounter repayment difficulties.  Thus, in addition to the final rules on 
originating qualified mortgages, regulations should also govern the participating agents in 
the mortgage origination and service process, such as mortgage brokers and loan 
servicers.  Further, the response to the subprime crisis should not have the result of 
discouraging the various small mortgage assistance or service programs of local 
governments, housing finance agencies, and nonprofit organizations. 
Local governments, together with non-profit organizations, have supported low- 
and moderate-income homebuyers through low-interest mortgages, down payment 
subsidies, and home purchase counseling.  These efforts have funded by federal block 




partnership program (HOME), state tax-exempt bond financing and state or local housing 
trust funds.  However, most local government housing programs are eligible residents 
who purchase a home within that locality.  If the locality is already highly racially-
segregated, this programs’ effect on racial segregation would be minimal.  Thus, regional 
approaches for home purchase assistance should be encouraged.  If metropolitan area 
level coordination is difficult to achieve, at least county level coordination would be 
beneficial.  Even if a regional approach is pursued, the appropriate, affordable housing 
units should be available in the white-dominant localities.  Thus, the barrier of 
exclusionary zoning also should be overcome. 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) can provide home 
purchase program across jurisdiction if funds come from state or other non-local sources.  
The case of  the Self-Help Credit Union in North Carolina can demonstrate how a CDFI 
can implement a fairly large-scale home purchase program using high-leverage loans in a 
responsible manner (Quercia, et al., 2011).  First, Self-Help purchased high-leverage 
loans to low- and moderate-income families from Wachovia Bank.  Confirming the good 
performance of these loans, they started a loan guarantee program funded by the Ford 
Foundation with help of Fannie Mae.  Owing to this guarantee, Fannie Mae purchased 
and securitized their high-leverage loans and sold these securities or held them in its 
portfolio.  The result was good loan performance and homeownership for 46,000 
families.  Even if other CDFIs cannot follow this model, demonstrating good 
performance of high-leverage loans to low- and moderate-income families with careful 
underwriting practices and homeowner counseling will help these kinds of loans to be 




institutions, with the cooperation among them, can help low- and moderate-income, 
minority families move to better neighborhoods and live in less segregated environments. 
So far, the potential impact of mortgage finance on metropolitan areas’ spatial 
pattern such as racial segregation has been mentioned neither in the debate on specific 
rule making nor that on the future of mortgage markets.  Since a majority of households 
should rely on mortgages to buy homes, it is not difficult to think that the mortgage 
market change affect the spatial patterns.  The most well-known example of this impact 
would probably be the FHA’s role in contributing suburbanization and racial segregation 
(Immergluck, 2004; Jackson, 1987; Massey & Denton, 1993).  The preference of the 
FHA, a major mortgage insurer at the time, for new purchase loans of single-family 
houses in newer, large scale, suburban developments is often attributed to encourage 
suburbanization and facilitate decline of inner city neighborhoods.  They did not intend to 
facilitate the specific form of metropolitan areas, but just provided the insurances for 
loans in places where they judge to be safer.  Now, knowing the impact of mortgage 
market policy and industry practice on the metropolitan structure in the past, we should 
consider not only financial market stability but also non-spatial impact on minority 











Table 33 Model of No Townhouses or Rowhouses 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -3.717 - - 1.431 0.2317 
 
0.179 - - 0.004 0.9527 
LN_ZINC_07 0.760 2.137 0.103 30.706 <.0001 
 
0.183 1.201 0.025 3.288 0.0698 
LN_HP_07 -0.750 0.472 -0.101 1.712 0.1907 
 
-0.246 0.782 -0.034 0.192 0.6616 
PER 0.229 1.257 0.031 22.380 <.0001 
 
0.265 1.303 0.037 30.518 <.0001 
HHAGE 0.001 1.001 0.000 0.033 0.8566 
 
0.002 1.002 0.000 0.149 0.6999 
MARRIED 0.146 1.157 0.020 0.976 0.3233 
 
0.166 1.181 0.023 1.281 0.2577 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.244 0.784 -0.035 2.661 0.1029 
 
-0.244 0.784 -0.036 2.709 0.0998 
HIGH -0.417 0.659 -0.050 2.886 0.0894 
 
-0.368 0.692 -0.046 2.291 0.1301 
BACH -0.686 0.503 -0.088 6.826 0.0090 
 
-0.573 0.564 -0.075 4.896 0.0269 
PGRAD -0.672 0.510 -0.086 5.768 0.0163 
 
-0.551 0.577 -0.072 3.981 0.0460 
BLACK 0.259 1.296 0.033 1.809 0.1786 
 
0.145 1.156 0.019 0.591 0.4421 
HISPANIC 0.116 1.122 0.015 0.445 0.5046 
 
0.108 1.114 0.015 0.399 0.5275 
ASIAN -0.609 0.544 -0.091 8.443 0.0037 
 
-0.607 0.545 -0.092 8.554 0.0034 
OTHERS -0.945 0.389 -0.147 3.734 0.0533 
 
-0.937 0.392 -0.148 3.809 0.0510 
INTEREST_07 -0.027 0.974 -0.004 0.426 0.5141 
 
0.011 1.011 0.001 0.070 0.7910 
TERM 0.008 1.008 0.001 0.587 0.4434 
 
0.007 1.007 0.001 0.517 0.4720 
GOV -0.120 0.887 -0.016 0.899 0.3431 
 
-0.110 0.896 -0.015 0.765 0.3817 
ARM_DUM 0.080 1.083 0.011 0.148 0.7009 
 
0.100 1.105 0.014 0.236 0.6272 
DOWNPAY_07 0.008 1.008 0.001 5.013 0.0252 
 
0.009 1.009 0.001 6.992 0.0082 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 2.098 0.1475 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 4.729 0.0297 
CLTV_85_90 0.280 1.323 0.038 1.549 0.2132 
 
0.503 1.653 0.070 5.200 0.0226 
CLTV_90_95 0.316 1.372 0.043 2.241 0.1344 
 
0.550 1.733 0.076 7.127 0.0076 
CLTV_95_100 0.250 1.284 0.034 1.203 0.2727 
 
0.418 1.519 0.059 3.488 0.0618 
CLTV_100_105 0.180 1.197 0.025 0.590 0.4424 
 
0.377 1.457 0.054 2.679 0.1017 
CLTV_105_110 0.462 1.586 0.061 0.871 0.3508 
 
0.599 1.821 0.082 1.516 0.2182 
CLTV_GT_110 0.813 2.255 0.100 1.981 0.1593 
 
1.193 3.297 0.145 4.297 0.0382 
PTI 4.090 59.724 0.553 40.112 <.0001 
      
WHEN -0.100 0.905 -0.013 4.912 0.0267 
 
-0.083 0.045 -0.011 3.449 0.0633 
            
-2 Log L 2463.159 
     
2505.387 
    
LR Chi 662.679 <.0001 
    
620.450 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 591.145 <.0001 
    
551.797 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.307 
     
0.290 
    
N 2964 
     
2964 





Table 34 Model of No Apartment Buildings 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -4.704 - - 2.445 0.1179 
 
-0.661 - - 0.052 0.8201 
LN_ZINC_07 1.035 2.8150 0.140 53.295 <.0001 
 
0.421 1.523 0.058 16.709 <.0001 
LN_HP_07 -1.277 0.2790 -0.173 5.343 0.0208 
 
-0.710 0.492 -0.098 1.742 0.1869 
PER 0.144 1.1540 0.020 10.551 0.0012 
 
0.177 1.194 0.025 16.169 <.0001 
HHAGE 0.011 1.0110 0.002 5.532 0.0187 
 
0.012 1.012 0.002 6.190 0.0128 
MARRIED 0.278 1.3210 0.038 3.722 0.0537 
 
0.317 1.372 0.044 4.924 0.0265 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.108 0.898 -0.016 0.544 0.4606 
 
-0.116 0.891 -0.017 0.642 0.4229 
HIGH 0.369 1.446 0.050 3.347 0.0673 
 
0.429 1.536 0.061 4.624 0.0315 
BACH 0.067 1.069 0.010 0.090 0.7642 
 
0.182 1.200 0.027 0.683 0.4085 
PGRAD -0.114 0.892 -0.017 0.216 0.6420 
 
0.021 1.021 0.003 0.008 0.9303 
BLACK 0.304 1.356 0.039 2.483 0.1151 
 
0.187 1.205 0.025 0.971 0.3244 
HISPANIC -0.112 0.894 -0.016 0.482 0.4877 
 
-0.106 0.899 -0.015 0.440 0.5071 
ASIAN -0.282 0.754 -0.040 1.691 0.1935 
 
-0.298 0.742 -0.044 1.922 0.1656 
OTHERS 0.459 1.583 0.056 0.623 0.4299 
 
0.430 1.537 0.054 0.568 0.4510 
INTEREST_07 -0.091 0.913 -0.012 5.219 0.0223 
 
-0.053 0.948 -0.007 1.850 0.1738 
TERM 0.005 1.005 0.001 0.247 0.6191 
 
0.004 1.004 0.001 0.147 0.7013 
GOV -0.175 0.839 -0.024 2.000 0.1573 
 
-0.157 0.855 -0.022 1.627 0.2021 
ARM_DUM 0.035 1.036 0.005 0.031 0.8606 
 
0.057 1.059 0.008 0.083 0.7732 
DOWNPAY_07 0.009 1.009 0.001 5.750 0.0165 
 
0.010 1.010 0.001 7.786 0.0053 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.542 0.4617 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 2.074 0.1498 
CLTV_85_90 0.226 1.254 0.033 1.020 0.3126 
 
0.425 1.530 0.063 3.770 0.0522 
CLTV_90_95 0.463 1.589 0.064 4.678 0.0306 
 
0.678 1.969 0.095 10.544 0.0012 
CLTV_95_100 0.250 1.284 0.036 1.222 0.2690 
 
0.422 1.525 0.062 3.637 0.0565 
CLTV_100_105 0.451 1.569 0.062 3.731 0.0534 
 
0.632 1.882 0.090 7.688 0.0056 
CLTV_105_110 1.114 3.047 0.133 4.285 0.0385 
 
1.295 3.651 0.159 5.877 0.0153 
CLTV_GT_110 0.980 2.664 0.121 3.463 0.0627 
 
1.308 3.699 0.161 6.350 0.0117 
PTI 4.134 62.426 0.561 42.204 <.0001 
      
WHEN -0.081 0.922 -0.011 3.566 0.0590 
 
-0.067 0.935 -0.009 2.472 0.1159 
            
-2 Log L 2519.491 
     
2564.385 
    
LR Chi 583.020 <.0001 
    
538.126 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 540.460 <.0001 
    
502.430 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.275 
     
0.255 
    
N 2979 
     
2979 




Table 35 Model of No Business or Institutions 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -1.099 - - 0.157 0.6922 
 
0.835 - - 0.095 0.7580 
LN_ZINC_07 0.506 1.659 0.081 15.813 <.0001 
 
0.222 1.249 0.036 5.467 0.0194 
LN_HP_07 -0.680 0.507 -0.109 1.793 0.1806 
 
-0.429 0.651 -0.069 0.736 0.3911 
PER 0.084 1.088 0.014 4.681 0.0305 
 
0.097 1.102 0.016 6.278 0.0122 
HHAGE 0.002 1.002 0.000 0.135 0.7130 
 
0.002 1.002 0.000 0.194 0.6595 
MARRIED 0.414 1.512 0.068 9.761 0.0018 
 
0.437 1.548 0.072 10.982 0.0009 
FEMALE_HEAD 0.093 1.097 0.016 0.458 0.4985 
 
0.092 1.096 0.016 0.448 0.5031 
HIGH 0.012 1.012 0.002 0.004 0.9497 
 
0.038 1.039 0.006 0.041 0.8395 
BACH -0.047 0.954 -0.008 0.049 0.8249 
 
0.006 1.006 0.001 0.001 0.9783 
PGRAD 0.095 1.100 0.015 0.168 0.6820 
 
0.157 1.170 0.025 0.461 0.4970 
BLACK -0.543 0.581 -0.094 11.427 0.0007 
 
-0.593 0.553 -0.104 13.833 0.0002 
HISPANIC -0.127 0.881 -0.020 0.695 0.4045 
 
-0.120 0.887 -0.019 0.624 0.4297 
ASIAN -0.271 0.763 -0.045 1.570 0.2103 
 
-0.278 0.758 -0.046 1.655 0.1982 
OTHERS 0.581 1.788 0.079 1.074 0.3000 
 
0.572 1.772 0.078 1.047 0.3062 
INTEREST_07 -0.103 0.902 -0.017 8.285 0.0040 
 
-0.086 0.917 -0.014 5.922 0.0150 
TERM 0.002 1.002 0.000 0.047 0.8288 
 
0.002 1.002 0.000 0.032 0.8581 
GOV 0.038 1.039 0.006 0.111 0.7394 
 
0.046 1.047 0.007 0.163 0.6865 
ARM_DUM 0.038 1.038 0.006 0.040 0.8414 
 
0.049 1.050 0.008 0.069 0.7935 
DOWNPAY_07 0.005 1.005 0.001 1.776 0.1827 
 
0.005 1.005 0.001 2.294 0.1299 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.122 0.7271 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.439 0.5079 
CLTV_85_90 0.548 1.730 0.082 6.138 0.0132 
 
0.647 1.909 0.098 8.739 0.0031 
CLTV_90_95 0.214 1.239 0.035 1.198 0.2738 
 
0.323 1.382 0.052 2.820 0.0931 
CLTV_95_100 -0.002 0.998 0.000 0.000 0.9926 
 
0.080 1.083 0.013 0.146 0.7027 
CLTV_100_105 0.128 1.137 0.021 0.359 0.5493 
 
0.212 1.236 0.035 0.998 0.3178 
CLTV_105_110 0.262 1.300 0.042 0.338 0.5613 
 
0.339 1.403 0.055 0.568 0.4509 
CLTV_GT_110 0.551 1.735 0.083 1.342 0.2467 
 
0.682 1.977 0.102 2.076 0.1496 
PTI 1.949 7.025 0.313 11.356 0.0008 
      
WHEN -0.065 0.937 -0.010 2.898 0.0887 
 
-0.059 0.943 -0.009 2.344 0.1258 
            
-2 Log L 2902.999 
     
2914.557 
    
LR Chi 399.308 <.0001 
    
387.749 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 362.803 <.0001 
    
353.196 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.187 
     
0.182 
    
N 2980 
     
2980 




Table 36 Model of Open Spaces 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -5.397 - - 4.285 0.0384 
 
-4.746 - - 3.444 0.0635 
LN_ZINC_07 0.231 1.260 0.045 4.312 0.0379 
 
0.138 1.148 0.027 2.723 0.0989 
LN_HP_07 0.314 1.369 0.061 0.438 0.5081 
 
0.393 1.481 0.077 0.696 0.4040 
PER -0.052 0.950 -0.010 2.128 0.1447 
 
-0.047 0.954 -0.009 1.766 0.1839 
HHAGE 0.004 1.004 0.001 0.950 0.3297 
 
0.004 1.004 0.001 1.031 0.3100 
MARRIED 0.138 1.148 0.027 1.215 0.2703 
 
0.144 1.155 0.028 1.327 0.2493 
FEMALE_HEAD 0.063 1.065 0.012 0.215 0.6431 
 
0.064 1.066 0.012 0.226 0.6343 
HIGH 0.148 1.159 0.027 0.639 0.4241 
 
0.159 1.172 0.029 0.741 0.3895 
BACH 0.370 1.448 0.071 3.423 0.0643 
 
0.390 1.477 0.075 3.827 0.0504 
PGRAD 0.313 1.368 0.060 2.085 0.1487 
 
0.336 1.399 0.064 2.414 0.1202 
BLACK -0.020 0.981 -0.004 0.015 0.9013 
 
-0.036 0.965 -0.007 0.051 0.8212 
HISPANIC 0.044 1.045 0.009 0.098 0.7546 
 
0.047 1.048 0.009 0.111 0.7386 
ASIAN 0.004 1.004 0.001 0.001 0.9823 
 
0.005 1.005 0.001 0.001 0.9783 
OTHERS 0.195 1.216 0.039 0.194 0.6598 
 
0.196 1.217 0.039 0.196 0.6584 
INTEREST_07 0.020 1.020 0.004 0.330 0.5657 
 
0.025 1.025 0.005 0.556 0.4558 
TERM -0.011 0.989 -0.002 1.759 0.1847 
 
-0.011 0.989 -0.002 1.866 0.1720 
GOV 0.053 1.055 0.010 0.262 0.6087 
 
0.054 1.056 0.011 0.270 0.6034 
ARM_DUM 0.208 1.231 0.042 1.602 0.2056 
 
0.212 1.236 0.042 1.666 0.1967 
DOWNPAY_07 0.003 1.003 0.001 0.980 0.3222 
 
0.003 1.003 0.001 1.182 0.2770 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.505 0.4773 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.741 0.3895 
CLTV_85_90 0.074 1.077 0.014 0.160 0.6892 
 
0.110 1.116 0.021 0.364 0.5464 
CLTV_90_95 -0.115 0.891 -0.021 0.387 0.5341 
 
-0.078 0.925 -0.014 0.182 0.6700 
CLTV_95_100 0.242 1.274 0.047 1.537 0.2150 
 
0.270 1.310 0.053 1.936 0.1641 
CLTV_100_105 0.304 1.355 0.060 2.321 0.1277 
 
0.335 1.399 0.066 2.875 0.0900 
CLTV_105_110 -0.103 0.902 -0.019 0.056 0.8127 
 
-0.071 0.932 -0.013 0.026 0.8709 
CLTV_GT_110 0.310 1.364 0.061 0.524 0.4693 
 
0.365 1.440 0.072 0.731 0.3925 
PTI 0.676 1.966 0.132 1.621 0.2030 
      
WHEN 0.014 1.014 0.003 0.153 0.6959 
 
0.016 1.016 0.003 0.211 0.6461 
            
-2 Log L 3401.878 
     
3403.495 
    
LR Chi 264.121 <.0001 
    
262.504 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 239.118 0.0003 
    
237.585 0.0003 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.120 
     
0.119 
    
N 2978 
     
2978 




Table 37 Model of No Abandoned Buildings 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept 5.252 - - 0.000 0.9897 
 
7.336 - - 0.000 0.9858 
LN_ZINC_07 0.812 2.252 0.024 7.140 0.0075 
 
0.470 1.599 0.014 4.315 0.0378 
LN_HP_07 -0.086 0.918 -0.003 0.006 0.9407 
 
0.298 1.347 0.009 0.070 0.7913 
PER 0.168 1.183 0.005 3.018 0.0823 
 
0.177 1.194 0.005 3.357 0.0669 
HHAGE 0.012 1.012 0.000 1.169 0.2796 
 
0.012 1.012 0.000 1.169 0.2796 
MARRIED 0.106 1.112 0.003 0.112 0.7381 
 
0.172 1.188 0.005 0.298 0.5850 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.016 0.984 0.000 0.003 0.9585 
 
-0.007 0.993 0.000 0.001 0.9818 
HIGH -0.149 0.861 -0.005 0.106 0.7449 
 
-0.095 0.910 -0.003 0.043 0.8350 
BACH 0.246 1.279 0.007 0.218 0.6403 
 
0.336 1.400 0.009 0.420 0.5172 
PGRAD -0.042 0.959 -0.001 0.006 0.9407 
 
0.062 1.064 0.002 0.013 0.9110 
BLACK -1.439 0.237 -0.062 21.910 <.0001 
 
-1.477 0.228 -0.065 23.704 <.0001 
HISPANIC -0.401 0.670 -0.011 1.159 0.2817 
 
-0.403 0.668 -0.011 1.165 0.2804 
ASIAN -0.427 0.653 -0.012 0.639 0.4240 
 
-0.451 0.637 -0.013 0.714 0.3981 
OTHERS -0.393 0.675 -0.011 0.129 0.7200 
 
-0.393 0.675 -0.011 0.129 0.7190 
INTEREST_07 -0.168 0.845 -0.005 5.470 0.0193 
 
-0.156 0.855 -0.005 4.764 0.0291 
TERM 0.039 1.039 0.001 4.191 0.0407 
 
0.036 1.036 0.001 3.625 0.0569 
GOV 0.197 1.217 0.006 0.543 0.4611 
 
0.215 1.240 0.006 0.654 0.4188 
ARM_DUM -0.489 0.613 -0.017 1.629 0.2018 
 
-0.479 0.619 -0.017 1.572 0.2100 
DOWNPAY_07 0.007 1.007 0.000 0.706 0.4008 
 
0.007 1.007 0.000 0.732 0.3922 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.093 0.7605 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.144 0.7047 
CLTV_85_90 0.924 2.519 0.022 2.439 0.1184 
 
1.009 2.743 0.025 2.942 0.0863 
CLTV_90_95 0.041 1.042 0.001 0.009 0.9251 
 
0.166 1.181 0.006 0.147 0.7010 
CLTV_95_100 -0.013 0.987 0.000 0.001 0.9767 
 
0.063 1.065 0.002 0.019 0.8893 
CLTV_100_105 0.384 1.468 0.011 0.690 0.4060 
 
0.437 1.548 0.013 0.900 0.3428 
CLTV_105_110 -0.209 0.811 -0.008 0.046 0.8299 
 
-0.138 0.871 -0.005 0.020 0.8868 
CLTV_GT_110 0.048 1.050 0.002 0.003 0.9592 
 
0.155 1.167 0.005 0.027 0.8699 
PTI 2.230 9.295 0.067 2.788 0.0950 
      
WHEN -0.099 0.906 -0.003 1.574 0.2096 
 
-0.098 0.907 -0.003 1.556 0.2123 
            
-2 Log L 693.700 
     
696.563 
    
LR Chi 201.244 0.0408 
    
198.381 0.0489 
   
Score Chi 211.940 0.0122 
    
209.497 0.0143 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.252 
     
0.248 
    
N 2971 
     
2971 




Table 38 Model of No Buildings with Bars on Windows 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept 8.305 - - 0.000 0.9823 
 
10.668 - - 0.001 0.9788 
LN_ZINC_07 0.652 1.920 0.043 10.150 0.0014 
 
0.329 1.389 0.022 4.816 0.0282 
LN_HP_07 -0.022 0.979 -0.001 0.001 0.9775 
 
0.280 1.323 0.019 0.139 0.7097 
PER -0.041 0.960 -0.003 0.549 0.4587 
 
-0.028 0.972 -0.002 0.267 0.6057 
HHAGE 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.002 0.9685 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.001 0.9801 
MARRIED 0.121 1.128 0.008 0.327 0.5674 
 
0.169 1.184 0.012 0.653 0.4189 
FEMALE_HEAD 0.108 1.114 0.007 0.218 0.6403 
 
0.112 1.118 0.008 0.234 0.6286 
HIGH 0.097 1.102 0.006 0.122 0.7267 
 
0.130 1.139 0.009 0.221 0.6385 
BACH 0.044 1.045 0.003 0.018 0.8929 
 
0.095 1.099 0.006 0.086 0.7695 
PGRAD -0.437 0.646 -0.032 1.578 0.2091 
 
-0.369 0.691 -0.028 1.143 0.2850 
BLACK -0.660 0.517 -0.051 6.908 0.0086 
 
-0.681 0.506 -0.053 7.430 0.0064 
HISPANIC 0.075 1.078 0.005 0.119 0.7305 
 
0.073 1.076 0.005 0.114 0.7352 
ASIAN 0.182 1.199 0.011 0.287 0.5921 
 
0.142 1.152 0.009 0.177 0.6743 
OTHERS -0.733 0.480 -0.057 0.963 0.3264 
 
-0.717 0.488 -0.056 0.932 0.3344 
INTEREST_07 -0.112 0.894 -0.007 4.360 0.0368 
 
-0.097 0.908 -0.006 3.304 0.0691 
TERM -0.002 0.998 -0.000 0.016 0.9010 
 
-0.004 0.996 0.000 0.059 0.8088 
GOV -0.029 0.972 -0.002 0.025 0.8740 
 
-0.029 0.971 -0.002 0.026 0.8732 
ARM_DUM 0.046 1.047 0.003 0.027 0.8708 
 
0.049 1.050 0.003 0.030 0.8631 
DOWNPAY_07 0.004 1.004 0.000 0.524 0.4692 
 
0.004 1.004 0.000 0.493 0.4827 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.010 0.9206 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.9897 
CLTV_85_90 0.557 1.745 0.033 2.287 0.1305 
 
0.665 1.945 0.040 3.324 0.0683 
CLTV_90_95 0.497 1.644 0.030 2.270 0.1319 
 
0.603 1.827 0.037 3.407 0.0649 
CLTV_95_100 0.121 1.129 0.008 0.125 0.7242 
 
0.202 1.224 0.014 0.352 0.5532 
CLTV_100_105 -0.088 0.916 -0.006 0.068 0.7937 
 
-0.015 0.985 -0.001 0.002 0.9638 
CLTV_105_110 -0.645 0.525 -0.053 0.992 0.3192 
 
-0.541 0.582 -0.044 0.704 0.4014 
CLTV_GT_110 -0.193 0.824 -0.014 0.084 0.7721 
 
-0.098 0.907 -0.007 0.022 0.8832 
PTI 2.121 8.340 0.141 5.415 0.0200 
      
WHEN -0.116 0.890 -0.008 3.026 0.0820 
 
-0.112 0.894 -0.007 2.846 0.0916 
            
-2 Log L 1279.217 
     
1284.73 
    
LR Chi 468.989 <.0001 
    
463.47 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 514.585 <.0001 
    
511.42 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.330 
     
0.33 
    
N 2890 
     
2890 




Table 39 Model of No Trash or Junk 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -5.194 - - 1.218 0.2697 
 
-3.069 - - 0.450 0.5024 
LN_ZINC_07 0.689 1.992 0.040 10.015 0.0016 
 
0.380 1.462 0.022 5.531 0.0187 
LN_HP_07 -0.158 0.854 -0.009 0.033 0.8557 
 
0.123 1.131 0.007 0.021 0.8853 
PER 0.005 1.005 0.000 0.007 0.9315 
 
0.018 1.018 0.001 0.093 0.7600 
HHAGE 0.009 1.009 0.001 1.407 0.2356 
 
0.009 1.009 0.001 1.477 0.2242 
MARRIED 0.283 1.327 0.017 1.615 0.2038 
 
0.322 1.380 0.019 2.106 0.1467 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.009 0.991 -0.001 0.002 0.9666 
 
-0.003 0.997 0.000 0.000 0.9881 
HIGH -0.088 0.916 -0.005 0.080 0.7768 
 
-0.071 0.931 -0.004 0.053 0.8177 
BACH 0.126 1.135 0.007 0.127 0.7213 
 
0.167 1.182 0.009 0.225 0.6354 
PGRAD -0.055 0.946 -0.003 0.021 0.8861 
 
0.004 1.004 0.000 0.000 0.9911 
BLACK -0.289 0.749 -0.019 1.244 0.2647 
 
-0.347 0.707 -0.023 1.826 0.1766 
HISPANIC 0.150 1.162 0.008 0.350 0.5540 
 
0.156 1.169 0.009 0.380 0.5374 
ASIAN 0.217 1.242 0.012 0.286 0.5926 
 
0.198 1.219 0.011 0.239 0.6251 
OTHERS 0.769 2.157 0.034 0.477 0.4896 
 
0.762 2.141 0.034 0.470 0.4932 
INTEREST_07 -0.026 0.974 -0.002 0.198 0.6563 
 
-0.011 0.989 -0.001 0.033 0.8558 
TERM 0.010 1.010 0.001 0.359 0.5491 
 
0.008 1.008 0.000 0.234 0.6287 
GOV 0.029 1.029 0.002 0.023 0.8786 
 
0.035 1.036 0.002 0.036 0.8494 
ARM_DUM -0.182 0.833 -0.011 0.396 0.5294 
 
-0.184 0.832 -0.011 0.406 0.5239 
DOWNPAY_07 -0.007 0.993 0.000 0.938 0.3327 
 
-0.006 0.994 0.000 0.756 0.3847 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.812 0.1783 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 1.418 0.2338 
CLTV_85_90 0.029 1.029 0.001 0.005 0.9417 
 
0.133 1.142 0.006 0.118 0.7308 
CLTV_90_95 -0.003 0.997 0.000 0.000 0.9927 
 
0.109 1.115 0.005 0.092 0.7620 
CLTV_95_100 -0.755 0.470 -0.046 4.171 0.0411 
 
-0.671 0.511 -0.041 3.359 0.0668 
CLTV_100_105 -0.685 0.504 -0.040 3.171 0.0750 
 
-0.596 0.551 -0.036 2.450 0.1175 
CLTV_105_110 -0.937 0.392 -0.061 1.742 0.1869 
 
-0.859 0.424 -0.057 1.469 0.2255 
CLTV_GT_110 -1.124 0.325 -0.079 2.154 0.1422 
 
-0.998 0.369 -0.070 1.699 0.1925 
PTI 2.106 8.218 0.122 4.460 0.0347 
      
WHEN 0.067 1.069 0.004 0.998 0.3179 
 
0.073 1.076 0.004 1.203 0.2728 
            
-2 Log L 1262.000 
      
1266.571 
   
LR Chi 204.672 0.0283 
     
200.101 0.0410 
  
Score Chi 190.417 0.1134 




      
0.167 
   
N 2979 
      
2979 




Table 40 Model of No Parking Lots 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -7.595 - - 6.369 0.0116 
 
-3.618 - - 1.548 0.2135 
LN_ZINC_07 0.865 2.375 0.122 39.808 <.0001 
 
0.301 1.351 0.043 8.847 0.0029 
LN_HP_07 -0.224 0.799 -0.032 0.170 0.6799 
 
0.236 1.266 0.034 0.196 0.6581 
PER 0.181 1.198 0.026 15.471 <.0001 
 
0.212 1.236 0.030 21.417 <.0001 
HHAGE 0.006 1.006 0.001 1.686 0.1941 
 
0.007 1.007 0.001 1.971 0.1604 
MARRIED 0.271 1.311 0.039 3.687 0.0548 
 
0.305 1.357 0.045 4.760 0.0291 
FEMALE_HEAD 0.027 1.027 0.004 0.035 0.8517 
 
0.026 1.027 0.004 0.035 0.8519 
HIGH -0.140 0.869 -0.018 0.390 0.5321 
 
-0.061 0.941 -0.008 0.076 0.7835 
BACH -0.345 0.708 -0.047 2.002 0.1571 
 
-0.218 0.804 -0.031 0.820 0.3651 
PGRAD -0.486 0.615 -0.069 3.448 0.0633 
 
-0.331 0.718 -0.048 1.659 0.1978 
BLACK 0.287 1.332 0.038 2.344 0.1258 
 
0.167 1.182 0.023 0.825 0.3637 
HISPANIC 0.021 1.021 0.003 0.015 0.9012 
 
0.034 1.035 0.005 0.042 0.8378 
ASIAN -0.324 0.723 -0.049 2.204 0.1377 
 
-0.324 0.724 -0.050 2.229 0.1355 
OTHERS -0.361 0.697 -0.055 0.521 0.4703 
 
-0.366 0.694 -0.057 0.544 0.4609 
INTEREST_07 -0.059 0.943 -0.008 2.398 0.1215 
 
-0.026 0.974 -0.004 0.482 0.4874 
TERM 0.007 1.007 0.001 0.554 0.4567 
 
0.007 1.007 0.001 0.471 0.4923 
GOV 0.095 1.100 0.013 0.592 0.4416 
 
0.111 1.118 0.016 0.819 0.3654 
ARM_DUM 0.010 1.010 0.001 0.003 0.9600 
 
0.025 1.025 0.004 0.016 0.8986 
DOWNPAY_07 0.005 1.005 0.001 1.843 0.1746 
 
0.008 1.008 0.001 3.982 0.0460 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.9897 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.742 0.3892 
CLTV_85_90 0.320 1.377 0.045 2.054 0.1518 
 
0.530 1.699 0.076 5.908 0.0151 
CLTV_90_95 0.255 1.290 0.036 1.454 0.2279 
 
0.489 1.631 0.071 5.712 0.0169 
CLTV_95_100 0.080 1.083 0.012 0.126 0.7222 
 
0.274 1.315 0.042 1.573 0.2098 
CLTV_100_105 0.142 1.152 0.021 0.369 0.5438 
 
0.349 1.418 0.052 2.386 0.1224 
CLTV_105_110 0.435 1.544 0.059 0.801 0.3709 
 
0.624 1.866 0.088 1.692 0.1934 
CLTV_GT_110 0.975 2.650 0.115 2.964 0.0851 
 
1.359 3.893 0.158 5.930 0.0149 
PTI 3.961 52.532 0.560 38.020 <.0001 
      
WHEN -0.111 0.895 -0.016 7.478 0.0062 
 
-0.095 0.909 -0.014 5.580 0.0182 
            
-2 Log L 2611.82 
     
2652.018 
    
LR Chi 411.70 <.0001 
    
371.500 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 367.68 <.0001 
    
330.675 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.20 
     
0.184 
    
N 2980 
     
2980 




Table 41 Model of No Roads Needing Repairs 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -3.794 - - 2.208 0.1373 
 
-2.136 - - 0.735 0.3914 
LN_ZINC_07 0.258 1.295 0.051 5.308 0.0212 
 
0.027 1.028 0.005 0.105 0.7462 
LN_HP_07 0.059 1.060 0.012 0.016 0.9003 
 
0.252 1.286 0.050 0.296 0.5866 
PER -0.039 0.962 -0.008 1.365 0.2427 
 
-0.028 0.972 -0.006 0.701 0.4026 
HHAGE 0.012 1.012 0.002 8.377 0.0038 
 
0.012 1.012 0.002 8.756 0.0031 
MARRIED 0.084 1.087 0.016 0.460 0.4976 
 
0.101 1.106 0.020 0.670 0.4130 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.243 0.785 -0.049 3.406 0.0650 
 
-0.240 0.786 -0.049 3.359 0.0669 
HIGH 0.314 1.368 0.065 3.375 0.0662 
 
0.336 1.400 0.071 3.903 0.0482 
BACH 0.485 1.624 0.099 6.512 0.0107 
 
0.530 1.699 0.108 7.851 0.0051 
PGRAD 0.415 1.515 0.085 3.985 0.0459 
 
0.469 1.599 0.097 5.146 0.0233 
BLACK 0.036 1.037 0.007 0.056 0.8124 
 
-0.007 0.993 -0.001 0.002 0.9617 
HISPANIC 0.036 1.036 0.007 0.065 0.7983 
 
0.042 1.042 0.008 0.089 0.7655 
ASIAN 0.263 1.301 0.050 1.638 0.2006 
 
0.256 1.292 0.049 1.553 0.2127 
OTHERS 1.388 4.007 0.209 6.379 0.0115 
 
1.388 4.005 0.209 6.373 0.0116 
INTEREST_07 -0.061 0.941 -0.012 3.547 0.0597 
 
-0.049 0.952 -0.010 2.308 0.1287 
TERM 0.009 1.009 0.002 1.061 0.3029 
 
0.008 1.008 0.002 0.890 0.3455 
GOV 0.066 1.069 0.013 0.411 0.5214 
 
0.066 1.068 0.013 0.403 0.5254 
ARM_DUM -0.233 0.792 -0.047 2.042 0.1530 
 
-0.224 0.799 -0.046 1.899 0.1682 
DOWNPAY_07 0.002 1.002 0.000 0.303 0.5819 
 
0.002 1.002 0.000 0.553 0.4572 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.054 0.8167 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.317 0.5733 
CLTV_85_90 -0.111 0.895 -0.022 0.352 0.5530 
 
-0.029 0.972 -0.006 0.024 0.8767 
CLTV_90_95 -0.076 0.927 -0.015 0.182 0.6694 
 
0.010 1.010 0.002 0.003 0.9565 
CLTV_95_100 0.073 1.075 0.014 0.140 0.7083 
 
0.139 1.149 0.027 0.521 0.4704 
CLTV_100_105 -0.089 0.915 -0.018 0.208 0.6484 
 
-0.016 0.985 -0.003 0.007 0.9358 
CLTV_105_110 -0.039 0.962 -0.008 0.010 0.9216 
 
0.032 1.032 0.006 0.006 0.9363 
CLTV_GT_110 -0.029 0.972 -0.006 0.005 0.9443 
 
0.089 1.093 0.018 0.048 0.8262 
PTI 1.645 5.183 0.325 9.757 0.0018 
      
WHEN -0.036 0.965 -0.007 1.117 0.2906 
 
-0.031 0.969 -0.006 0.836 0.3604 
            
-2 Log L 3429.906 
     
3439.780 
    
LR Chi 335.263 <.0001 
    
325.389 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 310.305 <.0001 
    
301.267 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.148 
     
0.144 
    
N 2975 
     
2975 




Table 42 Model of High Neighborhood Rating 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept 1.066 - - 0.164 0.6860 
 
3.750 - - 2.128 0.1446 
LN_ZINC_07 0.630 1.877 0.119 28.688 <.0001 
 
0.215 1.240 0.041 6.079 0.0137 
LN_HP_07 1.504 0.222 -0.285 9.920 0.0016 
 
-1.108 0.330 -0.212 5.606 0.0179 
PER -0.048 0.953 -0.009 1.901 0.1679 
 
-0.027 0.973 -0.005 0.625 0.4293 
HHAGE 0.004 1.004 0.001 0.865 0.3525 
 
0.005 1.005 0.001 1.171 0.2792 
MARRIED 0.403 1.496 0.078 10.688 0.0011 
 
0.432 1.541 0.085 12.423 0.0004 
FEMALE_HEAD 0.077 1.080 0.016 0.343 0.5582 
 
0.083 1.087 0.017 0.407 0.5236 
HIGH -0.131 0.877 -0.024 0.517 0.4723 
 
-0.083 0.920 -0.016 0.211 0.6462 
BACH -0.108 0.898 -0.020 0.287 0.5925 
 
-0.020 0.981 -0.004 0.010 0.9217 
PGRAD -0.252 0.778 -0.048 1.312 0.2521 
 
-0.153 0.859 -0.029 0.492 0.4831 
BLACK 0.297 1.346 0.055 3.377 0.0661 
 
0.217 1.242 0.041 1.847 0.1742 
HISPANIC 0.432 1.540 0.078 8.773 0.0031 
 
0.433 1.542 0.079 8.922 0.0028 
ASIAN -0.086 0.918 -0.017 0.197 0.6570 
 
-0.092 0.912 -0.018 0.230 0.6316 
OTHERS -0.005 0.995 -0.001 0.000 0.9915 
 
-0.003 0.997 -0.001 0.000 0.9950 
INTEREST_07 -0.019 0.981 -0.004 0.342 0.5589 
 
0.003 1.003 0.001 0.011 0.9161 
TERM 0.004 1.004 0.001 0.230 0.6317 
 
0.003 1.003 0.001 0.112 0.7382 
GOV -0.067 0.935 -0.013 0.410 0.5219 
 
-0.065 0.937 -0.012 0.389 0.5331 
ARM_DUM 0.044 1.045 0.008 0.067 0.7960 
 
0.056 1.057 0.011 0.108 0.7430 
DOWNPAY_07 0.009 1.009 0.002 7.616 0.0058 
 
0.010 1.010 0.002 9.756 0.0018 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 3.114 0.0776 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 5.744 0.0165 
CLTV_85_90 0.432 1.540 0.076 4.710 0.0300 
 
0.580 1.786 0.104 8.748 0.0031 
CLTV_90_95 -0.223 0.800 -0.044 1.555 0.2124 
 
-0.056 0.945 -0.011 0.103 0.7489 
CLTV_95_100 0.013 1.013 0.002 0.004 0.9476 
 
0.143 1.154 0.028 0.557 0.4555 
CLTV_100_105 0.062 1.064 0.012 0.098 0.7542 
 
0.198 1.219 0.038 1.015 0.3137 
CLTV_105_110 -0.552 0.576 -0.114 1.959 0.1616 
 
-0.408 0.665 -0.085 1.093 0.2958 
CLTV_GT_110 0.559 1.749 0.096 1.658 0.1979 
 
0.796 2.216 0.136 3.380 0.0660 
PTI 2.936 18.834 0.557 28.267 <.0001 
      
WHEN 0.084 1.087 0.016 5.529 0.0187 
 
0.092 1.096 0.018 6.680 0.0097 
            
-2 Log L 3310.908 
     
3339.983 
    
LR Chi 312.866 <.0001 
    
283.791 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 289.636 <.0001 
    
264.386 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.142 
     
0.130 
    
N 2954 
     
2954 




Table 43 Model of Satisfactory Police Protection 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept 3.977 - - 0.000 0.9933 
 
3.507 - - 0.000 0.9947 
LN_ZINC_07 0.491 1.634 0.021 3.739 0.0531 
 
0.594 1.812 0.026 9.766 0.0018 
LN_HP_07 1.255 3.507 0.055 1.464 0.2263 
 
1.157 3.180 0.050 1.270 0.2597 
PER -0.145 0.865 -0.006 5.760 0.0169 
 
-0.149 0.862 -0.007 6.158 0.0131 
HHAGE -0.008 0.993 -0.000 0.771 0.3798 
 
-0.008 0.993 -0.000 0.778 0.3777 
MARRIED 0.124 1.132 0.006 0.228 0.6329 
 
0.119 1.126 0.006 0.212 0.6455 
FEMALE_HEAD 0.377 1.459 0.016 1.553 0.2126 
 
0.382 1.465 0.016 1.592 0.2071 
HIGH 0.311 1.365 0.015 1.049 0.3058 
 
0.296 1.345 0.015 0.960 0.3271 
BACH 0.427 1.533 0.020 1.372 0.2414 
 
0.404 1.498 0.019 1.242 0.2652 
PGRAD 0.478 1.613 0.022 1.330 0.2489 
 
0.453 1.573 0.021 1.205 0.2723 
BLACK -0.061 0.941 -0.003 0.035 0.8522 
 
-0.033 0.968 -0.001 0.010 0.9193 
HISPANIC -0.058 0.944 -0.003 0.044 0.8345 
 
-0.058 0.944 -0.003 0.043 0.8358 
ASIAN -0.100 0.905 -0.004 0.058 0.8097 
 
-0.091 0.913 -0.004 0.049 0.8252 
OTHERS 21.126 >999.999 0.050 0.008 0.9311 
 
23.346 >999.999 0.050 0.003 0.9578 
INTEREST_07 -0.015 0.985 -0.001 0.045 0.8323 
 
-0.020 0.981 -0.001 0.078 0.7803 
TERM 0.004 1.004 0.000 0.059 0.8074 
 
0.005 1.005 0.000 0.071 0.7895 
GOV 0.238 1.269 0.010 1.159 0.2816 
 
0.238 1.269 0.010 1.157 0.2820 
ARM_DUM 0.345 1.413 0.013 0.736 0.3909 
 
0.346 1.413 0.013 0.740 0.3896 
DOWNPAY_07 -0.014 0.986 -0.001 2.254 0.1333 
 
-0.014 0.986 -0.001 2.323 0.1275 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 2.700 0.1003 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 2.839 0.0920 
CLTV_85_90 -0.053 0.949 -0.002 0.013 0.9091 
 
-0.081 0.922 -0.002 0.031 0.8599 
CLTV_90_95 -0.175 0.839 -0.006 0.162 0.6878 
 
-0.212 0.809 -0.007 0.239 0.6248 
CLTV_95_100 -1.095 0.335 -0.052 5.911 0.0150 
 
-1.121 0.326 -0.053 6.254 0.0124 
CLTV_100_105 -0.868 0.420 -0.037 3.373 0.0663 
 
-0.897 0.408 -0.039 3.632 0.0567 
CLTV_105_110 -1.011 0.364 -0.046 1.362 0.2431 
 
-1.043 0.353 -0.048 1.460 0.2270 
CLTV_GT_110 -1.209 0.298 -0.060 1.705 0.1917 
 
-1.250 0.286 -0.062 1.841 0.1748 
PTI -0.655 0.520 -0.028 0.383 0.5360 
      
WHEN -0.043 0.958 -0.002 0.317 0.5735 
 
-0.045 0.957 -0.002 0.338 0.5610 
            
-2 Log L 946.027 
     
946.408 
    
LR Chi 211.656 0.0126 
    
211.275 0.0115 
   
Score Chi 216.686 0.0067 
    
215.676 0.0066 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.214 
     
0.213 
    
N 2904 
     
2904 




Table 44 Model of Neighborhood Stores within 15 Minutes 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -0.405 - - 0.009 0.9241 
 
-3.201 - - 0.590 0.4423 
LN_ZINC_07 -0.425 0.654 -0.041 6.799 0.0091 
 
-0.049 0.952 -0.005 0.171 0.6796 
LN_HP_07 1.063 2.894 0.103 1.790 0.1809 
 
0.790 2.203 0.077 1.003 0.3165 
PER 0.032 1.032 0.003 0.350 0.5539 
 
0.007 1.007 0.001 0.021 0.8863 
HHAGE -0.001 0.999 0.000 0.039 0.8429 
 
-0.001 0.999 0.000 0.046 0.8302 
MARRIED -0.318 0.728 -0.030 2.666 0.1025 
 
-0.321 0.725 -0.030 2.744 0.0976 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.172 0.842 -0.015 0.650 0.4200 
 
-0.179 0.837 -0.016 0.710 0.3993 
HIGH -0.789 0.454 -0.068 5.963 0.0146 
 
-0.818 0.441 -0.069 6.465 0.0110 
BACH -0.451 0.637 -0.035 1.708 0.1912 
 
-0.524 0.592 -0.040 2.327 0.1272 
PGRAD -0.561 0.571 -0.045 2.364 0.1241 
 
-0.656 0.519 -0.053 3.273 0.0704 
BLACK 0.187 1.206 0.017 0.583 0.4452 
 
0.258 1.295 0.023 1.116 0.2908 
HISPANIC -0.147 0.863 -0.015 0.474 0.4914 
 
-0.173 0.841 -0.018 0.667 0.4141 
ASIAN -0.334 0.716 -0.035 1.526 0.2166 
 
-0.338 0.713 -0.036 1.582 0.2085 
OTHERS 0.579 1.784 0.047 0.389 0.5329 
 
0.621 1.860 0.050 0.448 0.5033 
INTEREST_07 0.280 1.323 0.027 25.805 <.0001 
 
0.251 1.286 0.025 21.677 <.0001 
TERM -0.013 0.987 -0.001 1.021 0.3124 
 
-0.011 0.989 -0.001 0.748 0.3872 
GOV 0.073 1.075 0.007 0.220 0.6391 
 
0.085 1.089 0.008 0.299 0.5847 
ARM_DUM -0.331 0.718 -0.035 2.154 0.1422 
 
-0.345 0.708 -0.037 2.352 0.1251 
DOWNPAY_07 -0.014 0.986 -0.001 5.709 0.0169 
 
-0.017 0.983 -0.002 8.162 0.0043 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 1.000 0.000 4.599 0.0320 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 6.932 0.0085 
CLTV_85_90 0.181 1.198 0.015 0.383 0.5358 
 
0.008 1.008 0.001 0.001 0.9787 
CLTV_90_95 -0.068 0.934 -0.006 0.059 0.8083 
 
-0.248 0.781 -0.023 0.814 0.3669 
CLTV_95_100 -0.420 0.657 -0.043 1.905 0.1675 
 
-0.570 0.566 -0.057 3.592 0.0581 
CLTV_100_105 -0.254 0.776 -0.025 0.614 0.4332 
 
-0.433 0.649 -0.042 1.845 0.1744 
CLTV_105_110 0.100 1.106 0.009 0.021 0.8838 
 
-0.104 0.901 -0.009 0.023 0.8785 
CLTV_GT_110 -1.255 0.285 -0.157 3.569 0.0589 
 
-1.521 0.218 -0.194 5.351 0.0207 
PTI -2.806 0.060 -0.273 12.187 0.0005 
      
WHEN 0.270 1.310 0.026 23.335 <.0001 
 
0.253 1.288 0.025 20.807 <.0001 
            
-2 Log L 1797.355 
     
1809.474 
    
LR Chi 351.656 <.0001 
    
339.537 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 340.710 <.0001 
    
330.563 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.221 
     
0.213 
    
N 2788 
     
2788 




Table 45 Model of No Serious Neighborhood Crime 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
 
Coeff. O.R. A.M.E Chi-sq p-value 
Intercept -2.345 - - 0.453 0.5007 
 
0.168 - - 0.002 0.9606 
LN_ZINC_07 0.680 1.974 0.070 18.682 <.0001 
 
0.306 1.358 0.032 6.556 0.0105 
LN_HP_07 -0.568 0.567 -0.058 0.816 0.3662 
 
-0.208 0.812 -0.022 0.114 0.7358 
PER -0.101 0.904 -0.010 5.263 0.0218 
 
-0.085 0.918 -0.009 3.763 0.0524 
HHAGE 0.001 1.001 0.000 0.049 0.8257 
 
0.002 1.002 0.000 0.101 0.7510 
MARRIED 0.180 1.197 0.018 1.131 0.2875 
 
0.223 1.250 0.023 1.754 0.1854 
FEMALE_HEAD -0.104 0.901 -0.012 0.353 0.5526 
 
-0.099 0.906 -0.011 0.318 0.5730 
HIGH 0.098 1.103 0.010 0.160 0.6890 
 
0.136 1.146 0.015 0.314 0.5753 
BACH 0.149 1.161 0.015 0.299 0.5846 
 
0.223 1.249 0.023 0.673 0.4120 
PGRAD -0.119 0.888 -0.013 0.165 0.6842 
 
-0.025 0.976 -0.003 0.007 0.9322 
BLACK -0.352 0.703 -0.044 3.356 0.0670 
 
-0.415 0.660 -0.052 4.757 0.0292 
HISPANIC 0.794 2.213 0.070 14.683 0.0001 
 
0.794 2.211 0.070 14.735 0.0001 
ASIAN 0.692 1.998 0.063 4.967 0.0258 
 
0.649 1.914 0.060 4.419 0.0356 
OTHERS 0.275 1.317 0.028 0.171 0.6792 
 
0.261 1.298 0.027 0.154 0.6944 
INTEREST_07 -0.083 0.920 -0.009 3.581 0.0585 
 
-0.064 0.938 -0.007 2.092 0.1481 
TERM 0.004 1.004 0.000 0.090 0.7642 
 
0.002 1.002 0.000 0.018 0.8921 
GOV 0.107 1.113 0.011 0.558 0.4549 
 
0.119 1.126 0.012 0.688 0.4070 
ARM_DUM 0.153 1.165 0.015 0.420 0.5168 
 
0.140 1.151 0.014 0.359 0.5492 
DOWNPAY_07 0.007 1.007 0.001 3.250 0.0714 
 
0.006 1.006 0.001 3.106 0.0780 
DOWNPAY_07_SQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.031 0.1541 
 
0.000 1.000 0.000 2.578 0.1084 
CLTV_85_90 0.123 1.131 0.013 0.220 0.6391 
 
0.236 1.266 0.024 0.824 0.3639 
CLTV_90_95 0.161 1.175 0.016 0.444 0.5054 
 
0.284 1.329 0.029 1.416 0.2341 
CLTV_95_100 0.049 1.050 0.005 0.038 0.8451 
 
0.123 1.130 0.013 0.242 0.6229 
CLTV_100_105 0.107 1.113 0.011 0.195 0.6592 
 
0.190 1.209 0.020 0.618 0.4319 
CLTV_105_110 -0.182 0.834 -0.021 0.140 0.7086 
 
-0.100 0.905 -0.011 0.042 0.8373 
CLTV_GT_110 0.015 1.015 0.002 0.001 0.9759 
 
0.145 1.157 0.016 0.085 0.7711 
PTI 2.650 14.159 0.273 13.187 0.0003 
      
WHEN -0.029 0.047 -0.003 0.374 0.5407 
 
-0.021 0.979 -0.002 0.204 0.6519 
            
-2 Log L 2020.951 
     
2034.590 
    
LR Chi 277.047 <.0001 
    
263.408 <.0001 
   
Score Chi 256.264 <.0001 
    
245.342 <.0001 
   
Pseudo-R2 0.165 
     
0.158 
    
N 2968 
     
2968 
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